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The World Bank and other multi-lateral donor organisations are increasingly urging 
governments in developing world to engage the private sector under the banner of Public 
Private Partnership to manage their public utility infrastructure and service provision. 
However, the World Bank‘s enthusiasm for this private sector model as a solution to 
developing country infrastructure and financing problems is not the result of compelling 
evidence. This argument that the public sector may not be able to achieve post-contractual 
balance and achieve good supplier balance is tested using data from two case studies in 
Ghana: telecom and water sector under PPP. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken and 
documentary sources collected. The case studies provided evidence that the Ghanaian public 
sector failed to achieve post-contractual balance and good supplier performance.  
 
The study concludes that PPP is not delivering the expected good value for money for the 
public sector and that Ghanaian public officials specifically should be cautious of their 
optimism that they have the ability to develop balance and obtain value for money from the 
private sector partners.   
 
This study fills a gap in transaction cost economics literature that does not consider power as 
relevant in the outcome in business-to-business relationships. It contributes to literature by 
demonstrating that adverse pre-contractual power relation can act as a constraint on the 
public sector to develop post-contractual balance with the private sector. 
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The world is being ushered into new era of partnership arrangements for delivering a variety 
of public services on behalf of governments. A form of partnership that has been receiving a 
great deal of attention in recent years is the Public-Private Partnership (PPP). PPP is a form 
of business arrangements between the state and the private sector entities to deliver public 
goods, services and infrastructure (HM Treasury, 2003b; European Investment Bank, 2007; 
World Bank, 2011).  Notably, most governments in developed and developing countries have 
applied public-private policy in public provision. In its early development especially during 
post-World War period governments in the USA and some Europe countries used the private 
sector to mobilise resources for national constructions. However, PPP initiatives in public 
provision were given a political legitimacy by the then Thatcher administration in the 1980s. 
Under the banner of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)
1
, the UK conservative was able to tap 
into the pool of private finance to provide under-supplied key public infrastructure and 
services in  education, health, transport and defence (The Stationary Office, 2000; Akintoye 
et al., 2003; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Julius, 2008; Oxford Economics, 2008). 
 
There is growing evidence in the literature that suggests that the PPP brings about several 
benefits to the governments.  It is claimed that public sector benefit from access to private 
sector financing, cutting-edge technology, innovation and project management competences. 
                                                          
1
 The term Private Finance Initiative (PFI), though not fundamentally different from PPP, is commonly used to 
refer to private sector initiatives. Under UK PFI arrangements, the private sector finances the project and sells it 
to the public sector. In return the public sector commits itself to make future payments to the private sector over 





More importantly, a greater part of the literature claims that PPP affords the public sector a 
convenience medium to transfer project risk. 
 
In the UK, the confidence of transferring project risk is illustrated by the growing use of 
private finance to fund public infrastructure. Official figures show that by 2003, a total of 570 
PFI contracts had been signed, with an estimated value of £36 billion (OGC, 2003; HM 
Treasury, 2003a). These included 119 health schemes and 239 refurbished schools (HM 
Treasury, 2003b; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). By March 2006, private financed projects 
had been extended to prisons, bridges, hospitals, roads, and military installations with a 
capital value around £50 billion.   
 
In continental Europe, studies indicate that PPP policy in public sector infrastructure 
provision is becoming increasingly popular with Spain establishing itself as the second 
largest market in terms of volume and value. According to an EIB report, by 2006 a total of 
92 public projects had been signed, representing a capital value of almost 200 billion euro 
(European Investment Bank, 2007; Blanc-Blude et al., 2007; Julius, 2008).  
 
In the USA, the PPP model had been used by the Federal government since the 1950s as an 
economic tool for stimulating private investment (Schneider, 1999; Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 
2006). In recent times, sensitive public projects in social works, education, prisons, and 
transport add to the growing list of public services that the Federal government is using the 
private sector to provide. Schrank and Lomax (2005), for example, report that PPP funded 
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projects in the US over the past decade in the transport sector alone are estimated at a value 
of $463.1 billion.  
 
In contemporary times, PPP initiatives have also started to emerge in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
other parts of the developing world as a response to infrastructure gap in public utilities and 
inadequate budgetary funding. At the centre of PPP emergence in Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
over bearing influence of the World Bank. The World Bank is using a broad and diverse set 
of policies including persuasive and coercive funding conditions to force governments 
especially in African countries to introduce drastic public procurement reforms to 
accommodate the private sector in public service delivery. Recent figures show that the 
World Bank, IMF and other multi-lateral lending agencies have increased their financial and 
technical assistance considerably to fund PPP projects. For example, the World Bank 
investment package for PPP projects in developing countries for the next 25 years stands at 
between US$75 billion and US$180 billion (World Bank, 1997, 2003b; Finger and Allouche, 
2002; Smith and Hanson, 2003). According to a more recent report released in 2011, the 
World Bank has spent about US$ 12 billion on various PPP projects in several African and 
Asian countries (World Bank, 2011). 
 
Despite the above-mentioned positive contributions of PPP to national development and its 
increasing appeal among policy makers, multi-lateral funding institutions and governments, 
the implementation of the public-private sector business model comes with much controversy. 
A number of studies demonstrate that the public sector had not been able to transfer risk to 
the private sector and that PPP model has not delivered cost savings as expected (Hartley and 
Parker, 2003; Bovaird, 2004; Lonsdale, 2005a; Lonsdale and Watson, 2007). It is typically 
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argued that it is difficult for UK public sector authorities to negotiate effectively for better 
deals with profit seeking private sector because of risk and uncertainty associated with 
transacting with external third parties over long term contracts (Cox et al, 2001; Lonsdale, 
2005).  
 
However, the controversy over the balance debate in PPP literature, appear to rest on 
prescriptions given by Williamson in his transaction cost framework (1983, 1986). 
Transaction cost economics theory (TCE) which is primarily concerned with how buyers and 
suppliers manage their contract relation to achieve cost efficient outcomes retains the 
confidence that buying organisations have the ability to anticipate risk and craft credible 
commitments to balance risk (Williamson, 1983; 1996). While TCE claims to post-
contractual balance using credible commitments cannot be denied, it has been pointed out 
that there are some factors that may make it practically difficult for the public sector to do so 
successfully. Looking at this issue in more detail, the main factors that are said by some to 
impair the ability of public authorities to achieve contractual balance with their private sector 
partners are two-fold: Pre-contractual power relations (which constrain the ability of public 
authorities to commit the private partner in negotiations to contractual balance (Cox et al., 
2000; Lonsdale, 2005a; 2005b) and the asymmetry in resources and negotiation capabilities 
of the contracting authorities (which can lead to the public authorities being ‗outplayed‘ 
during the negotiations by their private sector partners, which again leads to an unbalanced 
contract (Lonsdale, 2005b; Vigoda and Kapun, 2005; Cook and Aryee, 2006).  
 
In order to investigate the above arguments, this thesis looked at two PPPs companies run by 
the Ghanaian government – Ghana Telecom and Ghana Water Company – aiming at 
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providing new evidence on Lonsdale‘s arguments to contribute to the debate on PPP. To 
facilitate this, and given the complexity of the PPP policy in public procurement management, 
a major consideration is given to alternative theories of TCE, agency, property rights which 
may inform the analysis with the aim of firstly evaluating and extending theory and secondly 
to identify its implications for future PPP practice in Ghana. 
 
This thesis is organised into 9 chapters. In Chapter 1, the author reviews the broader PPP 
literature. This provides the theoretical context to the review of the literature concerning 
bilateral governance and balance in Chapter 2. The main developments of theoretical 
framework for contract management and argument of each approach are reviewed. With that, 
justification was provided for the choice of TCE framework for the research and the chapter 
proceeds to review the literature on general contracting problems and solutions based on 
incentive contracting economics theories. Chapter 3 provides theoretical analysis of TCE 
critique in the context of contractual problem of post-contractual balance problems through 
the lens of resources and power dependent theories. Chapter 4 develops on the previous 
chapters review, draws the theoretical framework for the empirical study and outlines the 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 deals with the research methodology for the research and lays out the 
philosophical assumptions, the research methods and the justification for using a qualitative 
case study. Chapters 6 provide a profile of the contracting environment of PPP in Ghana. In 
Chapter 7 the empirical data of the two cases are presented and analysed. Chapter 8 analyses 
the impact of the post-contractual imbalance on supplier performance. Finally, Chapter 9 
concludes the study. The results of the two cases and the post-contractual power structure and 
the relevance of the TCE approach to post-contractual balance are summarised and the 










PPP has been the subject of intense academic research over the past two decades in 
examining its effectiveness in the area of creating conditions for developing mutual-inter-
dependency with the private sector and delivering value for money. In this chapter, the author 
reviews the resultant literature in order to set the stage for an extended review of TCE 
contractual solutions to protect economic actors in exchange relationships to be discussed in 
later chapters. 
 
Discussions in this chapter are organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the benefits and 
growth of PPP in both developed and developing countries. In Section 1.3, the author reviews 
the perceived reasons for the growth in PPP both in developed and developing countries. In 
Section 1.4, the author reviews the claims and counter-claims that have been made for PPP, 
with respect to risk transfer and cost efficiency. Finally the author reviews of PPP definition 
in section 1.6 and with the aim of adopting a working definition for this study. 
 
1.2 The Benefits of PPP to the Public Sector 
 
There is growing evidence in the strategic management and marketing literature that suggests 
that partnerships bring about benefits to parties in many ways (Grimsey, and Lewis, 2007; 
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Thomsen and Steets, 2009). These broad benefits include risk transfer opportunities, early 
project completion times and on budget, access to private sector technology and innovation; 
scope for sharing knowledge and competences. In addition to the above benefits, the public 
sector is expected to gain access to private sector funding for key public projects government 
budgetary constraints affect their early take off. Some writers (e.g. Thomsen and Steets, 2009) 
contend that PPP provides the impetus for organisational reforms and institutional innovation. 
These reforms that had allowed managers within the public sector to take on market 
principles are believed helping them to improve upon their project planning and management 
skills. Studies in the strategic and management literature also show that public sector 
managers working with the private sector on public projects have acquired valuable skills in 
setting achievable targets and budgetary control planning, a knowledge  that been utilised 
effectively in other areas of public management (see Spackman (2002; NAO, 2003a). For 
example, Spackman (2002) found that PPP has helped in producing clear objectives, new 
ways of planning projects, and incentives for competitive tendering. PFI-based procurement 
has also forced NHS managers to concentrate more on outcomes than inputs, thus increasing 
efficiency (Pollock et al., 2001). The UK National Audit Office (NAO) report claimed that 
collaboration with the private sector has enabled the UK government to achieve its primary 
objectives of providing efficient services and that private funding of public sector projects 
brought a number of benefits in the form of shorter project times and greater reliability (NAO 
2003a). 
 
There are other intrinsic benefits from public-private working relationships, particularly in 
the IT sector. Studies in the UK showed that the public sector has utilised private sector 
expertise in ICT in many areas of government business, harmonising e-commerce across 
public departments from the procurement function to the creation of databases for all types of 
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government e-business transactions. This is significant development in UK public sector e-
commerce government‘s business by allowing different public sector organisations to share 
relevant information across government bodies and harmonise their functions through shared 
databases for consistent applications of government policies something which was difficult to 
do previously. The Benefits Agency (UK Treasury Taskforce, 1999) and the Inland Revenue 
(NAO, 2003e, PAC, 2003b) and the Offender Register Database (PAC, 2009) are a few of the 
areas that have benefited from PFI schemes.  
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list but it they provide a wide representative view of the 
various benefits accrued to governments working closely with the private sector not only in 
UK but possible in other countries as well. While empirical evidence shows that there is 
benefit in collaboration particularly PPP private sector involvement in public provision also 
comes with risk of losing autonomy and control which would be discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Turning our attention to PPP, several studies show that the policy now assumes a greater 
importance in many national development agendas.  Bovaird (2004) found that PPP forms an 
integral part of economic and industrial programmes in some countries, for example Italy and 
France. In the USA, PPP has become a major part of its urban development policy. Various 
studies also point to examples of partnerships in developing countries that are increasingly 
becoming an integral part of their national development agenda, such as in South Africa, 
some south eastern Asian countries and Latin America (Smith and Hanson, 2003). 
Multilateral lending institutions have also adopted PPP as part of their strategic documents. In 
Ghana, for example, PPP is being integrated into the national development plan to provide 
public infrastructure development under the MDGs.  
9 
 
It is important to point out that PPP is different from privatisation, even though many writers 
consider it as a disguised form of privatisation (Sheil, 2002). Whilst privatisation typically 
involves the complete transfer of state ownership of a public facility to a private business 
entity, PPP allows the state to retain ownership and control (Grout, 2002; Bovaird, 2004). 
Similarly, contracting out that involves outsourcing a service to private contractors, for 
example cleaning or security is distinct from PPP (Boyne, 1998; Wooldridge et al., 2002; 
Christensen & Pallensen, 2004). However, discussions about the merits of both privatisation 
and contracting out are outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
1.2.1 Evidence of the Growth of PPP 
 
Although PPP is widely practised worldwide, it is difficult to obtain exact information on the 
real growth of PPP in terms of numbers and value (Estache et al., 2007; DLA Piper, 2007). 
This is due in part to the confusion over the distinction between PPP and other contracting 
out schemes. In the UK, available statistics exist, but as Schrank and Lomax (2005) pointed 
out definitional problems of PPP mean that some projects are excluded from the compilation 
of PPP projects
2
. Elsewhere, outside the UK, it is even more difficult to obtain reliable data 
on PPP, especially in developing countries where there is a considerable grey area between 
full privatisation and PPP (Schrank and Lomax, 2005). 
 
                                                          
2
The latest PFI signed deals data published by HM Treasury in July 2007 lists 582 projects 
(See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_private_partnerships/ppp_pfi_stats.cfm). 
However, they state that this list omits many deals previously reported by line Ministries, due to their being 
either completed, consolidated or smaller than the revised recommended PFI/PPP threshold of 30million euro. 






Despite this difficulty, the few existing statistics give us a broad view of the growth of PPP 
worldwide. In the UK, for example, data from the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 
shows that by 2003 there were about 570 PPP/PFI projects in the UK with an estimated value 
of £36 billion. Out of these, about 60 per cent of the value went to the Department of 
Transport, with the Department of Health accounting for nearly £3 billion (Office of 
Government Commerce 2003). This number has steadily increased over the years to about 
812 projects by the end of 2006, with average new signings of between 90 and 100 projects 
annually (European Investment Bank, 2007). Details of PFI signed deals and values can be 
seen in Table 1.1  
 
































                                                                                                                            Number                   £ million 
Transportation           36   20,526 
Health         126      2, 891 
Defence           45      2,359 
Scotland           80     2, 092 
Education and Skills         93     1 858 
Home Office          44             1,767 
Work and Pensions            7          930 
Inland Revenue          10          491 
Wales           26         439 
Northern Ireland           28          366 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs        11          349 
GCHQ              1           330 
ODPM            27         302 
Lord Chancellor's Departments         11          256 
Trade and Industry           9           194 
Treasury                                       1         118  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office          2           91 
Customs & Excise            2            83 
Northern Ireland Court Service          2            65 
Culture, Media and Sport           3            44 
National Savings             1                               37 
Cabinet Office                1            12 
Office of Government Commerce          1            10 
Public Record Office            1           - 
Total          568    35,610 
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The European Investment Bank (EIB), one of the major financiers of PPP infrastructure 
projects in Europe, reports significant growth of PPP across continental Europe. Their latest 
released statistics (EIB, 2007) showed that the 15 years up to 2006 witnessed significant 
growth of PPP, with more than 1,000 contracts signed in the EU, representing a capital value 




                             
                                
                            



























In the US, where PPP has been practised for several decades immediately after the end of the 
second world war substantial growth in private sector participation in public infrastructure 
development and service delivery have been reported (McDonough, 1998). According to 
MacNeil and Warnock (2000) several thousands of housing units were developed through 
PPP in the 1990s in the US. Other services like solid waste disposals, ambulances and 







1993 1      454 
1994 2  268.1 
1995 15    3277 
1996 31    8420.1 
1997 42 5268.5 
1998 79  19965.8 
1999 86    9707.3 
2000 106  15746.3 
2001 83 152192.2 
2002 89 20521.1 
2003 99 18461.3 
2004 135 18124.5 
2005 137 28768.1 
2006 152 28427.2 
TOTAL 1066 194711.6 
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correctional facilities are also said to be provided by public private arrangements (Bloomfield, 
1998; McDonough, 1998). 
 
In Africa and other parts of the developing countries PPP procurement policy is gaining 
popularity among governments seeking external funding to key public infrastructure 
development and services. Figure 1.1 compiled by Estache, et al. (2007) from various 
databases, shows an amount of US$1000 billion committed to PPP projects between 1990 
and 2005 under World Bank payments. By 2010, US$71.26 billion is reported to have been 
spent (World Bank, 2011). In 2010, the World Bank is said to have spent US$2.3 billion on 
water infrastructure and supply services and a further US$11.9 billion on telecommunications 
(World Bank, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 PPP Projects: World Bank Programme  
 
 
The above examples illustrate the growing influence of PPP both in numbers and value but 
what accounts for its growth. In the next section, we examine some of the principal factors 
responsible for PPP growth as alternative to traditional public procurement.  
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1.2.2 Drivers of the Growth of PPP 
 
As already noted, PPP is acknowledged by many writers to be a mechanism for providing 
opportunities to governments to achieve their infrastructure and service targets. Criticisms of 
state monopoly and bureaucracy in the management of public utilities have led to the 
redefinition of the role of the state within market-led ideology. The rationale behind this 
paradigm shift is to encourage competition between service providers, share risk and drive 
costs down for the benefit of the public (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Beyond this broad 
rationale, several factors have been identified to account for the sudden explosion of PPP, 
both in the developing and developed countries. These are summarised as follows.   
 
The first factor behind the rise of PPP was the growing realisation that the public sector could 
not shoulder all of the state obligations alone (Bovaird, 2004). For example, since the 1980s, 
successive UK Labour and Conservative governments, despite their ideological differences, 
have consistently used the private sector funding and innovation to close infrastructure gap in 
health, schools, roads, defence that their tight budget could not provide funding upfront (see 
also Parker and Hartley, 2003; Grahame, 2003). Moreover, payment for these services are 
spread over several years some lasting more than 20 years. As was argued by Froud (2003) 
this has not only freed the UK government from pressure to finance projects from its own 
resources, but also helped the government to keep national debts low in the balance sheet 
called ‗off balance sheet financing‘ (Spackman, 2002; Grahame, 2003; Dewatripont and 
Legros, 2005; Sadka, 2006). Off balance sheet financing refers to accounting arrangements 
where UK government‘s yearly payments made against private funded projects disguised as 
recurrent expenditures instead as long term loans. The advantage to the government is that its 
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true debt portfolio is hidden from the watchful eyes of credit rating agencies and the country 
continues to benefit from low borrowing interest rate (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). 
 
Second, it is contended that PPP offers governments the opportunity to transfer project risks 
to the private sector, something that is claimed to improve both service delivery and cost 
efficiency. Risk sharing and allocation goes to the heart of PPP ideology and arguably 
remains the singular key reason that informed Major‘s government‘s decision to launch the 
PFI in the UK back in 1992. The expectation that the risk would be transferred to the private 
sector however, is a normative presumption which this thesis addresses further in the study 
within the context of TCE framework. 
 
Third, partnership advocates contend that PPP offers the public manager the opportunity to 
utilise private sector expertise and innovation, particularly in the high-tech construction and 
IT sectors (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Porter, 1995). It is argued that the traditional 
procurement system is wasteful and inefficient and that the introduction of market 
competition will not only drives cost down but will enable governments to tap into innovative 
ideas and market thinking into public administration. This argument is primarily based on 
neo-liberal logic that paradigm shift from traditional public sector management, which is 
deemed inefficient, to the private sector management, considered efficient,  is capable of 
responding to the needs of the people in a most cost-effective way (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Porter and Dewey, 1998; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003).  Neo-liberal thinkers argue that, by 
removing state control over public utilities and encouraging competition will reduce 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and the resulting savings passed onto consumers and tax payers 
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(see Boyne, 1998; Buse et al., 2005). Thus the private sector efficiency philosophy has come 
to dominate current thinking in the public sector.   
 
Fourth, it is not just governments that have been converted to the idea of PPP. A growing part 
of literature in developing countries suggests international development agencies like the 
IMF, the World Bank and various UN agencies have been at the forefront of encouraging and 
coaxing governments to adopt the private sector as development partners (Alexander, 2002; 
Kessler, 2004). In the case of the World Bank, it has gone beyond policy rhetoric and 
incorporated the principles of private sector participation in its policy documents, something 
that accounts for the growth of PPP in developing countries albeit, lending conditions. 
 
None of the above factors would have been of any significance, however, if the private sector 
had not been willing to accept project and service risks under PPP, although the extent of the 
risk they are prepared to take on is a matter of debate; a debate that is at the heart of this 
thesis. The private businesses have increasingly come to appreciate the benefits of partnering 
with the public sector for new market opportunities and wealth creation (Julius, 2008). It is 
typically argued that Governments are usually the biggest aggregate spender in any economy, 
initiating high-capital projects for the provision of health, education, transport, IT and many 
other high profile public projects for their citizens (Cabinet Office, 1999; Estache et al., 
2007). Julius (2008), for example, stated that the UK government spent an estimated £79.4bn 




Beyond the UK, according to World Bank estimates, the PPP market has an estimated annual 
value of $10 billion (Estache et al., 2007; World Bank, 2008). Projections from the World 
Bank also indicate a positive trend in market growth for the next ten years, as governments in 
Africa are expected to rely on the private sector to play a dominant role in providing public 
infrastructure and services for its increasing population (see, for example, Bayliss, 2002; 
Sadka, 2006). Not surprisingly, the private sector sees PPP as a huge opportunity to obtain 
lucrative government contracts and possibly lobbying and encouraging the PPP policy 
(Pollock et al., 2002). This suggests that the state is seen as a major source of business for the 
private sector and therefore increasingly attracting business interests and lobbying.  
 
However, it could also be argued from another perspective that the influx of partnership in 
public sector provision is a response to pressure from the business community to open the 
public sector for private participation. Schaferhoff et al, 2007 argues that partnerships are 
serving business interests. However, these observations indicate business interests may 
prevail but that does not mean partnerships are meant to service business interests only. As 
has been discussed earlier, governments are benefiting from collaborating with the privateer 
sector.  Clearly the relationship between business commercial interests and public welfare 
interests that calls into question the genuineness of the public sector interests. 
 
1.2.3 The Drivers of PPP Growth within Developing Countries 
 
The growth factors discussed in the preceding section also apply to the increasing number of 
PPP-led projects in developing countries (Aryee and Cook, 2003). However, this is not the 
whole story. The rapid growth of PPP in developing countries is largely driven by the World 
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Bank‘s deliberate policy to tie large capital-based contracts in developing countries to private 
sector participation (Castro, 2002; Lobina and Hall, 2003;  Aryee and Cook, 2003; World 
Bank 2006; Fobil et al., 2008).  
 
One explanation is that most governments in developing countries face internal political 
pressure not to implement any economic reforms that will bring the private sector to manage 
public utilities for fear of economic exploitation. The other reality is that most governments 
are confronted with infrastructure gap and poor services and without private sector support 
would not be able to cope with increasing public demand for public infrastructure and 
improved services. In some instances a new infrastructure is required and in some cases more 
financial assistance to rehabilitate deteriorating ones. That is to say governments in 
developing countries needed external funding to embark upon their ambitious national 
reconstruction. Ghana for instance, is faced with a huge infrastructure gap averaging US$1.5 
billion per annum for the next decade. This is required to bring the nation‘s infrastructure to 
the recommended status of a middle-income country but has not got the needed resources.  
 
However, the World Bank realised that despite the infrastructure gap that confronts 
developing countries and the difficulties of raising funds internally, most governments were 
not willing to involve the private sector for variety of reasons and the major is fear of private 
sector exploitation. On the other hand, the World Band and its major contributors are 
determined to effect the needed changes to allow the private sector to bring in a new way of 
managing public infrastructure. Against this backdrop the World Bank seized any possible 
opportunity and using their loan facilities as a form of a carrot and a stick to persuade or 
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coerce unwilling African governments to involve the private sector as partners in national 
developments (Cassen, 1994; Finger and Allouche, 2002; World Bank, 2003a).  
 
However, the involvement of the World Bank in PPP, has not only created uncertainty 
surrounding the PPP projects in developing countries in general and in Ghana in particular, 
but has generated a number of significant problems especially in designing balanced contracts 
with the private sector. This shifts our attention to examine the strategies the rationale behind 
PPP from the public sector perspective on trade-off between risk and efficient outcomes. In 
the next section we explore the concept of risk transfer and discuss why the concept is 
complicated and controversial in the management of PPP. 
 
1.3 PPP and Risk Transfer  
 
There have been general discussions about measurement problems on PPP performance and 
outcomes. In particular, attempts to measure PPP performance across sectors have run into 
methodological difficulties as benchmarks and objectives differ from project to project, 
making any assessment unreliable for comparison purposes (Arthur Anderson Enterprise LSE 
2001). Early assessments were largely based on cost-benefits analysis but that requires the 
development of clear industrial benchmarks by which the partnership in question can be 
evaluated. While it is easy to identify project cost assuming market prices apply, it has been 
found practically difficult to reduce public intrinsic benefits of service availability and 
satisfaction into verifiable figures. Moreover, the multi multi-faceted nature of PPP makes it 
increasingly becoming difficult to adopt an encompassing methodology to measure every 
aspect of PPP contribution to economic efficiency.  As a result of these difficulties, the 
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traditional cost-benefits analysis often used contracting out literature are not vigorously 
applied to PPP projects (Grout 1997).  
 
In the midst of this controversy emerged the use of risk transfer, which incidentally is the 
rationale behind PPP. The use of risk transfer to measure project success in terms of cost 
savings is  universally accepted and is believed overcomes the weaknesses of other systems 
(Hartley and Parker, 2001; Pollock et al., 2002; Geddes, 2005).  The UK HM Treasury (1995) 
refers to risk transfer as a key measure of value for money outcomes for the public sector. 
Indeed, some writers like Grout, 1997; Hartley and Parker, 2001; Pollock et al, 2001a) 
continually refer to risk transfer as a key test for value for money. 
 
It is important to observe that risks transfer construct has empirical importance, as it allows 
PPP outcomes to be measured in terms of cost minimisation. Additional advantage to the 
public sector is that the use of risk transfer avoids the inconsistency and controversy over the 
comparison one outcome with another using different metrics (HM Treasury, 1995; Grahame, 
2003). Arthur Anderson Enterprise LSE commissioned by UK Treasury Taskforce to 
examine the value for money aspects of PFI project put risk transfer ahead of other six 
output-based specifications competition, performance measurement and incentives, private 
management skill (Arthur Anderson Enterprise LSE 2001). The contribution of Arthur 
Anderson Enterprise LSE (2001) report is that risk transfer has now become the key rationale 
behind the public sector partnering with the private sector (HM Treasury, 1995; Pollock et al., 
2001; Froud, 2003. 
Subsequent studies have also established a link between risk transfer and value for money 
(see Spackman, 2002; Froud, 2003; Pollock et al, 2004; Shaoul, 2008).  For example, Arndt 
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(1999) suggested in his work that the appropriate transfer of risks helps the public sector to 
achieve good value for money. Pollock (2004) used risks transfer to measure the degree of 
the benefits that the public sector is expected to obtain from the private sector. Others, like 
Vining et al. (2005) and Leahy (2005) also use risk transfer to draw a distinction between 
PPP and traditional procurement practices, and postulate that value for money is achieved 
where appropriate risks have been transferred.  
 
Similarly, the World Bank uses the relationship between risk transfer and efficiency to 
emphasise that whether PPP ‗performs better than full provision by state-owned enterprises, 
depends, in particular, on whether performance risk is effectively shifted from taxpayers to 
the private shareholders of the company‘ (World Bank, 2002: 23-24).  
 
The above discussions illustrate risk transfer  general acceptability as the key determinant of 
value for money in PPP projects but this also generates a significant debate as to whether the 
public sector have in the past transferred risk or have the ability to pass the appropriate risk to 
the private sector. If so, to what extent has the public sector succeeded, if not, what are the 
impediments? We don‘t know that yet, although it is obvious that, as in any other policy 
implementation, there must be inherent problems that may facilitate or block risk transfer. 
Unfortunately, little is known in the literature. Before we investigate that claims empirically, 
it is important we visit the literature to examine evidence of its allocation and the views of 





1.4 Principles of Risk Transfer in PPP  
 
At the centre of PPP outcomes as noted is the notion of risk transfer (HM Treasury, 1995; 
Froud, 2003; Grahame, 2003).  Risks in the context of PPP are defined as: ‗Any factor, event 
or influence that threatens the successful completion of a project in terms of time, costs or 
quality‘ (EU Guidelines, 2002). The literature categories risk into design, construction, 
operational. Under this category of risk, the public sector spells out its output specifications 
and transfers the control and responsibility to the private sector to decide how to meet the 
pre-specified standard. Other risks are financial and demand. Financial risk refers to a future 
condition that cash flows might be insufficient to pay the private sector, or from supplier‘s 
side, the private sector fails to mobilise sufficient funding for the project, and demand risk is 
the possibility that demand levels will not meet the expected levels needed for the private 
sector to recoup its investments (Grahame, 2003; Sadka, 2008). From the public sector 
perspective it means the possibility that the project cost will rise more than reasonably 
expected.  
 
Given that each project faces a different set of risks, the UK Treasury Department, for 
example, laid down two principles in a framework for allocating risks between the public 
sector and the private sector (HM Treasury, 1995). First, project risks should be allocated to 
the party that is more able to manage it effectively at the lowest cost. Alternatively, where 
both partners have similar responsibility or control over the risk factor, the risk should be 
allocated to the party that is responsible or has relatively more control over the risk factor. 
The premise is that if the  private sector, for example, is in control over those risk whilst 
executing the project will be motivated to select the most cost efficient process and the 
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resultant savings passed on to the public sector entity in the form of low contract prices (HM 
Treasury, 1995; Froud, 2003; Grahame, 2003) . 
Based on this principle of risk allocation, project financing, delays in completion and 
operating risks are transferred to the private sector on the assumption that they have 
considerable resources and experience in managing these risks, more so than the public sector 
(HM Treasury, 1995; Grahame, 2003). On the other hand, risks that arise from uncertainty in 
the transactional environment including: (a) wrongly specified requirements, (b) catastrophic 
events, (c) demand and volume risks (Grahame, 2003:29) are retained by the public sector 
(HM Treasury, 1995; Grahame, 2003). In the case of bilateral contracting across borders, 
political risks, currency convertibility and transferability risks are expected to be retained by 
the host governments (Bayliss and Hall, 2003; Kessides, 2004). Common PPP forms and risk 
allocation are presented in Table 1.3. 
 























Responsibilities for the Public Private sectors under forms of Private Sector Participation 













Public Public and 
Private 
Public Public 1-2 years 
Management 
contract 
Public Private Public Public 3-5 years 
Lease Public Private Shared  Shared 8-15 years 





Private Private Private 20-30years 
Divestiture  Private or 
Public and 
Private 
Private Private Private indefinite 
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1.5 Evidence of Risk Allocation to the Public Sector.  
 
 
Although the principle underlying the classification and allocation of risk is clear, there is 
much controversy as to whether the public sector is capable of transferring risk to the public 
sector. The debate arises partly because empirical studies have produced inconsistent results 
depending on the model used and methodology applied. A review of the PPP literature gives 
the impression that the public sector, especially in the UK, has succeeded in transferring risk 
to the private sector. Many writers (e.g. Pollock et al., 2001; Parker and Hartley, 2003;; 
Lonsdale, 2005a) cite a number of PPP projects, both from empirical studies and official 
reports, and argue that there has never been any effective risk transfer. Rather, they contend 
that governments continue to bear the ―so called transferred risks‖. In an early study, Parker 
and Hartley (2003) examined a UK defence contract under PPP and concluded that the 
intended risks were never transferred. Other studies into the NHS and IT sectors reached 
similar conclusions (see Grout, 1992; Pollock et al., 2001; Lonsdale, 2005b). This, it is 
claimed, has affected value for money for the public sector. 
 
Staying with the UK, reports from the NAO and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
found that some PPP projects in the health, schools and IT sectors have resulted in high cost 
overruns, with others re-negotiated and the original estimates revised upwards (PAC, 2003b; 
NAO, 2004) suggesting that private sector initiatives were costly. In all these studies, the 
perception running through their arguments is that the public sector incurs heavy transaction 
costs and, disturbingly, experience cost overruns. It is also suggested that risk, if initially 




One explanation from the literature to account for ineffective risk transfer is the difficulty in 
identifying and measuring appropriate risk in a particular project by public buying managers 
(Grout, 1997; Pollock et al., 2001, 2004; Sheil, 2002). It is argued that buying managers are 
incapable of identifying a priori all risks inherent in complex transactions and that what 
public buying managers identify as total risk are mere estimates of future events that does not 
reflect the actual risk (see also Grout, 1997; Hartley and Parker, 2003). It could also be 
argued that, given the limitation of public managers to identify risk in complex and long term 
projects, the problem can be compounded when it comes to identifying and measuring the 
non-calculable risk in a project implementation. This difficulty of identifying unexpected risk 
is costing the public sector more than budgeted been highlighted in a UK Treasury Taskforce 
report (1999/2000). 
 
Studies revealed that at the time of signing the contract, 80% of the risks associated with the 
project could not be identified; they were only identified much later during the execution 
stage (see Pollock et al., 2001). While such an error may be considered as an innocent one, it 
may be symptomatic of a bigger problem concerning the identification and quantification of 
























Norfolk and Norwich NHS Trust  90 144 60% 
Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust 35 84 140 
Benefits Agency –Computers 200 1400 600% 
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clearly the tendency of the public sector to use original cost estimates in their analysis, 
ignoring other add-on incidental costs that occur before the project is completed.  The initial 
project cost of £200m, NIR2 earlier touted as a PFI success story, ended up costing the UK 
taxpayer £1400m more than budget recording 600%.  
 
The most significant problem the public sector faces is uncertainty. Indeed cost overruns 
usually experienced in PPP projects arise largely out of specification changes with the 
supplier which also shows the difficulty managers face when it comes to in identifying future 
relevant risk in a relation. Even the managers are able to identify some of the risk, there is the 
problem of quantifying them in monetary terms and on what methodology and whose 
projections. These are pertinent challenges inherent in managing PPP. However, little is 
known.  As a result, Sullivan and Ngwenyama, (2005) argue that since precise specification 
in hi-tech projects is impossible, and uncertainty is high, any claims that public managers are 
able to contract for and manage contracts for beneficial outcomes are highly contentious (see 
also Oxley, 1997; Lonsdale, 2005a; Zheng et al., 2008). 
 
In a more recent NAO (2007) report, the findings showed that the UK public sector continued 
to experience cost overruns. Initial approved project costs of £3.704 billion for various 
projects for the Highways Agency increased by £1.421 billion, representing 38% overrun 
(NAO, 2007). Further evidence was provided by consulting firm Mott Macdonald, who were 
commissioned to study cost overruns in 40 large projects. The study found that cost overruns 
ranged from 2-24% for standard buildings, 4-51% for non-standard buildings, and up to 66% 
for non-standard civil engineering projects (Gaffner and Pollock, 1999; Coulson, 2008).  
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The issue of high transaction cost associated with PPP projects has also been challenged. In a 
major study into transaction costs associated with UK PPP at the procurement phase, Dudkin 
and Valila (2007) found evidence that the aggregate transaction costs were disproportionately 
higher than purported cost savings. Their study showed that the public sector often incurred 
an average of 10% of contract value and bidders incur 9.3% and that translates into several 
millions of pounds; NAO, 2003; Dudkin and Valila, 2007). They concluded that transaction 
cost relating to the procurement phase alone is significantly enough to wipe off any potential 
economic benefits of PPP. Beyond the UK, problems of risk transfer and high transaction 
costs have also been reported. For example, in Australia (see Wettenhall, 2003 and Sheil, 
2000) and in the US (see Vining et al., 2005) studies show that PPP has not performed better 
for similar reasons discussed above.  
 
From the above anecdotal evidence, it does appear that PPP or PFI arrangements are seen in 
some parts of the literature as not producing real benefits to the public sector. The question 
that arises at this point is why the public sector would like to continue to engage the public 
sector under PPP or PFI to operate traditional public services. This question is relevant given 
that many governments in developed world countries continue to implement PPP policies in 
public provision while those in developing countries like Ghana are being encouraged to 
form partnerships with the private sector. A possible explanation is that PPP arrangements 
may have positive values that benefit the public sector.  
 
Indeed, some writers see the positive side of PPP demonstrated that the policy has brought 
about real cost savings than the inefficient traditional public procurement methods. Areas 
include early project completion time, technological innovation and cost savings. In an early 
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study of 121 selected PFI/PPP projects across the UK, NAO found from a survey that 95% of 
the managers of both public and private bodies believed risk had been transferred to the 
private sector (NAO, 2001). Writers (such as Grimsey and Lewis, 2007) have cited reports 
from Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE (2000) and the NAO (2003e) to argue that the 
significant improvements in the NHS, IT services, road and transportation sectors were the 
result of the successful transfer of risks to the private sector.  
 
Similarly, an early HM Treasury study of seven UK PPP projects on value for money, using 
PSC valuations, reported an average cost saving of about 20%, amounting to about £1 billion 
in 2000 (HM Treasury Report, 2003a). Table 1.5 below depicts the various PFI projects data 
compiled by the UK Treasury showing that the UK government made cost savings in projects 
transferred to the private sector. From the table, total cost savings amounting to £937m were 
made with NIRS2 and Prime projects recording the highest yields of £195.6m and £560m 
respectively. 
 


















   Source The Treasury Taskforce 2003a 
 
    
 Project 
Present Value of Public 
Sector  Cost £‘m 
Present Value 





Dartford and Gravesham 181.6 176.5  5.1 
Bridgend and Fazakerley 567 513 54 
4DBFOs 797 698 99 
A74 ( M)/M74 210 193  17 
NIRS 2 392.9 133.6 195.6 
Prime 2545 1988.5 560 
RAF Vehicles     24.7 18.9     5.8 
TOTAL 46550 3718.5 936.5 
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Other studies also reported PPP positive contributions in non-traditional but important areas 
such refuse collections. For example, Hodge (2000) found evidence of cost savings in refuse 
collection and cleaning services. In a similar study into PPP performance, Grimsey and Lewis 
(2007) provided some cases that indicated cost savings ranging between 9% and 16%  IN 
PPP run projects. Studies by the Australian Industry Commission (1996) found cost savings 
ranging between 10% and 30% in private sector delivery. 
 
In terms of timely completion of projects, The NAO (2003a) compared project cost between 
private financed and traditional procurement and found that 76% of the PPP projects were 
delivered on time and 78% within budget as compared to 30% and 27% respectively with 
traditional procurement. In recent times, Coulson (2008) cited the HM Treasury survey report 
(2006) on operational performance, which found that in 79% of projects service standards are 
delivered always or almost on time indicating that operational risk was passed on to the 
private sector. 
 
It is clear from the above that the evidence of PPP performance relating to risk transfer and 
value for money is mixed and does not provide us with consistent results and explanations on 
the matter. It also shows that PPP analysis may turn out positive or otherwise depending on 
what the focus on. . 
 
There have been several attempts to explain the cost overruns often experienced by the public 
sector especially in UK. It is contended that the public sector officials have the tendency to 
exaggerate cost savings from private funded projects in order to justify taking the public 
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sector down the PPP route (Gaffney and Pollocks, 1999; Sadka, 2006). In a study Sadka 
(2006) suggested that these exaggerations can be as high as 50% or more. He cited the 
Channel Tunnel project as an example, where revenues were found to have been exaggerated 
by two-thirds of the predicted levels (Sadka, 2006). In the UK, potential cost savings from the 
Dartford and Gravesham hospital project were also found to have been overstated by £12 
million (NAO, 1999). Similarly, some studies report cases in which over-enthusiastic 
government officials in some developing countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have 
exaggerated cost savings in toll road projects (see Strong, Guasch and Benavidas, 2004).  
 
A further explanation may be attributed to the methodology of calculating potential savings 
from PPP. The public sector comparator (PSC) is a mathematical model that uses discount 
rates in a finance test for PPP projects to show that the government is able to provide public 
infrastructure and services at lower cost than traditional public procurement (Grout, 2003; 
Grahame, 2003). It is often used by academics and public sector managers as a barometer to 
measure the level of risk transfer. The use of PSC has been criticised as an unreliable 
methodology because  arbitrary discount rate are often used to calculate potential savings 
from PPP, that produce results that indicate that privately financed and managed projects are 
cheaper than traditional public procurement. Grout (2003) in particular found that the 
government has a tendency to apply 6% instead of the government standard rate of 4% 
discount factor for both cost of borrowing and revenues, thus producing positive savings from 
using private sector project financing (see also Jenkinson, 2003, p. 326).  
 
An earlier study into the health sector by Pollock et al. (2001) has also challenged the PSC 
financial modelling which they considered was deliberately manipulated to provide 
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justification for using the private sector. The researchers further demonstrated that, had a 
realistic and objective discount factor been used, the private-financed initiative would have 
turned out to be more costly. In a separate study, Fitzgerald (2004) in Australia provided an 
excellent quantitative analysis to show that the discount rate used in PSC models is subjective 
and therefore could produce misleading results. 
 
The other issue raised about risk transfer is the cost associated with the private sector 
accepting risk from the public sector. The empirical research supports the view that 
transferring risk and its associated uncertainty is not free but increases cost to the public 
sector. Given the overriding aim of the private business entity of maximising profit for 
shareholders, it stands to reason that risk accepted from the public sector would be valued at 
the going market price and passed over in the form of the contract price (Grout, 1997). As a 
result, the public sector is paying an unduly high price for the transfer of risks to the private 
sector.  
 
In relation to above, firstly, there is a perception that suppliers deliberately put up a low bid 
in order to gain competitive advantage and after the contract is awarded negotiate for higher 
price. This view is supported by past studies, which found many UK PPP projects were 
priced in this way. Pollock et al. (2001) reviewed PPP in the UK health sector and found that 
the private sector valued risk like financing and operational risk and this is added as part of 
project cost. Similarly, a study by and Parker and Hartley (2003) among growing cases where 
it has been demonstrated how risk has been passed back to the public sector (see also Shaoul, 
2005; Couldson, 2008).  
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From the above discussions, one important issue that stands out as clear is that the public 
sector managers face significant uncertainty in collaborating with the private sector. It is not 
that public sector managers are not concerned about cost overruns, the major problem may 
come from the fact that managers are unable to prevent cost overruns when the private sector, 
after the contract has started, come back to demand price increases. Briefly, it could be 
argued that PPP policy is characterised with uncertainty and that gives advantage to the 
public sector. The review also brings to the fore the importance of the examining the 
economic rationale of the public sector entering into collaborative relationships, which 
already been shown is to transfer risk and manage uncertainty. Unfortunately, given the 
importance of risk transfer to the public sector this area has attracted less attention in the 
literature. Until now little is known about the conditions that influences risk transfer. This is 
significant because, as the review has shown, the public sector is said to achieve good value 
for money when the appropriate risk is transferred to the private sector.  Moreover, little is 
known about the methodology by which risk in a relationship is shared between a buyer and a 
supplier. Although there has been some attempts to show that risk transfer requires genuine 
alignment of interest with the private sector (see Cox et al., 2004; Lonsdale, 2005a) much is 
yet to be known about conditions that create genuine alignment of interest between a buyer 
and a supplier. Given the importance of balance in PPP, it would seem the issue of balance 
would have been given much more scholarly attention than it is receiving. Those studies that 
explored the issue of symmetry between the public sector and the private seeking to unravel 
the mystery of  risk transfer are mostly illustrative and descriptive and does not delve deeper 
into the problem therefore offer little guidance as to the various impediments to the 
development of balance.  This, at least in part, originates from the fact that most researchers 
focus on successful cases using TCE analysis as a result failed to investigate properly 
problems that confront the public sector in their efforts to transfer risk to the private sector. 
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Therefore, it is important to examine the impediments to the balance in PPP. This brings to 
the fore the importance the core question of whether PPP in its present state could be 
described as an inter-dependent one that fosters the sharing of risk in a mutual satisfaction 
way. Since the focus of the study is to investigate whether the public sector has the ability to 
develop a balance with the private sector so as to transfer risk to the private sector, it is 
important we discuss the definition of PPP which is taken in the next section before we 
proceed further with our study. 
 




One aspect that has not been provided yet in this chapter is a definition of the term PPP. As 
can be seen from the above, PPP is a broad concept used in the public management literature 
to describe a wide range of ‗partnership‘ relationships that can be developed, from not-for 
profit voluntary partnerships to legally-binding commercial ones. The preceding literature 
review took the usage of the term PPP by the various participants in the literature at face 
value. This was purposely done in order not to exclude large parts of ‗PPP‘ literature, which 
would have happened if a definition had been established upfront. At this stage, however, it is 
important to develop a working definition of PPP, within the context of the study. To do this, 
the author reviews various attempts made to define PPP and then justifies his own. 
In this section, we examine the definition of partnership and how different scholars have 
conceptualised it within PPP. The author attempts to bring them together to increase our 
understanding of what constitutes its essence. Finally, we develop the working definition 
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from the concepts and ideas of Williamson. This is deemed appropriate for further analytical 
research on PPP in this thesis. The objective is to drive the research by advancing a 
theoretical framework that identifies a number of variables that help to promote or hinder the 
developing of a state of partnership that satisfies both parties. 
 
1.6.2 PPP Definition 
 
In recent years, studies on PPP have recognised it as essential for increased economic activity 
and competitiveness. Yet there is still no consensus among researchers on how PPP should be 
defined. The PPP concept is subjected to different interpretation and definitions, at different 
levels in different contexts with different objectives (Geddes, 2005).  Partnerships can be 
voluntary or for commercial purposes. In public-private sector business arrangements, PPP 
can take many forms, ranging from Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) to service contracts, 
from multi-million dollar global projects to low budget community-based projects. 
Partnerships can be bilateral or multilateral bodies and actors can include local or multi-
national private businesses, non-governmental bodies or policy think tanks (Steets and 
Thomsen, 2009). PPP can also be viewed as horizontal or vertical (Geddes, 2005).   
 
Due to its diversity in dimension and purpose, various writers and policy makers have 
defined PPP in various ways, some loosely, others in a specific context, illustrating the fact 
that the term PPP is not understood universally. Indeed, the literature acknowledges that PPP 
definition has always been a challenge (Wettenhall, 2003; Geddes, 2005; Lonsdale, 2007; 
Schaffhaff and Kaan, 2007) and a matter of contention (Schaffhaff and Kaan, 2007). This 
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conceptual difficulty is complicated further by the temptation of many government officials 
to confuse PPP with privatisation.  
 
In PPP, public sector bodies and private sector entities retain control, but are expected to 
share costs, rewards, and responsibilities. On the other hand, privatisation represents the 
transfer of control and ownership risks and rewards to the private sector. Confusion like this 
appears to impede rational discussions about PPP, since all the negative inferences of 
privatisation are applied to PPPs as well (Schaffhaff and Kaan, 2007). 
 
The Oxford Dictionary (2002) defines a ‗partnership‘ as a ‗joint business with shared risks 
and profits‘. Nelson‘s definition is similar but he added words like ‗shared responsibilities‘ 
(Nelson 2002:46). Beyond the literal meaning of partnership, a review of the literature shows 
that PPP definitions have been approached from different perspectives and have been 
associated with a number of strategic and operational perspectives (Wettenhall, 2003; Geddes, 
2005:p.114). 
 
Strategically, partnerships are defined as purposive relationships between independent firms 
who share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high level of 
mutual interdependence. From this conceptual view, partnerships are formed for the purpose 
of achieving goals and benefits that individual firms could not attain easily. For example, 
some writers (Klijn, 1996; Bigelow, 2001; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Allen and Philips, 
2003) conceptualise partnership as interdependent and co-equal and argue that partnership 
connotes an intention to create symmetry of the partners‘ interests and objectives. From this 
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conceptual view, partnership emerges as a state of natural equality. Features include partners‘ 
readiness to demonstrate tolerance, the adoption of flexibility in decision-making, openness 
to diverse experiences and commitments to each other‘s goals.  
 
Others see partnership in the public sector as political, concerning policy formulation. Thus 
from a political perspective, PPP is conceived as a policy tool for achieving governmental 
objectives without directly getting involved in risky decisions and changes. For example, 
Bult-Spiering and Dewulf (2006) defined partnership as a political tool that allows public 
bureaucrats to use the private sector to achieve governmental programmes and objectives see 
also Froud, 2003). Similarly, Hess and Adams (2001) identify partnership as an emerging 
policy tool for tapping into the discipline of the market.  
 
PPP has been conceptualised as a joint venture in which public and private sector bodies pull 
their resources and expertise together to support a government‘s infrastructure development 
programme in specific areas in the economy (Pollock et al., 2001, p275). Carroll and Steane 
(2000), for example, broadly defined PPP as ‗agreed, co-operative ventures that involve at 
least one public and one private sector institution as partners‘ The writers further described 
PPP along the lines of partnership as an arrangement that allows a public sector body to 
engage a private company to achieve developmental objectives set by the political authorities. 
The Canadian Council appeared to favour this view when it defined PPP as a venture 
‗between the public and private sectors built on expertise of each other that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards‘ 
(Canadian Council, 2003).   
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Operationally, PPP can be defined in terms of relationship management and the setting of 
goals and outcomes. This includes setting up flexible arrangements under terms where both 
parties have confidence to work together to create value for themselves. For Macneil (1978) 
PPP is said to bring about operational efficiency resulting in beneficial outcomes to both 
parties under the so-called ‗win-win‘ philosophical underpinnings. 
 
Some writers also define PPP as project orientated activities, similar to the classical 
contracting model. Blanc-Blude et al. (2007) define PPP to include the design, construction, 
operation and maintenance of a facility with major components of private finance. The more 
common operational labels such as co-ordination, collaboration, and joint steering 
committees are used to indicate evidence of a PPP arrangement (see Huxham, 1996; 
Glendinning, 2003). 
 
Alternatively, other writers focus on the input and output of resources or outcomes that 
partners are expected to produce. Those who approach PPP definition from an input/output 
perspective describe it in terms of purposes, structures and operating procedures between the 
public and private bodies for a pre-defined objective of the public sector body (Huxham, 
1996; Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Nelson, 2002; Wettenhall, 2003).  From this conceptual 
view, the public sector defines the standard of service which the private sector is expected to 
execute, and performance is measured along these benchmarks. The IMF, the World Bank 
and other multi-lateral partners‘ output measures appear to fall within this category, laying 




Indeed, the World Bank definition of PPP is illustrative. The Bank defines PPP as the 
‗combination of a public needs with private capability and resources to create a market 
opportunity through which the public need is met and a profit is made‘ (World Bank, 2004b). 
In this definition, a problem of partnership emerges which has to do with the contrast 
between the two different agendas of the two parties. Whilst the public sector defines 
partnership in terms of achieving good value for money, the supplier side considers it as a 
commercial opportunity to make profits (Bartley, 1996, p731). 
 
In recent times, PPP has become synonymous with the loose idea that PPP is about the 
transfer of risks to the private sector. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
described partnership as ‗a risk-sharing relationship, based upon a shared aspiration between 
the public sector and one or more partners from the private and/or voluntary sectors to deliver 
a publicly agreed outcome and for public service‘ (Geddes, 2005, p.40).  A similar definition 
from the Commission on Public Private Partnership (2001) considered partnership as a 
mechanism for sharing risks between the demand side, i.e. the government, as a buyer, and 
the supply side.   
 
Similar to the above, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
focuses on the alignment of public and private sector objectives. For example, OECD defined 
PPP as a partnership ―between the government and one or more private partners, according to 
which the private partners deliver a public service in such a manner that the service delivery 
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners‖ 
(OECD, 2008). However, the definition added that the effectiveness of the alignment depends 
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on sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners, a proposition that runs through many of 
the definitions earlier reviewed.   
 
All the above conceptual view of partnership provides us with clear indication that scholars, 
practitioners and funding agencies perceive PPP role as risk transfer and its management- it is 
a controversial issue where there is intense debate has received less research attention on the 
constraints to successful risk transfer.  Although, these definitions remain important in the 
literature it is essential that we subject these ris transfer claims to strict empirical analysis. To 
this end the above definitions are either too broad or descriptive. Furthermore, defining 
partnership in terms of risk and reward sharing within a philosophy of equality is also too 
vague to be of any analytical value in allowing us to operationalise partnership for 
measurement. As a result, it is necessary for the author to move away from the definitions 
provided by participants in the PPP policy arena towards guidance provided by the 
economics literature (Lonsdale, 2005b). The reason is that, since 1983, economics literature 
has moved away from a simple adherence to traditional neo-classical models to more ‗realist‘ 
ones that reflect the practical business world of bilateral contracting. Attention would be 
focused on two strands of the literature, on property rights and Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory, from which the researcher teases out the working definition for this study.   
 
In the property rights literature, as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
More (1990), the incentive effects of asset ownership imply that shared ownership of 
economic producing assets maximises joint gains and minimises acts that will put their 
investments at risk. This implies that in PPP, both the public sector and private sector adopt at 
39 
 
the outset an efficient ownership and control governance structures to share risks and gains 
efficiently (see Engel et al., 2008).  In this way,  joint interest in the relation creates bonding.  
 
Although this is found to be an improvement in the attempt to define PPP it is analytically 
problematic, as the definition ignores the relationship between partners‘ interests and 
resources that may not be commensurate in value distribution or the effect of bargaining 
power over divisions of relationship surplus or the residual control rights of non-human 
assets.  
 
We now turn to the more comprehensive definition of PPP obtained from the Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) literature, initially developed by Williamson (1975). TCE 
conceptualises ‗partnership‘ as a bilateral contracting arrangement that seeks to promote 
interdependent business relations between economic actors. In defining bilateral governance, 
TCE takes a balance, a stance, in respect of the need to manage the risks arising from asset 
specific investments. Williamson shows that bilateral contracting allows both the public and 
the private sectors to jointly invest in transaction specific assets to reap the gains from trade 
for mutual benefit (Williamson, 1991).  
 
In relation to the breakdown of classical contracting under conditions of asset specificity and 
uncertainty, Williamson gave the rationale for bilateral contracting: ‗Individuals who are 
responsible for adapting interfaces have personal as well as an organisation stake in what 
transpires‘ (Williamson, 1996,p. 104). Williamson further explained that ‗individuals located 
at the interfaces may refuse to be part of opportunistic effects to take advantage of (rely on) 
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the letter of the contract when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated.‘ This implies that 
wealth creation constraints are assumed away and the prediction is that parties in partnership 
are willing and able to collaborate with each other to create interdependent relations (Hart 
and Moore, 1990; Williamson, 1996).  
 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the importance of PPP and noted its benefits; drivers 
noted the importance of risk transfer in the management of PPP. We also discussed the debate 
on risk transfer to the private sector and cost minimisation. Whilst various studies point to 
examples of PPP that have effectively transferred risks to the private sector, others provide a 
different picture that indicates fairly ineffective risk transfer and high project cost overruns. 
The inconsistencies in the managing risk transfer ignited PPP debate and provided the 
impetus for us to seek empirical evidence as a way to enrich our understanding of the 
phenomenon. This led us to examine the definition of PPP from different perspectives to help 
us contextualise and develop a working definition for our research using Ghana as a research 
focus. We found among other things that PPP is all about risk transfer but that also leaves us 
with contestable implied assumption of balance under TCE theory.  
 
As has been developed from the literature, TCE assumes an equilibrium state in which the 
current and future states, action, or decisions of partners are committed to create mutuality for 
efficient outcomes. Given that this issue of a balance is central to the thesis, the author now 
proceeds to examine TCE literature and other perspectives of agency theory and property 










In the previous chapter, we defined PPP in terms of the TCE mechanism of bilateral 
contracting. Underpinning this definition is the TCE assumption that bilateral governance 
allows parties to manage their uncertainty through collaboration. In addition, bilateral 
governance provides buyers with the basis for safely negotiating the variations that arise out 
of transactional uncertainty. However, others are less optimistic about balance in bilateral 
governance and worry about the TCE solution to lock-in problems that characterises all forms 
of bilateral contracting. 
 
This debate over balance is central to this thesis. Not only does PPP resemble the bilateral 
contracting mechanism put forward by TCE (in its use as a definition), but the policy 
statements of many governments and TNOs, such as the World Bank, also take the TCE view, 
or at least invest in the hope that such mechanisms can be balanced in the manner of TCE. 
Yet a potential problem of PPP is the ability of contractual authorities to get the right balance, 
deemed important because it facilitates the transfer of risk over the life of the contract 
relation. This chapter looks at the issue of post-contractual balance in more detail.  In this 
chapter we discuss the contribution that TCE can make to efficient management of PPP 
contracts between the public sector and the private sector. We also draw together other 
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incentive theories of agency and property rights that focus on how autonomous economic 
agents design efficient contracts in a way to prevent or minimise risk in business exchanges.  
 The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses generally the principal agency 
theory and property rights theory followed by the rationale for the choice of TCE theory for 
this study. Section 2.3 introduces the TCE theory used in this study. This is followed by 
discussions on the interplay of opportunism, bounded rationality, asset specificity and 
uncertainty and the use of credible commitments. Section 2.5 discusses bilateral governance 
and section. Section 2.6 discusses the TCE‘s confidence that buying managers have the 
ability to balance their relation through shared investments or financial hostages. This is 
followed by concluding comments that introduces the critique of TCE assumptions on 
bilateral governance balance. 
 
2.2 Models of Contract Management 
 
In contract management literature, there are basically three broad theories of incentive 
contracting in economics: agency theory, property rights theory (PRT) and TCE (Mahoney 
1990; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Brousseau and Glachant, 2002) These theories 
individually provide guidance to autonomous actors on how to design efficient contractual 
solutions to protect themselves economic against problem of risk. Brousseau and Glachant 
(2002) noted that these three schools of thought in economics of contracting dominate the 
field of incentive contracting in economics. Given that PPP is affected by the economics of 
contracting, each of the models will be briefly discussed before focusing on TCE theory to 
investigate whether the Ghanaian public sector may or may not be able to develop post-




2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory approach to contract management is widely used by scholars to describe 
the contractual relationship when one party (the principal) engages another party (i.e. the 
agent) to act on its behalf. According to (Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5), an agency 
relationship: is created when ‗one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the 
agent) to take actions on behalf of the principals that involve the delegation of some decision-
making authority to the agent.  
 
The theory assumes that principals and agents have different agendas and attitudes towards 
risk sharing (goal conflict). This goal conflict may, in turn result in one or both parties 
undertake actions that may be against the interest of the other party (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Holmstrom, 1979). Agency framework provides that unless the agent‘s behaviour is 
controlled through incentive contracts, conflict of interests is likely to arise to undermine the 
interests of the principal (Kotovitz, 1987; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The agency model recognises two broad strategic behaviours as adverse selection and moral 
hazards (Akerlof, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mahoney, 1990). An adverse-selection 
is an ex-ante strategic behaviour problem and it appears when the agent withholds private 
information about its own capabilities from the principal or the principal made a wrong 
choice of selecting an agent as result of lack of information on agent‘s actual capacity to 
deliver as expected (Akerlof, 1970: Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
 A moral hazard, on the other hand, is an ex post-contractual strategic behaviour and it arises 
when the principal cannot observe the agent‘s actions either because the agent is more expert 
in their task or monitoring costs are found to be prohibitively higher than the savings to be 
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made by doing so. Both adverse selection and moral hazards may explain why a principal 
may not achieve functionality and cost efficiency from agency relationships (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
The major contribution of agency theory to efficient contract design is that it points out the 
possibility of goal conflict of the agent and moral hazards as a result of information 
asymmetry. Thus the agency model focuses on the need for the principal to craft risk-
incentive mechanism into the contract design in a way that the motivational goals of the agent 
are aligned with his interests.  
 
However, the agency model has some weaknesses. Perrow (1986) and others have criticised 
agency theory for ignoring complex issues of competition and lack testable hypothesis.  The 
agency model has also been criticised for assuming that ex post bargaining is efficient and ex 
ante incentive alignment for specified incentives could easily lead to predictable outcomes. 
This assumption is argued to ignore the possibility that increasing uncertainty makes it 
expensive to shift risk despite the motivational benefits to do so (Perrow, 1986; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Williamson (1983) commented on the weakness of the agency model of assuming zero 
cost transaction and noted that output measures such as functionality and quality cannot be 
measured in reasonable accuracy a priori. Agency model also Brousseau and Glachant (2002) 






2.2.2 Property Rights Model 
 
 
The PRT on the other hand focuses on the assignment of rights to owners of economic assets 
(Coase, 1960). Property rights theory hold that economic activities include exchange of 
resources that can be bundled into property rights (Demsetz, 1964; Alchian and Demsetz 
1972). In the economics literature property rights refer to the rights to use, right to earn 
income from, and to transfer or exchange to assets and resources.  The distribution of income 
generated by collected effort by different contracting parties pursuing different agenda 
motives leads to inefficient positioning and therefore carries some forms of risk and cost. The 
main arguments in the PRT theory is that unless the investing party is given the control and 
residual rights over his assets, they may be exposed to the hazards of hold-up and 
opportunism (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1979, 1994; Demsetz, 1964). In effect, property 
rights specification arise in response to the economic problem of allocating scarce resources, 
and the assigning of property rights affects economic behaviour and economic outcomes 
(Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1964).  
 
The major contribution of PRT to contract design is the modelling of ownership and incentive 
structures put forward by Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The model 
prescribes that the owner of the assets should be given the right to take decisions and in 
extreme cases where uncertainty is high should adopt joint sharing of the risk in the assets. 
Perhaps, the most important contribution PRT theories to contract management are in the area 
of supporting economic activities through legal protection (Libecap, 1989). For example, 
countries with effective property rights regime have been able to attract investors because 




Like the agency model, the PRT model suffers from some weaknesses. Williamson (2002) 
commented on the problem of property rights by arguing that given the pervasive information, 
uncertainty and complexity that affects property rights it is not feasible to bargain efficiently 
at the beginning of the contract. In other words, PRT ignores the cost involved in trying to 
specify ways to respond to changes in the environment and enforcements (Demsetz, 1998; 
Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). Moreover, some writers, such as North (1990) and 
Williamson, 2002) commented that it is difficult to operationalise the important explanatory 
elements in property rights models.  
 
The third, approach to incentive contract design is TCE. As it would be discussed in greater 
detail in the chapter, TCE offers a different perspective to what constitutes contractual 
problems and the corresponding solutions for them. Notwithstanding, their obvious 
differences in their assumptions on contractual efficiency, are useful in providing important 
understanding of various contracting problems both in the private business sector and in the 
public sector.  
 
2.2.3 Justification of TCE  
 
This study adopts TCE as the dominant theory to investigate the causes and problem of hold-
ups in the telecoms and water contracts. While it cannot be denied that agency theory and 
PRT can explain opportunistic behaviour through the contractual incentives framework, 
neither of them would be helpful to answer the research question. In particular, the research 
question is formulated around TCE assumption and that makes TCE as obvious theory to 
focus on, even though agency and PRT theories may be found useful to the study. TCE 
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reasoning has serious implications for public policy. Reviews undertaken by Macher and 
Richman (2006), for example, on TCE show that it has relevance as a guide to public policy 
and practice  and had been used in number of  management studies (see also Joskow, 1988; 
1990; Saussier, 2004). 
 
2.3 Overview of TCE Theory 
 
In Chapter One, we noted that PPP policy has generated debate on the key criteria of risk 
transfer and high cost overruns to the public sector at a time when the PPP approach to public 
sector procurement is growing in influence and practice worldwide. As was noted, many 
writers continued to be sceptical about the arguments in support of private sector 
participation in public provision principally because of possible contractual failures and high 
cost overruns. However, the problem of PPP contracting is better explained through 
economic theory on transaction costs analysis, as espoused by Williamson. 
 
TCE is a branch of organisational economics that focuses mainly on firms, markets, and other 
forms of contracting and seen as governance structures to minimise transaction costs and to 
achieve efficient outcomes (Williamson, 1985). Williamson, drawing from Coase‘s (1937) 
ideas, posits that the main purpose of economic institutions of capitalism is economising on 
transaction costs during exchanges with third parties (Williamson, 1985). In this context 
organisations are viewed as collections of explicit or implicit contracts characterised by 
incomplete specification of contingencies and therefore involve transaction costs. Williamson 
distinguishes transaction costs from production costs and defines transaction costs as those 
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incurred in every transaction when ‗a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface. One stage of activity is terminated and another begins‘ (Williamson, 
1981, p. 552; 1996a, p. 58). Some writers have provided their own definitions. Arrow defines 
transaction costs as the ‗costs of running the economic system‘ (Arrow 1969, p. 48) and 
argues that its identification in different contracts and under different systems of resource 
allocation is important. Dahlman (1979) distinguishes three categories of transaction costs: 
search for information costs, bargaining and decision costs and enforcement costs. 
Combining Williamson‘s definition and that of Arrow and others, the picture that emerges is 
that transaction costs arise every time business exchanges take place with a third party. These 





In TCE analysis, the methodology for economising these costs ‗entails an examination of the 
comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative 
governance‘ studies (Williamson, 1996a, p. 58). This implies that managers consider 
possibilities of how to organise a transaction at relative cost. According to Williamson, 
managers may choose market transaction or organise it in-house. The other form of 
governance that had emerged between the continuum between markets and in house is the 
hybrid form of governance. PPP falls under the hybrid governance and is further discussed 
later in the chapter. Table 2.1 shows the various types of governance structures. Each of these 
modes of governance is supported by specialised institutional structures in which ‗the 
integrity of a transaction or related set of transactions is decided‘ (Williamson, 1996, p. 11). 
Detailed discussion on the dichotomy between market and internal provision (hierarchies) are 
                                                          
3
 The relevance of transaction costs as they relate to contract management is that they cause economic friction 
and this is distinguished from production costs. 
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beyond this thesis even though its significance cannot be lost on the hybrid form this thesis is 
interested in. 
  
Table 2.1 Transaction Characteristics and Governance Structure  
 
 
Matching governance structures and Attributes of Transactions. (Source Williamson, 1979) 
 
In general terms, although the market enjoys the advantage of being able to use competition 
to fix optimal prices, this advantage is shifted to the internal provision when a transaction 
requires special need for future adaptation and re-negotiations (Williamson, 1975, 2008). The 
reason is that market transactions contain frictions that could lead to ‗market failure‘, 
particularly when firms attempt to enter into long-term business collaboration to buy or sell 
goods and services supported by specialised assets. These market failures, in the TCE view, 
are bounded rationality opportunism, asset specificity and uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). 
Crucially, it could be demonstrated that the above variables are also contractual problems in 
PPP at least, from TCE perspectives. As a result, it is important we understand their 
theoretical implications and contractual solutions proposed by Williamson to design them 
away efficiently in a contract design (Mahoney, 1990).
4
. In the next section, we discuss 
briefly his behavioural assumptions and transactional characteristics. 
                                                          
4
 Managers are therefore called to organise transactions so as to ‗economise on bounded rationality while 
simultaneously safeguarding themselves against the hazards of opportunism‘ (Williamson, 1985). 
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2.3.1 Behavioural Assumptions 
 
TCE is one of a number of schools of thought that has made the issue of human behaviour a 
central element in theoretical discussions of economic organisations. Other behavioural 
economics and trust-based schools too have highlighted the importance of human nature in 
inter-firm relations (for example, Simon, 1957; Levinthal and March, 1993; Bromiley and 
Flemming, 2002). Simon (1957; 1955), for example, in relation to efficiency outcomes, urges 
that the study of human behaviour should form the basis of a research agenda.  
 
Following Simon (1957) and drawing much of his material from the behavioural economics 
literature, Williamson (1975) developed two behavioural concepts into his analytical 
framework and insisted that the study of human behaviour is critical to an understanding of 
how economic actors think and how their minds work (Williamson, 1979). He identified two 
human traits - the conditions of cognition and self-interest orientation- and described them as 
problematic in contract management. He summarised his rationale for placing human 
behavioural assumptions at the height of his analysis as that ‗human imagination and ability 
to surprise opponents is high and that knowledge of particulars, moreover, does not preclude 
surprises.‘ 
In support of his assumptions, Williamson, citing Simon (1985, p. 302) said: ‗Nothing is 
more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than 
our view of the nature of the human beings whose behaviour we are studying‘, making 
reference to cognitive and self-interestedness of humans. This may also implies that the study 
of contractual problems also requires the understanding of human motivation in business 
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relations (Williamson, 1985. p. 58). It is with this in mind that we examine TCE behavioural 
assumptions of TCE. The framework for transaction cost analysis is depicted in Figure 2.1 
 
      


















               
                
                                        













In what follows, therefore, bounded rationality and opportunism will be discussed in detail. 
Later in the discussion, the third behavioural assumption will be discussed: human foresight 
that allows decision makers to partially overcome their cognitive limitations.  
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2.3.1.1 Bounded Rationality 
 
Economists have long worked on the assumption that humans conform to the model of 
rational utility maximisation (Simon, 1955; March, 1994). Under the rational model, decision 
makers are assumed to be perfect calculating machines, able to predict accurately from the 
costless information in the environment (Simon, 1955). The rational model has the following 
assumptions: 
(a) humans have access to relevant information  
(b) there are no limits on the extent of information gathering 
(c) information is available to humans at no cost 
 
Williamson, amongst others, has challenged this assumption (see also Edgeworth, 1890; Hall 
and Hitch, 1939). For example, Edgeworth described humans as having ‗limited intelligence‘ 
(1890:467), and Almond (1945) used ‗limited rationality‘ to describe human limitations in 
making informed decisions. Simon (1955: 1957), on his part, pioneered a paradigm shift from 
the more optimistic neoclassical view of man as a rational being to a more cautious one of 
near rationality. His justification was that there are limits on the ability of actors to search for 
and process information (Simon, 1955).  
 
Relying on Simon and others from the behavioural school, Williamson defined bounded 
rationality as a behaviour that is ‗intendedly rational, but limitedly only so‘ and argued that 
economic actors would not be able to write a complete contract (Williamson, 1996, P. 6). The 
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literature offers a number of reasons why economic agents would not be able to write a 
complete contract, of which the condition of bounded rationality is part.  
 
The TCE literature offers a number of reasons why economic agents would not be able to 
write a complete contract, of which the condition of bounded rationality is part. First, 
cognitive limitations mean that it is not possible for agents to assemble all necessary 
information, thus contracts will always be incomplete with errors, gaps, and omissions Even 
where complete information is available, it is contended, it may be a costly exercise to write 
all of them in one document for third party enforcements by the courts (see Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1996). The central message is that economic actors are rationally 
bounded in one or the other and that create risk in business exchanges. However, bounded 
rationality on its own does not tell us anything about why contracts fail or increases cost of 
doing business with third parties. This takes us to the second assumption of opportunism in 
the TCE framework. The next section discusses the second behavioural assumption of 





The second behavioural assumption in the TCE framework is opportunism. A major objective 
of  individuals in economic exchange is the self-interest to maximise their interests   However, 
self-interests may move beyond normal pursuit of one‘s interests to where cheating and 
deception are employed as strategic behaviour to maximise their profitability at the expense 
of the other party in an exchange. Williamson defined opportunism simply as ‗self-interest 
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seeking with guile‘ (Williamson 1975:6: 1985 p. 47). He used the word  ‗guile‘ to differential 
simple self-interest from dishonest acts to include ‗calculated efforts to mislead, distort, 
disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse,‘ Williamson (1985) assumed that economic agents 
have the propensity to cheat given the opportunity to maximise their interests. However, 
further contributions to the concept of opportunism have identified that opportunism may be 
explicit or subtle and therefore difficult to detect. For example, the literature identifies acts 
such as refusing to honour contractual terms, walking away from contracts or other deliberate 
acts with an intention to cheat are all explicit form of opportunism (Williamson, 1985; 1996; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000). For example, Muris (1981, p. 521), agreeing with that definition of 
opportunism, added that opportunism occurs when a party behaves, contrary to the 
understanding of the contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement‘s explicit terms, 
resulting to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer. 
 
Subtle opportunism, on the other hand, can take the form of withholding information or 
making false representations during negotiations similar to adverse selection or moral hazards 
in agency relationships. Examples of subtle opportunistic acts that may lack visibility to a 
contracting party include quality shading and the withholding of effort or shirking (moral 
hazards) which is consistent with agency framework. The other important aspect of 
opportunism pointed out in the literature is the distinction made between opportunistic 
attitude and opportunistic behaviour. Williamson (1975, p. 48) refers to opportunistic 
attitudes as one of the ‗rudimentary attributes of human nature,‘ implying that this particular 
human attitude is relatively stable and unaffected by a given situation. In contrast, 
opportunistic behaviour could be dictated by incentives that are present in a given situation 
that may encourage or deter opportunistic behaviours (Williamson, 1975). Opportunistic 
behaviour can be interpreted as one that may be triggered in many situations when gains from 
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short-term opportunistic acts are attractive or where the possibility of detection is low (see 
Williamson 1975; 1985). This is the real threat in business exchanges as inaccurate 
information about the intention of a potential supplier is the source of transaction cost. This 
part of new meaning to opportunism as a pervasive human failing is not only controversial 
but has generated a lot of debate in the literature. The basis of the debate will be made clearer 
as we review TCE literature. 
 
2.3.1.3 The Significance of the Behavioural Assumptions 
 
The TCE literature uses the behavioural assumptions to explain the complex problems in 
economic exchange and their significance on efficient outcomes. The effect of both bounded 
rationality and opportunism on market exchanges is illustrated in a matrix in Figure 2.2 
below.   
 
 
Figure 2.2 Contracting in the Context of Bounded Rationality and Oppottunism 
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The matrix consists of four different types of marketing conditions which correspond to 
bounded rationality and opportunism. The model specifies four distinct contracting 
conditions an economic actor is likely to be located.  In cell (A), the key information about 
the transaction is available to each party and there is no opportunism. This is the ideal market 
for economic actors to engage in economic activity to achieve efficiency. However in real life, 
this condition hardly occurs. The other cells B, C, and D, present us with the practical 
problem when one, or both bounded rationality of opportunism is present.  If a transaction 
takes place under a condition of unbounded rationality and presence of opportunism, the 
likelihood of opportunism occurring can be foreseen, and, as a precaution, extra-safeguards 
can be crafted in the contract design to deal comprehensively with the risk. This from of 
comprehensive contracting is in cell (B). Similarly, where opportunism is absent, but limited 
information is present, parties are able to respond to contractual problems that may occur in 
the course of the exchange. This type of contracting takes place in cell (c) and is where 
relational contracting is developed (see McNeil, 1978, Granovetter, 1985). However, where 
both parties are rationally bounded but opportunism is present are present in a given 
transaction, then both parties face the most difficult contracting environment and, as a 
consequence, lead to market failures. Unfortunately, TCE argues that this is where most 
economic exchanges take place under the conditions described in cell (d).  Interestingly, 
bilateral contracting, the focus of this thesis, is also located here. 
 
Going by Williamson‘s model of contracting claims, one is tempted to regard opportunism as 
pervasive in economic exchanges and that together with bounded rationality buyer-supplier 
exchanges may not be efficient. Williamson appears to hold that view strongly when he 
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contended that contractual difficulties ‗would vanish were it not for the twin conditions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism‘ (Williamson, 1996a, p. 10).  
 
However, the debates over the centrality of opportunism in transaction cost analysis shows 
that not everybody shares that view (see Alchian and Woodward, 1988; Coase; 1991). For 
example, Coase reject the idea that opportunism is an important factor in business 
relationships nor does he accept the idea that asset specificity exposes a firm to opportunism 
and therefore lead to integration. For example, Coase (1991, p, 71-72), made reference to  
Smith contract with GM and argued that there was a harmonious relationship between the 
two and that GM did not resort to post-contractual opportunism despite much of the dedicated 
machinery was specific to GM.  
 
The debate over opportunism is irrelevant to our present study. What is important, though 
from the debate what that means to the public sector manager in managing PPP.  On the other 
hand, as opportunism debate continues PPP empirical studies in UK, USA, and Australia 
provide the evidence that opportunism remains the major cause of high transaction costs. 
However, it is unclear where the dividing line should be drawn between potential opportunist 
suppliers and those who are not given public sector is interested in post-contractual protection 
against risk of opportunism. Before we look into the various mechanisms available to 
managers to design efficient contract to achieve optimal supplier performance, we shift our 
attention to the second block in the TCE framework related to transaction characteristics of 




2.3 .1.4 Transactional Characteristics  
 
The previous section discussed the behavioural assumptions that underpin the TCE analysis. 
In this section, we focus on the three attributes of a transaction identified as asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. The objective here is to examine how these transaction attributes 
interact with bounded rationality and opportunism to create contractual problem impediments 
to efficient contract design.  TCE identifies the attributes of a transaction -asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency as central to its hypothesis. Their full implications for the post-
contractual hold-up will be discussed in the following section. 
 
One of the problems faced by early transaction cost theorists was how to make transaction 
costs operational. This problem was solved when Williamson made the characteristics of a 
transaction the unit of analysis in his framework focusing on the main analytical properties of 
a transaction (Williamson, 1975; 1996). Williamson argued that taking the transaction as the 
basic unit of analysis allows transaction costs to be operationalised in line with the three 
conditions proposed earlier by Commons (1932) solves the methodological problem in 
analysis contractual relationships. According to the guidelines laid down by Commons (1932), 
any unit of analysis should contain ‗in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and 
order‘ (Commons 1932, p. 4). Williamson (1975; 1996) further noted that the degree of each 
attribute in each particular transaction can be measured reasonably and this allows the theory 
to focus primarily on micro-analytical questions (for example, the comparative efficacy with 
alternative generic forms of governance, market, hierarchies and hybrids to economise on 
transaction costs. TCE identified the attributes of a transaction -asset specificity, uncertainty 
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and frequency as central to its hypothesis. Their full implications for the post-contractual 
hold-up are discussed below. 
 
Asset specificity: Asset specificity is perhaps the most important transaction characteristic in 
TCE framework. Williamson (1985) defines asset specificity as ‗durable investments that are 
undertaken in support of a particular transaction, the opportunity cost of which investment is 
much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be 
terminated.‘ These transaction dedicated assets cover physical, human resources and 
intangibles. 
 
Specifically, the literature distinguishes six primary types of asset specificity: (1) site 
specificity, where businesses are located together to economise on inventory and 
transportation expenses; (2) physical asset specificity related to the plant, machinery or tools 
needed to carry out specific tasks (3) dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in 
general purpose plants that are made purposely to suit a particular customer; (4) ‗brand name 
capital‘ and (5) temporal specificity in investments to support timely on-site responsiveness 
(6) dedicated assets specially developed to serve the special needs of a large customer 
(Williamson, 1991,1996). 
 
In recent times, non-physical human asset specificity related to specialised knowledge such 
as research and development and firm-specific knowledge have come under asset specificity. 
Mortensen (1978) suggested that human specificity involves the experience and skills 
required in training some writers (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 1998) have suggested that shared 
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language, knowledge and routines should be considered as asset specificity in partnerships, 
arguing that their value is limited to that relationship. In whatever form asset specificity takes, 
the characteristics remain the same. Their uses are restricted to a particular transaction with 
less economic value in the nest best uses (see Williamson, 1996; Klein et al., 1978).  
 
The second variable is uncertainty. The concept of uncertainty can be found in strategic and 
management literature and refers to an information problem (Slater and Spencer, 2000). In 
TCE literature, the concept of uncertainty refers to ‗unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding an exchange,‘ MacGuinness, 1994; 70) provided a more specific definition of 
uncertainty as a condition when ‗there are very many known alternatives or there are known 
to be currently unimaginable possibilities‘ (MacGuinness, 1994; P.70). This implies that there 
are so many known and unknown possibilities that it is difficult to identify which is likely or 
not to occur in the future.  In the context of contract relation, future conditions of price 
(Pilling et al., 1984), service or product demand (David and Han, 2004), technology and 
government regulation (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006) are few examples of non-
contractible ones create potential problems for economic actors to provide for in written 
contract contracts. Even if it is possible to imagine future contingencies it is not possible to 
quantify their effect on the contract design. An important contribution to economic contract 
literature regarding uncertainty is one from Knight (1921). He distinguished risk from 
uncertainty by noting that ‗risk‘ refers to choice situations where decision makers are 
confronted with conditions whose outcome can be known from alternative choices with 
known probability distributions and their pay offs.  In comparison to uncertainty, risk allows 
for the possibility that economic agents are able to predict the likelihood of an occurrence and 
pre-emptive action against it.   
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The distinction between risk and uncertainty is significant to contract management because 
Williamson does not consider risk as constraints to efficient contract design but considers 
uncertainty as problematic to complete contracting design. By contrast, under uncertainty, 
economic agents cannot plan against future events since the future cannot be predicted with 
absolute certainty. Even where complete information is available, TCE argues that it is hard 
for parties to communicate their intentions in such a way that an uninformed third party or a 
court could reasonably enforce them (Williamson; 1975; 1983). Williamson agreed with Hart 
(1988) that all long term contracts are necessarily incomplete and has since become the 
anchor of Williamson‘s analysis between complete contracting and one incomplete with 
transaction cost in possibility of future post-contractual negotiations. The uncertainty concept 
has been extended to cover behaviour of economic agents deemed unpredictable in the sense 
that individuals may be tempted to play outside rules of engagement or being opportunistic 
(Williamson, 1985; 1979).  The concept of uncertainty and the link to opportunism is 
important as we examine the contractual problems in PPP and the need for ex-post protection. 
Frequency:  The last variable of a transaction in TCE model is frequency.  In the TCE 
literature, frequency is understood to mean how often a transaction will have to be carried out 
between a buyer and a supplier (see Williamson 1979; 1985:60-61). Williamson noted that 
the frequency with which a transaction occurs matters and argues that where a particular 
transaction occurs infrequently, (for example maintenance of plants and machinery that takes 
place once a year) managers will find it cost effective to organise that transaction from 
outside the firm. This is because the costs incurred to establish a specialist unit that works 
only once a year cannot be justified in terms of the investments made to keep it operational. 
In contrast, a manager may find it worthwhile to organise internally a core transaction that 
occurs frequently and save set-up costs and that of concluding separate contracts for the time 
the service is required.  
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 Of all the three transaction characteristics, Williamson placed asset specificity at the heart of 
its analysis which he described as the ‗big locomotive to which TCE owes much of its 
predictive content‘ in vertical integration. In relation to the behavioural assumptions, TCE 
hold the view that asset specificity exposes the firm to opportunism where uncertainty is high 
hence integration is adopted to avoid post-contractual opportunism (Williamson, 1979). This 
has been subject to many empirical studies and scholarly debate.  
 
One part of research has studied how asset specificity and uncertainty and opportunism affect 
buyer-supplier relationships and others analyse the effect of these interacting variable on the 
contract design and governance. Some studies found that asset specificity (David and Han, 
2004), others found uncertainty (Klein, 1978) as critical factor that lead to contractual hold 
ups problems and opportunism. Other writers (Armour and Teece, 1980) contend that if 
technological uncertainty is high due to quick obsolesce market transaction is predicted. On 
the other hand if technological uncertainty is due to the complexity of coordinating a 
technical a system then greater internalisation is predicted (Armour and Teece, 1980).  
 
Although empirical studies suggest that Williamson‘s assets specificity and uncertainty and 
to a lesser degree inefficiency provided the rationale for integration, recent debate between 
Klein (2000) and Coase, (2001, 2006) on one hand and Casadesus-Masanell, and Spulber 





In recent times, the account given by Klein, et al., 1978) on the Fisher Body and GM as 
evidence of integration to avoid opportunistic behaviour has been challenged first by 
Casadesus-Masanell, and Spulber, (2000) and later by Coase, (2006). The view of Coase, 
(2006 p.268) following the earlier work by Casadesus-Masanell, and Spulber, (2000)  on the 
Fisher Body-GM case and after further investigation now with more access to more  
documents asserted that ‗asset specificity leading to opportunist behaviour are wrong.‘ He 
continued: ‗The opportunistic actions that were supposed to have taken by Fisher Body, the 
locating of the body plants, and the use by Fisher Body of inefficient methods of production, 
never happened‘ (ibid).  He argued that Klein et al, 1978, got all wrong and that the decision 
to merge with Fisher Body was purely for business purposes.  However, the issue of vertical 
integration is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, the focus is on the effect of uncertainty 
which many writers argue causes hold-ups and lead to costly ex post-bargaining in bilateral 
contracting. The significance of this is addressed later in the thesis in which its economic 
implications and TCE‘s contractual solution of using extra-safeguards prevent parties against 
the risk of hold ups would be further discussed. 
 
It is noteworthy to point out that we spent greater part of discussing the major contracting 
problems in business exchanges under two areas of human failings of being limited in our 
ability to make rational decisions and the possibility that there are dishonest individuals who 
will take advantage of a party‘s cognitive incompetence to cheat. We also note the 
characteristics of a transaction in which uncertainty on makes long term contract incomplete 
and when such a relation is supported by transaction specific assets creates scope for 
opportunism and possibly market failure. All these factors affect bilateral contracting of PPP. 
From this stage we will be able to address the specific contractual problems associated with 
PPP and the appropriate solutions. In the next section, we consider the many ways PPP share 
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similarities with TCE‘s bilateral contracting and the implication for PPP efficient contract 
design in terms of risk sharing. 
 
2.3.2 Bilateral Governance 
 
In this section, we look at bilateral governance as a hybrid form of governance. Bilateral 
governance was a later addition to the original TCE market and hierarchy dichotomy. 
Williamson (1975) was criticised for paying little attention to hybrid governance modes by 
over-emphasising markets and hierarchies (Macneil, 1978; Granovetter, 1985).  Williamson 
(1975) dismissed ‗hybrid‘ governance ‗as middle kind‘ that are unstable. However, against 
the backdrop of the explosion of different forms of hybrid governance of relational 
contracting (McNeil, 1978); networks (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Grandori and Soda, 
1995); joint ventures (Hennart, 1991), and strategic alliances (Oxley, 1997), Williamson 
(1985: 1996) operating successfully in different business sectors, finally accepted and gave 
legitimacy to it as part of his transaction cost minimisation hypothesis. In accepting hybrid as 
part of his hypothesis Williamson (1985, p. 83) noted:  
 
‗Whereas I was earlier on the view that transactions of a middle kind were very difficult to organise and hence 
were unstable….I am now persuaded that … they are much common.‘  
 
 
Unfortunately, hybrid governance has not attracted much scholarly attention and empirical 
studies in the same way as market and hierarchy, and PPP readily comes to mind which little 
is understood about its dynamics. At this stage, it would be helpful to examine the rationale 
behind the increasingly emergence of bilateral contracting despite the fact that transactions 
that are characterised by some form of idiosyncratic investments, uncertainty with risk of 
opportunism are supposed to be integrated. 
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2.3.3 Emergence of Bilateral Contracting in Business Relationships 
 
Although TCE provides that transaction characterised by asset specific and uncertainty are 
better organised under unified governance to avoid post-contractual opportunism,  the extant 
empirical studies show that bilateral governance is increasingly becoming popular in business 
activities both within and across national  borders (Kogut, 1988; Pisano 1990; Pirrong, 1993). 
What accounts for the explosion of hybrid form of governance worldwide?  
 
Some writers in contemporary times assert that in fast and turbulent but dynamic market 
conditions, organisations are able to survive when they establish collaborative relationships 
(see also Kogut, 1988; Myer, et al., 1993). Other writers, such as Pisano (1990), explored 
when firms are likely to enter into collaborative relationships sharing information and 
managing their uncertainty and found that parties are able to operate successfully in 
partnerships than when operating individually. His studies discovered that bilateral 
governance is more likely in situations where partners are in joint product or service 
development, such as R&D, or where inter-related multiple projects are involved. On the 
other hand, he also found that bilateral governance will emerge less if there are more 
alternative suppliers. Pirrong, 1993 found that specialised and capital intensive industries 
such as the aviation industry, telecommunications or ship building fall into this category. 
Klein‘s (1978; 1980; 1996) studies in hybrid relationships found similar reasons. He 
concluded that bilateral contracting is desirable if the product or the input markets are thin, 
implying that the relative scarcity of suppliers will mean that the buyers will have to enter 
into a form of partnership to maintain supply security and exploit their economies of scale for 
their mutual benefit.  
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A further consideration case for bilateral governance is that backward or forward integration 
may not be feasible in some situations because of legal prohibitions Williamson (1985) and 
Klein (1996) contended in some cases industry regulators had declared integration unlawful 
on suspicion that it is meant to create cartels for the purposes of seeking monopoly rents. 
Although in recent times a distinction has been made between firms seeking market power 
and firms seeking to provide contractual safeguards through sharing and complementing each 
other‘s work, antitrust laws mean that bilateral contracting is thriving would continue  to be 
adopted (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
 
All the above explanations for the existence of bilateral governance are applicable to PPP. In 
the public sector as already noted in Chapter 1, bilateral contracting PPP arose as a response 
to the need to transfer risk to the privates sector it cannot handle efficiently and also to access 
private sector technology and innovation it lacked capacity internally to produce. However, 
the framing of PPP as hybrid governance meant that the risk of market failures resulting from 
incomplete contracting (uncertainty), lock-in effects (sunk costs, and switching cost) and 
opportunism equally apply to and that require that ex-post protection. In the next section, we 
look at the problem of hold-ups from TCE lenses as it affects public sector in their 
relationship with the private sector. 
 
2.4 Bilateral Contracting and Post Contractual Hold-ups 
  
In this section, we discuss the literature on contract failures arising from hold-ups, argued to 
be the biggest challenge in business exchanges (Williamson, 1975; Klein, 1978; Monteverde 
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and Teece, 1982). A hold-up is the condition where a party finds itself in a relationship 
detrimental to its interest but in the absence of viable alternatives has to accept less than ideal 
terms from the other party (see Williamson, 1985; Masten and Crocker, 1985; Masten, 1993).  
 
In the TCE literature, the common causes of hold-ups are occasioned by asymmetrical 
investments in transaction specific assets as evidenced from empirical studies (see 
Monteverde and Teece, 1982; John and Weitz, 1988), aerospace components (Masten, 1984), 
natural gas (Masten and Crocker, 1985), and coal (Joskow, 1985, 1987). Studies in this area 
also suggest that hold-ups occur when a significant shift in future events affecting the 
contract relation (i.e. market conditions; technological changes; government legislation) 
pushes the contract out of the self-enforcement range and the parties need to renegotiate the 
original terms (see Klein et al., 1978). A classic example of a hold-up is the Fisher Body-
General Motors case. The contract between the two parties over delivery of chassis was 
signed and when demand rose and GM needed to renegotiate the price and volume, Fisher 
Body refused to locate its production facilities and after costly renegotiations General Motors 
purchased Fisher Body in 1926. Both TCE theories and PRT have used this narrative to 
support their theories on the importance of asset specificity residual rights and hold-ups in 
many textbooks (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Besanko et al., 1996). This version of the 
explanation for the integration earlier been noted, however, has been challenged contending 
that the merger has more to do with synchronising their operations than to overcome the 
opportunistic behaviour of Fisher Body (see Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Coase, 
2000, 2006).  
 
 In PPP, the problem of hold-ups brings into focus the exit constraints of switching costs. 
Switching cost refers to cost of writing off previous investments made and cost of developing 
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a new supplier in the market.  Switching costs may go beyond writing off previous specific 
assets. Cost such as searching for a new supplier, delays in project completion, service 
interruptions and loss of reputation and payment of compensation are some of the obvious 
cost associated with switching from one supplier to another (see Heide and Weiss 1995; 
Blankerburg et al., 1999). A further consideration is also given to loss of future revenues a 
period between termination and the time that the new supplier becomes operational. 
Essentially, switching cost could be prohibitively high in PPP. For example, in the NIRS2 
project in the UK, the estimated switching costs were £44 million (Lonsdale, 2005a). This 
leads us to consider what another cause of a hold-up termed ‗fundamental transformation‘ 
arising from long term relationship in business exchanges.  
 
Williamson also draws attention to a phenomenon of ‗fundamental transformation.‘ The term 
refers to the situation whereby suppliers will go through competition bidders but in the next 
contract renewal the buyer may no longer be interested in changing partners by using the 
market as a result of dedicated assets deployed since the last contract award. Williamson 
(1976) used this term to describe the Oakland California cable TV (CATV) franchise.  He 
found out that the franchisee considered in costly to write off the dedicated investments and 
use the market again to select a partner there was prepared to accept terms that were no near 
the original one. However, the small number relation‘ is not restricted to the franchise 
industry but in other sectors where dedicated assets to support a relation is required. In the IT 
sector, for example, Lacity et al, (1996) examined broadly long term contracting effect on IT 
contracting. These writers concluded that this high asset write off prevented the IT buyers 
from re-entering the market during contract renewals.  Another perspective than can be taken 
is that some suppliers may encourage IT buyers to invest in their systems and effectively cut 
off other competitors and lock them into their systems. Theoretically, either the buyer or 
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supplier could engage in hold-up behaviour and opportunism. Although opportunism may be 
present in buyer supplier exchange, it could be a real risk if the transaction involves asset 
specificity. This is because it allows the vulnerable party to be exploited. 
 
In PPP contracts, the public sector is vulnerable hold-ups in similar way since most  of the 
relationships are characterised by medium to high asset specificity (Lonsdale, 2005a). One of 
the problems facing the public sector is uncertainty and is the major cause of hold-ups in 
PPP. Empirical results in UK public sector shows that uncertainty relating to incomplete 
specification of all future contingencies end up with high transaction costs and poor value for 
money. For example, the Benefits Agency (UK Treasury Task Force, 1999), Channel Rail 
link (Glaister, 1999) and Libra project are but a few of the many other high PFI projects (see; 
NAO, 1999; Treasury Task Force, 1999; Gaffney and Pollock et al., 2001; Lonsdale, 2005b; 
Sadka, 2006).  
 
From the above cases, one can argue that many of the hold-ups the public sector faces are 
attributed to uncertainty with economic consequences of high transaction cost and poor value 
for money. This is particularly so, at least, from TCE perspective, an opportunistic private 
supplier may take advantage of a hold-up to appropriate economic rent from the relationship. 
This does not suggest that all suppliers are potentially opportunistic and nor does it also 
suggest that no supplier will be opportunistic. Perhaps, more often the risk posed by hold-ups 
can result in vulnerable actors to seek partners who are not opportunistic. However, this is 
proven difficult in practice because of behavioural uncertainty on the part of economic agents 




Despite the central problem of hold-ups and the risk that opportunistic suppliers exploit to 
appropriate quasi-rent many writers challenge the view that hold-ups are orchestrated by 
suppliers or that it result in economic rent appropriations (Klein, 1996; Coase, 2006). As 
already noted Klein does not share Williamson‘s assertion that economic partners engage in 
strategic behaviour to engineer hold-ups for rent appropriation. Klein, 1996) shown that the 
hold-up that occurred in the GM-Fisher contract was a result of uncertainty when the original 
contract shifted from self-enforcing range to conditions not covered in the original contract. 
He further distinguished between a normal hold-up situation where a partner issues of threats 
of exit and the one which it is used a party to negotiate favourable terms against the ideal 
position of the other part.  While supporting arguments that hold-ups occur in business 
exchanges and can also affect firms‘ performance, Coase, (1991; 2006) demonstrate that the 
presence of hold-ups in a relation does not indicate economic exploitation in the A.O. Smith 
contract with GM (Coase, 1991, p, 71-72). Demsetz, 1982; Hubbard, 2001 also show that 
hold-ups may be subtle and difficult to detect. 
 
Given the problem of identifying a potential opportunistic suppliers and the effect of 
opportunism on optimal outcomes, buyers are advised to assume the worst and design an 
efficient contract to protect themselves from possible post-contractual opportunism 
(Williamson, 1975; 1983). This takes us to consider TCE guidelines on the use of credible 
contract enforcement mechanisms by buyers can craft into their contract design to protect 
themselves against uncertainty and post-contractual opportunism. Before we examine 
Williamson‘s (1983) credible commitment model and its substantive application in 
transactions supported by dedicated assets, we discuss briefly private mechanisms considered 
as alternative to explicit contracts and the role of repeated interactions in changing 
uncertainty into calculated risk between short term opportunistic acts and towards long term 
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to contractual mutual benefits and which is relevant in our study..  In the next section we look 
at these approaches. 
 
2.4.1 Approaches to Contract Disputes Resolution 
 
 
Contracts are normally supported by contract law and that means contractual disputes can be 
subjected to court arbitration and litigation. While this can be useful using third parties to 
settle commercial disputes, a growing criticism from writers suggests that it could be 
counterproductive in relationships such as PPP where continuity is deemed important 
(Williamson, 2000; 2003; Mahoney, 1991). Writers such as Klien (1978), Telser (1981) and 
Mahoney (1991) have argued against the use of the courts as it is found to increase 
transaction costs through delays and high legal fees. Moreover, many writers (e.g. Tesker, 
1981; Mahoney, 1991) have argued that if the courts fail to enforce the terms literally, then 
this may paradoxically create more scope for hold-ups and this in turn would mean that 
parties may be cautious in what they write in their contract. 
 
The obvious difficulties of using the courts to settle contractual disputes allows parties to 
seek protection using reputations and repeated transactions (Williamson, 1979; Mahoney 
1991). However, as has been found in practice, there are some problems with the reliance on 
the goodwill of partners to remain committed to non-enforceable contractual promises. In the 
case of reputation effects, it is believed it can act as an effective check on opportunistic 
behaviour as past performance is a key criterion for future business. Studies have shown that 
mere reputational effects are insufficient to enforce contract performance (see Williamson, 
1979; Gallick, 1984; Coase 2006, p). For example, Gallick (1984) study of the fishing 
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industry in the USA showed that when fishing technology changed and short-term gains 
become attractive, the processing company reneged on exclusive dealings. The argument is 
made that, reputation was no longer an effective enforcement mechanism.  
 
Closely related to agents‘ reputational capitals is the use of contingent renewal as a tool to 
enforce good behaviour (performance) of economic agents in return for future business 
(Telser, 1981). As Gintis (2005) found out, in contingent renewal markets the principal has 
power over agents because they can impose cost on agents by terminating their services that 
persistently fall below expectation. The strong point for this approach is that suppliers are 
compelled by risk of loss of future earnings to behave responsibly. However, the limitation in 
the use of power of contingent liability hinges on the fact that alternative sources for the 
supply for those particular goods or services might be in short supply. In such circumstances, 
Gintis (2005) noted the supplier may exercise counter-threats on the buyer by withholding its 
valuable services or products (see also Telser, 1981). Moreover, the strength of this approach 
also hinges on whether the supplier can easily develop alternative markets.  
 
Another informal approach often mentioned in the literature is repeated game. Similar to 
contingent liability, parties are disposed to collaboration for mutually satisfying outcomes 
and may be willing to share private information for their common good and survival. 
However, as has been pointed out, prisoner‘s dilemma phenomena tend to frustrate the use of 
this model. A prisoner‘s dilemma exists when individual incentives will lead them to the 
worst outcomes possible for themselves (see Gintis, 2005). However, uncertainty on what 
action other party may take may incline them to act opportunistically on the logic that if he 
does not cheat, the other party may do so, leaving him worse off. Moreover, repeated game 
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theories can be economically wasteful, because parties will incur more transaction costs to 
out-guess each other (Gintis, 2005).  
 
In the case of formal written long-term contracts, some writers (e.g. Klein et al., 1978; 
Joskow, 1990; Lusch and Brown, 1996) provide justification why this strategy might be 
useful in providing partners with stability or safety nets against post-contractual opportunism. 
While it is found that exclusivity time given to investors allows for sufficient time to recoup 
investments, studies show risk of hold-up makes this approach unsuitable in many 
transactions characterised by uncertainty. Some market conditions, such as price, demand and 
technological changes are difficult to predict over the contract planning period but could 
cause tensions in the relationship should they occur. Moreover, tight contract terms may 
create opportunities for parties to engage in a hold-up by insisting on the literal interpretation 
of the contract when unforeseen contingencies arise. This is what actually happened in the 
GM-Fisher contract when the conditions went out of the self-enforceable range as a result of 
events not foreseen and provided in the contract (see Klien et al., 1978).  
 
The above approaches and their weaknesses have implication for public sector managers. The 
reason is that adopting reputations and repeated transactions are private agreements and may 
be convenient and cheap but it leaves the fate of the relationship to chance since these 
mechanisms are unenforceable. Even if the courts can enforce contractual performances, the 
public sector might not be keen to adopt litigation since delay and cost will affect disruptions 
to essential services being provided by the government. On the other hand, using non-legal 
enforceable arrangements to support relationship alignment will not be a problem if 
opportunism is not present. However where opportunism exist the use of non-enforceable 
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informal agreements may be counter-productive. This is because suppliers may be tempted to 
act dishonestly if gains from short term opportunism are higher than long term contractual 
compliance. Williamson (1991, p.273) stressed this point strongly when he commented that: 
‗When the lawful gains to be had by insistence upon literal enforcement exceed discounted 
value of continuing the exchange relationship, defection from the spirit can be anticipated.‘ 
As a result, the solution to this conundrum for the public sector is on the reliance of 
Williamson‘s prescription to craft appropriate credible commitments as extra-safeguards to 
protect themselves against this problem of uncertainty. In the next section we examine the 
assurance given by Williamson that the public sector managers apply credible commitments 
to share risk efficiently to minimise transaction costs.  
 
2.4.2 The Expectation of Balance: Bilateral Governance Shared Investments or use of 
Financial Hostages 
 
The similarities between PPP and bilateral governance of TCE mean that the relationship 
between the public sector and the private sector also involves asset specificity and uncertainty 
and risk of hold-up. TCE examines the problem of asymmetrical asset specificity and noted 
that contractual problems might exist when economic generating assets are not jointly owned 
or risk shared. Consistent with Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore (1990) PRT 
model, TCE recognises the risk of post-contractual opportunism if transaction assets are not 
shared equitably. The concern from both traditions join in their beliefs that if the economic 
generating assets are owned by an individual say the buyer, the supplier will not necessarily 
take the assets‘ long run value into consideration and may appropriate the stream of rents 
especially when there is information or measurement problem Kim and Mahoney (2005). A 
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fear that an opportunistic agent will dishonestly appropriate all gains from relation may 
impact negatively on the economic activities. One of the drawbacks to economic activities is 
that parties may be unwilling to invest in transaction specific assets to support a relation 
unless they receive credible commitment that the other party will not behave 
opportunistically (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Grossman and Moore, 1990. However, if the 
contracts are complete from agency perspective then it is possible for owners of the assets to 
anticipate the other party‘s opportunistic acts and craft every contingency into the contract in 
such a manner that the initial contract balance will remained unchanged even during post-
contractual negotiations over the life of the contract.  As pointed out by Kim and Mahoney, 
(2005) based on its assumptions the separation of ownership from control of economic assets 
does not matter in agency framework.   
 
A widely recognition that managers are bounded rationally and uncertainty makes contract 
incomplete means that all future contingencies cannot be specified in contract. The 
renegotiations over the non-contractible elements have been shown to cause efficiencies 
problems in sharing gains from the output. As a solution to this problem, Williamson (1983) 
provides two strategies to craft extra safeguards to balance the risk and uncertainty in the 
relation. In the first option, where the public sector has made more investment in transaction 
specific than the private sector, which often the case, according to TCE, the investments 
should be shared with the private sector. In a situation where it is not practicable to contribute 
equally to dedicated assets, the buyer is advised by TCE to demand financial hostages equal 
to the risk not covered in the relationship. It is typically argued that if risk in dedicated assets 
is shared equitably both parties will have incentives to respond to emerging events and 
manage their uncertainty in mutual satisfying way. On the other hand, if one of the parties, 
and if it is the buyer, who has invested more in the relation, will bear more of the risk than the 
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supplier. The problem for the buyer is that he gets locked into the relation with the effect of 
getting exploited by the supplier. 
 
Clearly, TCE prescription appears to be more appealing and suitable to the public sector as 
well as private businesses. However, the task of selecting the appropriate credible contract 
enforcing measures to optimal contract design appears to be difficult, given that decision-
makers are assumed to be rationally bounded (Simon, 1957). Williamson responded by 
introducing the concept of farsighted contracting that makes buying managers having the 
ability of exercising foresight to select broad contractual safeguards to develop and sustain 
post-contractual balance. Williamson stressed the point that although buying managers might 
be rationally bounded they are not necessarily myopic and argued that the economic agents 
have the capacities ‗to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into 
the contractual relation, thereafter to devise responsive institutions‘ (Williamson, 1996, p. 9). 
What Williamson is arguing is that buying managers have the unlimited contractual foresight 
to recognise specific risk arising in a relation have the ability to provide contractual 
protection against it (Williamson, 1983, 1985). From TCE reasoning post-contractual lock in 
could be avoided and most importantly, result in interdependence or contractual balance. 
Table 2.2 shows the three generic governance choices for transactions characterised with 
little or no asset specificity to high significant levels of asset specificity and their 
economising behaviours are summarised in which farsighted contracting is emphasised under 
bilateral governance. It is to be observed that the introduction of feasible foresight appears to 
address the bounded rational contradictions to provide strong arguments for the prescription 
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The significance of this is that while this allows for the development of a theory that bridges 
the conceptual gap between incomplete contracting and complete and deterministic contract 
design, less is known about how this can be operationalised by public sector buyers. We 
examine the empirical evidence of how successfully this has contributed to the development 
of balance in bilateral contracting 
 
2.4.3 Evidence Provided by TCE for Bilateral Balance 
 
Several studies have investigated whether credible enforcement arrangements have resulted 
in contract design. Early empirical support came from the franchising industry. An important 
study conducted by Hadfield (1990) on the role of credible commitments found that the 
exchange of hostages sustained a balance relationship between franchisees and the franchisor 
(see also Klien and Leffler, 1981; Kaufman and Lafontaine, 1994; Minkler and Park, 1994; 
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sales agencies successfully used offsetting investments in other specific areas of the relation 
to reduce their dependence on the powerful manufacturers to some extent in the automobile 
industry (see Heide and John, 1988; Oxley, 1997; Allen and Philips, 2003).  
 
In the case of PPP, public managers in UK are encouraged to follow TCE guidelines to craft 
extra-safeguards such as the use of financial hostages to manage their risk but these results in 
mixed results. While some studies found evidence of symmetry between the public sector 
entity and the private partners (Bigelow, 2001; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003), other studies 
(e.g., Pollock et al., 2001, Parker and Parker and Hartley 2003) reported that the public sector 
was in asymmetric relationships and suffered from poor supplier performance. In a recent 
study, Lonsdale showed that the IT contract between Siemens Business Services (SBS) and 
National Savings and Investments (NSI) was balanced post-contractually as a result of 
exchanging financial hostages while on the Libra project; the Benefits Agency and NIRS2 
contracts among other PPP projects the public sector failed to create balance with the private 
sector entities with the added problem of high transaction costs (Pollock et al., 2001; 
Spackman, 2002; Sheil, 2002; NAO 2003c; Lonsdale, 2005a. Thus it appears from the above 
empirical cases show that there are many things about PPP largely uncovered by research. 
 
 
2.5 Concluding Comments  
 
This chapter has reviewed the analytical role of the TCE framework in explaining how a 
contract can be managed to achieve optimal contract design. Williamson identified bounded 
rationality, opportunism, asset specificity and uncertainty as the main source of market 
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failures and transaction cost (Williamson, 1996). The insight from TCE theory is that 
economic actors are rationally bounded to design complete contracts and this becomes more 
complicated if the relation is supported by transaction specific assets in the presence of 
opportunistic suppliers. This has profound implication for managers in the public sector using 
PPP route for public provision. However, Williamson provides contractual solution through 
his credible commitments. 
 
A study of UK policy guidelines regarding public-private business arrangements shows that 
much of the public managers‘ expectation to use farsighted contracting to design credible 
commitments into their relation to achieve a balance grows out of the TCE‘s expectation of 
bilateral balanced assumptions (OGC, 2002; PAC 2003a). While the efficacy of credible 
commitments model cannot be denied, there is also cause for concern given the mixed results 
from empirical studies. The concern is that there might be some unexplained factors 
accounting for asset specificity responsible for the observed asymmetrical relationship in PPP 
but largely remains unknown. Moreover, the TCE framework somehow has not completely 
explained the continued public sector asymmetrical relationship with the private sector and 
most research work turn to the obvious explanation using the old worn cliché of asset 
specificity to account for the asymmetrical relationship in PPP and has paid little attention to 
the possibility that hold-up can occur when no dedicated assets are involved in the transaction. 
Little is not known yet about this and there appears to be a gap in TCE framework and 
analysis. This lack of complete explanation from TCE provides us with the impetus to 
investigate the issue of balance in PPP by using the power theories. This in turn, might help 
us find the explanation for the difficulties faced by public sector managers in their efforts to 
apply TCE prescription to balance their relationship with the private sector. In the next 
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chapter we examine this weakness in detail and use the insight to design our research 



























CHAPTER 3     





In this thesis so far, we have established the prevalence of PPP, noted its drivers, and made 
the link between PPP and TCE, especially balanced bilateral contracting. We also looked at 
the some of the literature that has explained the balanced bilateral contracting theory and 
found it to be supported in various cases. In this chapter, we look at the various criticisms of 
TCE. We examine first general criticisms of TCE in section 3.1, followed by specific 
criticisms of TCE‘s approaches to bilateral governance. Section 3.2 discusses power and 
Section 3.3 discusses Resources and Capabilities in negotiations. This leads the author to 
argue that the ability to develop balanced bilateral governance can be hampered by two 
factors: pre-contractual power resource, asymmetry in resources and capabilities in 
negotiations. Finally, it introduces the conceptual framework emerging from the research and 
provides supporting evidence from the study. 
 
3.1.1 General Criticisms of TCE 
 
Whilst TCE has clearly provided great insights into business-to-business relationships over 
the past 30 years, it has also been subject to criticisms and extensions over a wide range of 
issues, many of them about its behavioural assumptions, and, more generally, about 
transaction cost analysis. The initial criticisms of TCE‘s behavioural assumptions were 
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particularly severe. Early critics described the notion of opportunism as ‗controversial‘ 
(Granovetter, 1985; Donaldson, 1990; Ghosal and Moran, 1996a; Conner and Prahalad, 1996) 
and bounded rationality as ‗inconsistent‘ (Hodgson, 1991; Bröder, 2000). Others have also 
criticised the TCE model as ‗unhealthy‘ (Hirsch et al., 1990), and an ‗ethereal hand for 
organisation researchers‘ (Donaldson, 1990). Probably, the severest criticism came from 
Ghosal and Moran (1996a; 1996b) who described the TCE model as ‗bad for practice‘ and 
without ―realism and balance.‘ Ghosal and Moran‘s argument was that TCE theory had 
ignored the distinction between markets and firms in terms of their internal logics, and 
therefore failed to appreciate ‗that managing an organisation based on the logic of markets 
prevents the development of organisational advantage‘ (1996, p.58). 
 
Further criticism from the trust based schools in relation to opportunism assumption. 
According to the trust-based school of thought mutual ex-ante fear of rent seeking behaviour 
and opportunism has led to reluctance of parties to invest in specialised assets. It is typically 
argued that positive human traits such as trust could be cultivated to support business 
relationships could better be managed successfully even at higher levels of asset specificity 
(Grandori, 1995; Noteboom, 2002). 
 
All the above critique directed at TCE framework are but few of the many in the literature but, 
at least, demonstrate clearly some of the weaknesses in its assumptions. However, what is 
most important to this thesis is a specific question that has engaged the attention of both 
practitioners and policy makers in the public sector. This is whether the bilateral contracting 
mechanism can be balanced by the public sector as easily as is suggested in the TCE. 
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In Chapter 2, we noted that PPP is characterised by incomplete contracting and therefore 
subject to hazards of hold-ups and supplier opportunism. We also noted TCE‘s contractual 
solution of shared investment in dedicated assets or the party at risk demanding financial 
hostages from the other party. In UK, government officials have followed TCE‘s prescription 
to manage its partnership with the private sector. For example, UK, the National Audit Office 
(NAO,2005b, p235)  report on London Underground made some recommendations to policy 
makers that; ‗success (in PPP) requires a genuine alignment between contracting parties to 
ensure that the partnership is more than just a statement of intent‘ Similar recommendation 
came from the UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and HM Treasury that ‗PPP needs to 
be approached in the spirit of partnerships, where both sides are open, share information fully 
and work together to solve problems‘ (Public Accounts Committee, 2003a p.3 quoted in 
Lonsdale 2005a).  
 
This optimism has also found its way into policy documents of the World Bank and other 
international developing agencies like the (World Bank, 2004b; OECD 2008). As we noted in 
Chapter Two, empirical evidence does not conclusively support the assumptions that PPP 
could easily be balanced. The mixed results however, suggests that TCE logic is limited in its 
ability to explain the contradictory results and throws open the question about the soundness 
of the underlying assumptions on credible commitment model. In view of this we re-examine 
assumption underlying the credible commitment and the confidence it reposed in buying 
managers to achieve a balance in the design of the contract. We start by taking a critical look 




The TCE theory has similarities with agency theories PRT perspectives (Williamson, 1975) 
in many aspects in the context of how economic agents can support their business 
relationships with efficient contract design in the form of protection against risk of hold-ups 
and post-contractual opportunism. Whilst, agency theory prescribes for risk-incentive 
approach against uncertainty arising from information asymmetry, both PRT and TCE 
recognises the problem of property rights and prescribes for efficient contractual solution to 
protect parties against the problem of uncertainty and hold ups (Williamson, 1979,1983; 
Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).  
 
However, the optimal contract mechanism of incentive theories can be interpreted as ignoring 
the distribution of resources endowment of the parties. In other words, TCE, PRT and agency 
theories paid little attention to the issue of power in business exchanges. This omission in 
procurement context means that the incentive theories are limited in their ability to explain 
the differential power that naturally arises when parties with different needs but are in 
possession of critical scarce resources decided to engage each other in an exchange 
relationship i.e. procurement environment. Although PRT recognised the importance of 
scarce resources and the ownership right to earn income, it failed to consider that supply and 
demand constraints may create an advantage for one party to have power over the other party. 
In the case of agency theory, it pays little attention to property rights system in which agency 
problems occur, thus the effect of competing over scarce resources was ignored in their 
analysis. Briefly, it can be argued that incentive theories provide us with only partial 
understanding of contractual problems and solutions in buyer-supplier exchange relationship.  
Having said that what is conspicuously missing from the three models and in Williamson‘s 
TCE model in particular, is power. Williamson made some assumptions when proposing his 
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credible commitment model which are relevant in the studies of PPPs. They are discussed in 
the next section. 
 
3.1.3 TCE Assumptions on Credible Commitments 
 
Williamson made a number of assumptions including a world in which buyers and suppliers 
have equal capabilities and resource endowments and these are evenly distributed between 
economic actors and business to business relationships. Although Williamson (1995) accepts 
that the concept of power is important in politics, and to some extent in intermediate markets, 
he does not think that power is relevant to the distribution of risk and value in an exchange 
relationship. His thinking is grounded in the mainstream economist‘s view of the market as a 
perfect mechanism where efficiency of exchange is assumed to be achieved through the 
coordination of the independent actions of multiple actors in the market. In this world of TCE, 
economic actors have the ability of economising on bounded rationality and opportunism. 
  
As a result, TCE theorists have argued from several fronts contending that business-to-
business relationships have efficient internal self-regulatory coordination systems to create 
equilibrium. Even if market inefficiencies such as power and opportunism exist it is assumed 
that could be competed away by many participants in the market. Consequently, Williamson, 
1995, p.23) dismissed power that: ‗Power has little to contribute to the study of contract and 
organisation in circumstances where the parties to an exchange can and do contract in a 
relatively farsighted way.‘ This demonstrably sums up how TCE researchers have come to 
downplay the role of power relations in buyer and supplier relation. From this perspective, it 
can be argued that the feasible contractual solutions to contractual problem are partial 
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because they do not take into account set of constraints in buyer and supplier exchange 
relationship. The problem with these set assumptions is that Williamson takes the private 
sector‘s attitude towards risks as neutral. Based on this narrow view, Williamson did not 
consider the possibility that a supplier may have the ability refuse to c-operate with the buyer 
to craft credible commitments into the contract designed aimed at reducing its scope to 
maximise profits.  The above critique is one of many we shall be exploring as we develop our 
argument in the subsequent sections.   
 
3.2   TCE and Power  
 
Writers of the power relations school have challenged Williamson‘s views on power in 
business-to-business exchanges and argued that business exchanges are often characterised 
by the power relations (see Heide and John, 1988; Cox et al., 2000). Some writers found 
power as significant influence in supply chain management, health and construction sectors 
(see Cox et al., 2001; Lonsdale, and Watson, 2004). As these and many other growing 
empirical studies show that power is relevant issue, some researcher turned their attention to 
power and dependency theories.  
 
Based on above, this thesis proceed from the premises that if Williamson‘s assumptions on 
power are relaxed would lead us to consider transaction costs in an imperfect market which 
can equally constrain efficient contract design. In a recent study Hingley (2005, p.552) paid 
attention to power and found power imbalance in UK fresh food supply industry and 
contended that ‗the concept of power is rarely discussed in supply chains except to deny its 
importance‘ and recommended that power relation variables should be considered in buyer-
supplier analysis A study into the problems facing PPP pointed out that public sector 
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contracting the private sector  for strategic services put private service providers in a power 
advantage to leverage for good deals at their expense (Lonsdale, 2005b). 
 
Perhaps the two UK PPP contracts of National Savings and Investments (NSI) and Lord 
Chancellors Department (LCD) studies by Lonsdale, 2005a), is the most outstanding example 
of providing different circumstances a public sector entity succeeded in crafting credible 
commitments into the contract design and the other entity being hampered by adverse pre-
contractual power relations to craft credible commitments into the contract design.  
 
In the case of NSI and Siemens Business Systems (SBS) on one hand and LCD and ICL on 
the other, Lonsdale demonstrate that while the NSI, a public sector body, was able to 
successfully develop and sustain a balanced post-contractual relationship with its supplier, the 
other public sector entity, LCD, found itself in an adversarial relationship and, as a 
consequence, failed to achieve a balance. 
 
Lonsdale, (2005a) also found that the relative asymmetry in the resources and negotiation 
capabilities with the private sector allowed the private sector to outwit the public sector in the 
negotiations. His third factor is internal politics in procurement decision-making. He argued 
that procurement managers in pubic face are constrained by the preference of managers 
higher up the hierarchy ladder who may use their power position to override sound 
procurement decisions leading to poor contractual choices-a problem highlighted in the 
organisation literature (Pfeffer. 1978).  Based on his findings Lonsdale (2005a) consequently 
proposed a model to study PPP performance in creating the right conditions for successful 
risk transfer to occur (see Figure 3.1). He observed that given the nature of essential nature of  
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projects that come under PPP the public sector face tremendous obstacles to develop post-
contractual balance with private sector suppliers and that in turn affects its ability to get good 
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In reviewing his arguments in the NSI/ SBS and LCD/ICL cases, it became obvious that the 
adverse pre-contractual power relationships and asymmetry in resources and capabilities of 
negotiation were found to have significantly impact on the efficient contract design. 
Regarding  internal politics in procurement decision-making it is  not clear how that led or 
facilitated scope for lock-in in either of the two cases of SBS and LCD contracts and other 
ones he investigated. In drawing his conclusion and in an attempt to link internal politics to 
post-contractual balance Lonsdale, (2005b, p.242) noted that: ‗Such contracts are far from 
ideal in terms of contract management as they are inevitably vague-given the level of 
uncertainty characterising such long term contractual periods- geared towards an expectation 
of renegotiations.‘ It does appear that the writer is substituting uncertainty in decision-making 
for internal politics in decision-making. Although it could be argued that personal preferences 
of people in authority may get in the way of efficient utilisation of scarce resources and thus  
may be relevant in understanding the political implications of stakeholders in the 
implementation of PPP policy it does not address the specific problem of balance in a 
relationship. In this instance, although Lonsdale attempted to explain contractual hold-ups or 
its absence by looking at internal politics he failed convincingly to link it to the problem of 
contractual imbalance or hold-up.  In addition, introduction of internal politics in this study 
may throw the purpose of this study out of course into political economy literature which is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Moreover, when contract decisions are taken by the political 
authority or  outside the procurement department, the act of crafting efficient extra-
safeguards into the contract relation is the responsibility of the public procurement 
department or the negotiation team which this thesis is investigating its impact on the contract 
design. Also, review of the PPP policy choice is vested in the power of seat of government in 
Ghana and not within individual public sector entities as is the case in developed countries. 
For the above reasons, this study is focusing on investigating the two independent variables 
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of adverse pre-contractual power relation and asymmetry in resources and negotiation 
capabilities. Our next task is to review the literature with the aim of first, to establish whether 
Lonsdale proposition is grounded in literature and, second, to find out if it has any research 
value in order to carry out empirical research in a different country ie in Ghana. The next 
section reviews the literature on power focusing on the variant power-dependency theory and 
relations.  
 
3.2.1 Pre-Contractual Power and Contractual Balances- Lonsdale Factor  
 
The notion that the concept of power is an inextricable factor in business exchanges has long 
been advocated in the social science literature (Emerson, 1962; Dahl 1957). In network 
exchange theory, power in social exchange denotes inequality in society. According to the 
early power literature, wealth arose not primarily from money but from exchange value or 
power of exchange. Marx (1848), an early proponent of power, argued that power enabled 
entrepreneurs to control the factors of production and exploit labour, leaving them to live like 
wage slaves.  
 
In contemporary times, the discourse on power has expanded into social exchange theory.  
In social exchange theory, it is assumed that some actors control more highly valued 
resources than others and the differences in the nature of resources among people leads to 
exchange and interdependence. One of the most prominent contributions to the analysis of 
social power was Emerson (1962, 1964). In the early development of the power-dependence 
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theories, he postulated that inequality in resources can lead to power and inequality with the 
weaker party in subjugation and the powerful in domination (see also Blau (1664, 1986). 
 
Emerson, (1962, p, 32) in his classical power dependency model stated the dependence of A 
on B, in turn is a direct function of the motivation investment of B in goals mediated by A 
and a negative function of the availability of those goals to B outside the A-B relation.  
Emerson shows that  in an exchange relation between two actors, A and B, the power of an 
actor increases as its value offering to the other party increases and decreases proportional to 
the degree of availability of the other party to seek alternative sources. Thus the resource 
value and resource availability determine the level of dependence in A-B relation.  The more 
dependent B is upon A, the more power A has over B (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Cox et al, 2000).  
 
 Essentially, what this means is that if A depends on B more for valuable resources than B on 
A then B has power over A. Some scholars have subsequently developed the power 
dependency theory by introducing variations to define power relations in buyer-supplier 
business exchanges (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Krajic, 1983; Cox, Sanderson, Watson, 
2000). The common thread running through their models and empirical studies is that power 
in exchange is derived from the relative dependency of exchange partners on one another for 
the resources of value they desire. For example, Buchanan (1992) conceptualise power 
dependence as different in value that buyer-supplier attaches to the relationship.  
 
 In other words, the fundamental assumptions of all the developed models seem to emphasise 
the occurrence of power structure in buyer-supplier and those characterised by asymmetrical 
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inter-dependences. The asymmetrical inter-dependences may be dysfunctional because the 
dominant partner may attempt to exploit the dependent party (Emerson, 1962). In that sense 
one can argue that parties bargaining power may be derived from critical resource 
endowments that a party holds.  
 
 
Following these early developments on resource and dependency, some researchers (Cox et 
al., 2000) developed model to study power in buyer-supplier relations. The model is similar 
to Emerson model in that the model employs comparable endowment resources of utility and 
scarcity dimensions to derive power structure predictions. Utility refers to the importance of 
the resource to the other party‘s operations. The more a party values a particular resource, the 
more he becomes dependent on the party who is in possession of it. Scarcity, on the other 
hand, refers to the level of difficulty in gaining access to alternative sources of the valued 
resources outside of the relationship. Others looked at imperfect substitution as critical asset 
at price (Martimort and Stole, 1999).  A third element, information, is then added by some 
members of the power relation school. According to Cox et al (2000), control or access to 
right information is considered as a power resource it comes to contract negotiations. 
MacDonald, (1999) noted that access to information enjoys pricing independence. Thus we 
can identify the three elements of utility, scarcity, and information represent the sources and 
structure of power in business exchanges (Cox et al., 2000).  The model developed by Cox et 
al, (2000) is shown in Figure 3.2. An alternative scenario in the matrix is that the two parties 
can be independent of each other. Finally, they can become inter-dependent, potentially 
sharing gains and losses in an agreed, mutually- beneficial manner and finally one of the 












Source: Cox et al 2000 
 
From the above power construct it is possible to draw three central assumptions.  
(1) Economic actors engage in an exchange to obtain resource of value hence mutual 
dependence develops.  
2) Exchange partners behaviour is motivated by the desire to increase gain and to avoid loss 
(3) actors engage in business exchanges obey demand and supply characteristics.  
 
These core assumptions allow various predictions to be made about the behaviour of actors 
engaged in exchange and the effects of different factors on the outcomes of exchange (see 
also Mohm, 1997; Molm and Cook, 1995; Cox et al., 2000). 
 
3.2.2 Impact of Power on Surplus Value 
 
The relative power of buyers and suppliers are expected to be a key factor in explaining the 
value capture. Surplus value simply refers to the difference between the supplier‘s costs and 
A 
Buyer Dominance  


















Relative utility and scarcity of suppliers‘ 






Distribution of  
Surplus value                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           






Distribution of  
Surplus value 
Created from the                                                                                                                     
relationship 
the value of the product to the buyer (Cox et al., 2000). Although both the public sector and 
the private sector may have common desire to be in collaboration, the literature suggests that 
goal conflict exist in terms of maximising their share of the value from the relation.  
 
The writers (Cox et al., 2001) further contribution to value capture in business relationship is 
a model developed to explain six possible feasible generic relationship styles that are likely to 
emerge in the distributing of gains from collaboration from power perspective. The six 
feasible generic styles are depicted in Figure 3.3.  
 
 




           Source: Robertson Cox Ltd (2001). All rights reserved. Adopted from Cox et al 2002 
 
 
The relationship matrix suggests that if the buyer is in total dominance then the buyer stands 
a good chance to maximise its share of the surplus value (top row). On the other hand, if the 
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constraint on the ability of the buyer to achieve its benefit target from the relationship 
(bottom row). The situation is different if both parties are in an inter-dependent or balanced 
power relationship. In that case, both the buyer and supplier have incentives to share the 
surplus value in a mutually satisfying formula (middle row). Studies in PPP  suggests that 
most of the contracts signed by public authorities with the private sector are located in boxes 
3 and 6 of the matrix in Figure 3.2, indication of adversarial relationships with the private 
sector, implying that the public sector may found itself in an asymmetrical position and yet 
remain in the relation 
 
From the above analysis, it is reasonable to assume that power and dependency underpin 
public sector and private sector business relationship. Like all market exchanges, bargaining 
process entails the passing of value from one individual to the other in exchange for what the 
other party‘s values. However, the relative value a party attaches to a resource differs in a 
relation in exchange for another. In relation to the public sector, the problem of power 
structure can be argued that since the public sector has less sufficient resources to meet their 
need and have to rely on the private sector for valuable services to meet public provision 
requirements and the private sector depends on the public sector for business and profits thus 
interdependent relation pertains. However if the public sector depends more on the private 
sector  than the supplier on public sector then the public sector will struggle to develop inter 
dependent relations.  This difficulty has been commented by Lonsdale that: ‗it will be 
extremely difficult to get a supplier in developing contractual safeguards that will create 
balance in the post-contractual relationship‘ (Lonsdale, 2005a, p.238). Even though the above 
power discussions throw more light on the dependency, little is known about the mediating 
factors and the magnitude effect on contract design. However, power theories are by no 
means universally accepted. Critics maintain that while power can be useful in explaining 
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contractual problems in business relationships it should be seen as dysfunctional (Emerson, 
1962; Pfefferr and Salancik, 1978; Cox et al., 2000, 2002). It is this dysfunctional aspect on 
the contract design in PPP that we will be exploring in the rest of the study 
 
3.3 A Model for PPP Balance. 
 
Revisiting power Lonsdale arguments, the first element in Lonsdale‘s argument was that pre-
contractual power relations will affect the ability of public sector bodies to negotiate post-
contractual balance in PPP arrangements. The argument here is three-fold. First, power 
relations do exist in pre-contractual negotiations. Second, suppliers seek to use bargaining 
advantages for commercial gain, even at the expense of efficiency. Third, in the PPP context, 
this means unbalanced contractual arrangements, with little risk transferred, much of that 
returned during the contract period and giving unsatisfactory value for money, especially 
where there are significant variations. The latter are a problem, as they are negotiated over by 
a dominant supplier which is major threat to contractual balance. However, even when there 
is equal pre-contractual bargaining strength, risk remains if the buyer‘s bargaining team does 
not match the competence of the supplier‘s team. 
 
While the Lonsdale risk transfer model has contributed to the debate on PPP performance by 
taking a different perspective, questions about its generalizability remained limited. His 
conclusion is based on two case studies in the UK and he did not say its findings apply to 
developing countries as well. For example, in arriving in his conclusions Lonsdale did not 
consider the implication of his study in a country like Ghana where PPP policy is being 
experimented for the first time. Moreover, his work called for more research to provide more 
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understanding of the issues he raised in his study from different environmental perspective.  
Some writers Utting and Zammit (2006) working at the United Nations have also added their 
voice for more robust studies on PPP particularly in developing countries so as to provide 
useful insight to make practical conclusions for public policy. Until now little is known about 
the conditions that influence pre-contractual bargaining power to either create power between 
buyer-supplier. Specifically, little is known about the way in which power from endowment 
resources impact on the dependent relationship between the public sector and the service 
providers. Based on the above limitations in our understanding relating to business 
relationships it is critically, important to examine the factors of power and dependent position 
when a buyer and supplier enter into an exchange relationship. 
 
It is noteworthy to point out this study focuses on pre-contractual power resources between 
the public sector and private sector looking at the power resources variables. Others have 
covered the contractual problem of asset specificity with sufficient studies to explain the 
contractual problems and its high transaction costs and would not be followed in this work. 
As a result, this thesis seeks to extend Lonsdale arguments to investigate this issue further to 
provide more understanding about the effect of power on the ability of the public sector 
authorities to achieve post contractual balance. We now look at the other factor of negotiation 




3.3.1 Capability and Resource of the Buying Function 
 
In this section, we examine the other factor this thesis will be focusing on:-the asymmetrical 
resource and capability of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector mentioned by 
Lonsdale. Central to the argument in his model on commercial resources and capabilities of 
the public sector negotiation team, is the idea ill-resourced public buying managers may 
contribute to the difficulties in achieving a balance with the private sector.  He contended that 
the private sector possesses superior negotiation resources and that gives it the ability to 
outplay the public sector negotiation team in a context of contract design.  
 
This is in sharp contrast with Williamson‘s assumptions about buyers and suppliers as 
operating in business markets. Williamson assumes that buying and sales managers in 
business transactions are equally knowledgeable and well-informed and have the ability to 
select choices to arrive at efficient outcomes (Williamson, 1995, p. 39).  However, these 
assumptions were contested by Lonsdale (2005b) in his risk transfer model, who argued that 
asymmetry in resources and capabilities in buyer-supplier relationships may sometimes exist 
and that this may allow either the buyer or the supplier to gain advantage in the pre-
contractual negotiations. Even in cases where there is symmetry, he argued fundamental 
differences may still exist in terms of knowledge or experience.  He supported his conclusion 
with cited cases in UK healthcare sector.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that Lonsdale is not the only writer in this observation. Other 
studies have also raised concerns about the gap between the negotiation ability of buyers and 
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suppliers that had allowed suppliers to out-stage buyers in contract negotiation resulting in 
poor contracting signing poor contracts (Industrial Society, 2000; NAO, 2003c). Some 
writers (for example, Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) have observed that knowledge asymmetries 
exist because of differences in organisation design, path dependency and human resource 
endowments. 
 
It is evident from above that there is real concern about the asymmetries that exist between 
the buyer‘s negotiation team and the supplier‘s team. This concern has been echoed earlier on 
by some independent reports coming from UK. For example, the NAO and PAC have 
expressed concerned about  poor contract signings in PPP projects and have singled out poor 
commercial skills and inexperience on the part of public sector buying managers as major 
causes. Evidence of poor contract signings in Police Service Airwave project, the Libra 
project, the London Underground PPP projects and many other ones are cited in UK audit 
reports. In all these cases, poor contract signings are generally attributed to buying managers 
difficulties in understanding of the technical requirements and project risks (see NAO, 2000b; 
2002b; 2003b; 2004).  In more recent times, the competence of UK public sector buyers has 
been called into question in the contract for a single database for offender management to 
harmonise operations across the HM Prison Service and the National Probation Service. In a 
PAC 2009 report, the chairman Edward Leigh expressed concern over ‗senior managers‘ 
ability to deliver such a project‘. He stated his frustration on the incompetency of public 
buying managers in handling procurement contracts by saying that ‗there was not even a 
minimum level of competence in the planning and execution of the project‘ (PAC, 2009). The 
report went on to further recommend that the commercial skills of buying managers should 
be improved to the level of a standard required in negotiations. 
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In developing countries where few studies exist, Smith and Hanson (2003) found that 
technical incompetency was largely responsible for bad contract signing in the water projects 
in South Africa (see also Gilson Grimm, 2004). 
 
All these anecdotal cases have demonstrated that buyers in general and public sector buyers 
in particular often find themselves being either not in sophistication against their sales 
opponents in negotiations. However, the big picture that emerges is that the public sector 
buying managers are often dominated and sometimes may be bullied by their competent sales 
and marketing opponents. Although suppliers are often seen as having superior negotiation 
resources and capabilities, it is important to emphasise that this is not always the case. There 
are documented cases that point to the fact that buying departments are not always weaker 
than the supplier‘s sales team. In some cases some organisations, the purchasing department 
is well resourced, so much so that they can have an advantage over the selling function of 
their suppliers. In the food industry, suppliers of farm products find themselves in a very 
weak bargaining position with highly trained buyers (Hingley, 2005). Similar, arguments can 
be raised for supermarkets and some food retailers in the UK and US, such as Tesco, Wal-
Mart and Morrison, could be mentioned to be more knowledgeable and capable, providing 
them with an advantage in their relationship with their suppliers.  
 
In yet other cases, the TCE assumption of well-resourced equivalence appears to be actually 
fulfilled. For example, the aerospace and automotive industries represent examples where 
buyers seem to enjoy similar resource and capability to those of their suppliers. Although it 
could be argued that some firms or the supermarkets use their economic power to bully 
vulnerable small suppliers to accept less than third rightful share of the gains little is known 
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about other factors that allow suppliers to gain pre-bargaining advantage outside the supply 
chain such as the public sector. Lonsdale, 2005a, 2005b) described areas such as training, 
professional qualifications, professional turnover as some of the problems militating against 
public procurement departments. By contrast, he noted that the sales and marketing 
department of the public sector are well-resourced in terms of training, and retention of 
professionals gives them an advantage in planning negotiation strategies. Until recently little 
is known about what conditions which may empower or disable a buyer and by extension the 
public sector managers to negotiate with suppliers at an equal competent level. Lonsdale 
study of UK public sector could be seen as drawing attention to the importance of public 
sector raising a well-resourced and competent negotiation team. Unfortunately, Lonsdale 
study did not specify what kind of attributes a good negotiator should possess that the public 
sector lags behind. Additionally, although, his work is useful in drawing a distinction 
between the procurement department and sales department in the context of procurement 
negotiations, they are descriptive and broad for operationalisation purposes. As a result, we 
turn to the literature to review what it says strictly staying within the confines qualities-
competence team should possess and the capacity of deployment in the field of commercial 
negotiation. Issues like negotiation planning and detail negotiations are beyond this study.  
 
3.3.2 Importance of Negotiation Resource and Capability 
 
 
The negotiation process has become a more important strategic tool in buyer-suppler 
negotiation as companies look to reduce their expenditure but increased product or service 
offerings. The literature points out the goal conflict between buyers and suppliers are 
reflected in attitudes towards risk and cost. Since profit is a function of revenue over cost of 
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executing the project, suppliers have strong incentives to use the negotiation process to 
maximise their returns and not pass value over to the buyer (Cox et al., 2003). With this 
objective in mind it is reasonable to expect that suppliers would adopt two-prong strategies; 
firstly, to negotiate for better price and secondly, to formulate terms to perform minimum 
possible under the contract to reduce cost. In order to be successful suppliers have to be 
present a strong negotiation team.  
 
The implication flowing from above is that negotiation process has become a strategic tool 
for a supplier and the purchasing professionals working in the public sector have to negotiate 
increasingly better to obtain the best price with suppliers. This need for improved 
performance has been stressed by some writers such as Ahadzi and Bowles (2004). Studies in 
the IT sector suggest that suppliers continuously adopt evolving strategies to dominate the 
negotiation proceedings (see Lacity et al., 2009). Reilly (1994) on the other hand, found that 
a supplier‘s negotiation team does not eagerly show their hand in negotiation unless they are 
forced to do so through hard bargaining from buyers 
 
From above discussions the importance of buyer‘s raising a well prepared and resourced 
negotiation team as their supplier‘s counterpart resonates in the bargaining literature. We can 
therefore expect that a well-resourced and capable negotiation team can achieve the best deal 
possible from any commercial deals. However, the difficulty lies in determining the attributes 
of a good negotiator. In the next section we examine the unique attributes that purport to offer 





3.3.3 Attributes of a Good Negotiator  
 
The importance of a buyer raising competent negotiation team to achieve negotiation 
advantage with suppliers‘ marketing team has received less attention in the literature although 
few studies started looking at the problem. Many writers have drawn a link between efficient 
contract design and competence of negotiators and this has been duly discussed in the 
literature (Karass, 1994: Sturgess, 2008; Lacity et al., 2009).  
 
In a major study, Karass (1994) conducted a survey placing emphasis on analytical skills. The 
survey found that the source of negotiators strength comes from discrete knowledge such as 
industry knowledge, commercial skills, and knowledge in law and accountancy and suppliers 
markets. The survey also summarised the major indicators of a value-oriented negotiator as 
experience, education and analytical skills. He conceded that the negotiator‘s ability to 
perceive and exploit power – i.e. identification of risk and attitude to risk – are critical factors 
to successful negotiation and this may be difficult for negotiators with limited knowledge and 
understanding of commercial of risk in a particular industry. However, McDonald (1999) 
found that imbalance in technological skills results in significant disequilibrium that favours 
the supplier. Interestingly, these attributes are what the sales and marketing teams develop 
effectively for competitive advantage (see Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004; Mayer and Solomon, 
2006; NAO, 2007). 
 
The question of technical competence is recently raised by Lacity et al. (2009). The writers 
found that firms‘ success in negotiation was greater when buyers have technical knowledge 
about the transaction in IT contracting. They argued that this allows an organisation to 
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effectively bid, select, and negotiate an effective contract with a supplier to maximise value 
from its offering.  
 
One key negotiation resource that is conspicuously missing in Lonsdale‘s analysis is market 
intelligence. Market intelligence has long been used by marketers to gather critical 
information about buyers‘ strengths and weaknesses, including issues on value of a particular 
transaction to their operational needs. As pointed out in the marketing literature, intelligence 
offers a competitive bargaining advantage. With the right intelligence about suppliers‘ needs, 
a buyer can gauge the scope of the supplier‘s key strength and vulnerabilities concerning  the 
transaction and use the knowledge to build coherent bargaining strategy that will be at the 
level of suppliers‘ proposals (Baiman and Rajan, 2002; Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004).  
 
 
The advantage to the public sector based on Lacity et al., (2009) studies is that buying 
managers may be able to develop proactive negotiation strategies to counter the domination 
strategies suppliers are likely to bring up. A further advantage is that the negotiators will 
avoid making costly errors of judgement when signing contract. This is significant as UK 
PAC on number of PPP contracts commented that failure to sign good contracts as a result of 
wrong judgement are attributed to insufficient for planning the negotiation strategy (PAC, 
2009; Industrial Society, 2000; NAO, 2003c). It can be argued also that improvement in the 
resourcing the procurement departments and staff training may minimise the risk of being 
outplayed by more profit-oriented private sector sales and marketing teams  
 
However, the consequences of poor bargaining skills on the part of buyers are that of 
increasing risk of hold-ups in PPP. Williamson (1985) also points to inefficient bargaining 
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post-contractually as one of the transaction failures in contracting. Although Williamson used 
inefficient bargaining in a different sense to refer to problems associated with post-
contractual negotiations when there is a lock-in, it can also be demonstrated that inefficient 
bargaining at the pre-contractual stage could equally enhance hold-ups if the risk is not 
spotted before the contract is signed. As already noted, in contract regime, written terms are 
legally enforceable and the courts cannot be relied upon to reconstruct new meanings to fill 
gaps on behalf of a party to a contract (Williamson, 1979). In other words, the courts do not 
reward incompetent contracting. Based on this problem, one can reasonably see the 
possibilities of suppliers taking advantage of incomplete buying team, though this may not be 
the case.  
 
The implication is that the responsibility of designing efficient contracts to protect the firm 
against risk of hold-ups is the negotiation team.  On the other hand, a buyer negotiation team 
with full knowledge and skilful in negotiation, may lead to a possibility of taking the contract 
towards contractual efficiency. The assumption derived from above is that competent 
negotiators know at least, how to plan, manage hostile negotiation environment, to persuade 
their buyer counterparts and how to recognise and use power to their advantage.  
 
The problem though, is that buyer‘s negotiations may be affected by lack of negotiation 
strategies when both incentive and transaction constraints of power are taken into account. 
From this perspective, the problem of avoiding legitimising hold-ups in the contract hinges 
on competency of buying managers, or who undertake negotiation on behalf of the public 
sector body. As Sturgess, (2008) argued negotiators‘ core attributes of a negotiation underlie 
the concept of power between opposing buying team and supplier‘s team. On the buyer side, 
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this will mean negotiators will surrender a degree of power to their supplier counterparts and 
concede on issues that would have been avoided 
 
An important point that needed to be pointed out is that given the problem of catching up 
with the suppliers‘ sales and marketing team does not suggest that nothing is being done to 
build the capacity of public sector buyers. On the contrary, it is just that the problem of 
catching up with the suppliers‘ competence is far deeper than what is in the literature. The 
shocking revelation from NAO and PAC reports about the asymmetry of negotiation 
resources and capabilities of the UK public sector procurement managers prompted national 
capacity building and programmes to improve negotiation competency.  Experience in UK 
suggests that various intervention programmes including training, recruitment of 
professionals and have not yielded the required results.  
 
Others options have been explored to raise the standards of public buyer competency level of 
public buyers. One such short-term approach is the use of consultants by the government with 
two-fold aim. Firstly, to use the consultants to minimise the incidents of public sector buying 




All the above strategies are meant to empower the public sector buyers. However, this 
experiment was found not only to be ineffective but costly to the taxpayer. One particular 
drawback of using outside consultant highlighted by the chairman of PAC (2009) is that 
public buying managers take advantage of the presence of consultant to avoid taking 
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responsibility for poor project negotiations In a recently released report on management 
consultancy fees, the UK NHS alone spent £478m on management consultants between 2005 
and 2010, yet it was found that the consultants still could not save the health sector from 
being outplayed by suppliers (The Daily Mail, 2010; PAC, 2010). Moreover, in the same 
report the PAC (2010) expressed concern about their impact of the consultants on the 
negotiation capability of the public sector officials and the ‗loss of commercial knowledge 
when the advisers leave‘ suggesting that the public sector may not have benefited from the 
consultants presence. Where this does leaves the public sector?  It demonstrates the 
difficulties of public managers of catching up with suppliers. Although it is tempting to place 
the problem on poor bargaining strategies, what is not clear is whether the public sector may 
ever catch up with their opponents and negotiate contract at equally competent level given all 
the constraints buying managers face. 
 
The problem is compounded because empirical research in this particular area finding causes 
and its impact on the efficient contract design and the appropriate contractual extra-
safeguards against risk (i.e. hold-ups) are limited. It could also be the case that public sector 
buyers have resources and capabilities as the supplier‘s sales team, at least to improve 
outcomes at the negotiation table; they may lack the ability to transform the resources into 
powerful negotiation strategy. Further research is needed to provide the answer to this 
conundrum facing public buyers. In order to fill the gap, we have defined the negotiation 
competence in terms of unique attributes of commercial skills, experience and capabilities as 
the resources required to plan a powerful negotiation strategy for an advantage.   
 
From the above, it can be concluded that the literature emphasises the importance of the need 
of the public sector to raise a well-resourced and capable negotiation team to match that of 
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the private sector- a mismatch likely to produce signing bad value for money. Given that the 
UK public sector with all its vast resources are still struggling to have its negotiation 
resourced to match that of the private sector it is reasonable to expect that gap between the 
public sector in Ghana and the more experienced private sector to be wider.  However, little 
is known about the issue at this stage. 
 
3.3.4 Supplier Performance 
 
Although the preceding discussions in this chapter and previous chapters indicate that the 
contractual problems of PPP facing public sector managers principally deal with hold-ups and 
challenges to implement mechanisms to achieve balance. However, it is not an end in itself, 
rather the approach is aimed at securing good value from suppliers. If we consider this aim as 
fundamental then we can reasonably posit that supplier performance is critical. This takes us 
back to power. Of the various factors that the literature discusses which support supplier 
performance, is when the buyer is mutually inter-dependent relation or a more preferably in 
dominance and the supplier is the dependent party. The reason as suggested by the power 
models is that supplier performance partly depends  on the capacity of the buyer to choose the 
most optimal contract design and sufficient power resources to control the behaviour of 
suppliers in the relation (Cox et al., 2001). This implies that when the buyer enjoys 
favourable post-contractual balance may enhance its prospects to force suppliers to perform 
according to agreed minimum performance standards. From the economic perspective, TCE‘s 
approach to efficiency outcomes suggests that transaction cost is minimised when there is 




In the situation of buyer‘s dependency on supplier resources we noted in power theories 
could opportunities for the supplier to exploit the power relation to renegotiate the terms of 
the contract, and possibly reduce performance levels of the minimum delivery required. In a 
dependency position, the buyer has few opportunities to leverage value from the supplier 
(Cox et al., 2000, 2004). In other words, we can expect that the supplier in dominance will 
not pass on cost savings from the relation to the buyer. This of course will depend on other 
considerations of whether the supplier will recognise its bargaining leverage advantage and 
exploiting it and secondly, whether the buyer‘s negotiation team is able to design efficient 
incentive contract with extra-safeguards to neutralise the effect of supplier dominance.  
 
An alternative scenario is that, if the buyer is in dominance the supplier may be forced to pass 
all cost savings to the buying organisation. Studies also show that firms that fail to achieve 
mutual interdependence suffer from poorer outcomes than those in properly balance 
relationships with suppliers (Masten, Meehan and Snyder, 1991; Silverman, Nickerson and 
Freeman, 1997; Mayer, 2000; Ménard and Saussier, 2002). In putting all that has been 
reviewed so far in this study, we arrive at a proposition that an adverse pre-contractual power 
relations may lead to post-contractual imbalance and this in turn put the supplier in 
dominance position. From this premises and we can expect poor performance from suppliers. 









The preceding section reviewed Lonsdale three risks factor of pre-contractual power, 
asymmetry in resource and capability in negotiation. We have considered and extended his 
argument to identify some gaps in the literature that requires further research. Based on the 
literature reviewed and based on our research objectives we would be building evidence that 
may provide more understanding for public policy. In the next chapter we develop our 























Theoretical Model and Hypothesis 
 
 
4.1 Towards the Analytical Framework and Hypotheses  
 
 
Chapter I discussed the importance of PPP in national infrastructure development and service 
delivery. The problem of risk transfer was discussed in Chapter 2 and we noted that empirical 
study results showed inconsistency results. We reviewed TCE theory on its framework for 
developing a balance in bilateral governance using credible commitments. The critique of the 
Williamson‘s credible commitments was taken in Chapter 3 alongside Lonsdale‘s argument 
that the public sector is not likely to develop post-contractual balance as a result of adverse 
pre-contractual power relations, asymmetry in resources and capabilities in contract 
negotiation. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the research problem 
and in section 4.3 provides the justification for the choice of research setting in Ghana using 
the two PPP cases. The result of the research hypotheses and summary of the chapter are 
found in sections 4.4. 
 
4.2 Problem Statement  
 
There is considerable amount of literature on the subject of bilateral contracting that 
discusses the problem of misalignments and risk transfer to the private sector. Empirical 
studies, using TCE models have investigated lock-ins and misalignments in PPP focusing on 
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asymmetrical investment in asset specificity and the problem of achieving functionality in the 
least cost economising way. 
From the earlier analysis, it seems that endowment resources of parties to a transaction play a 
significant role in developing pre-contractual power relations, which in turn defines power 
balance and outcomes. Therefore the relative power position of buyers and suppliers are 
factors expected to influence the conditions that create balance within a given relationship.  
 
In adopting the power approach to the analysis of the ability of the Ghanaian public 
authorities to achieve post-contractual balance and good supplier performance, in the 
implementation of the PPP policy in public provision, one is interested in the nature of 
internal and external factors that may facilitate or impede these efforts. Although some few 
studies have addressed the question of contractual imbalance in PPP relationship and its 
profound impact on supplier performance only few has considered it from pre-contractual 
power perspective (see Cox e al, 2001). In particular, with the exception of Lonsdale work 
fewer studies have investigated why it is difficult to successful apply Williamson credible 
commitments model to balance risk and minimise uncertainty in a relation. However, little is 
known about the conditions that impact on the ability of the buyer to develop a balance using 
TCE guidelines and with specific reference to Ghana, an empirical research on the impact of 
pre-contractual adverse power relations on Ghanaian public authorities is yet to be done. On 
the other hand, Lonsdale conclusions may not necessarily apply to Ghanaian context. The 
review of the literature suggests that developing countries like Ghana operates in a different 
political and economic environment and Lonsdale conclusions might yield different outcomes. 
More specifically, there is little evidence that to the best of knowledge of the author such a 
research has taken place in a developing country. It is therefore important that we examine 
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the factors that may impede the efforts of the Ghanaian public sector to develop post-
contractual balance with the private sector and to achieve good performance. 
The goal of this study is to empirically test two hypotheses that are deduced from the 
literature on resources endowment and dependency. To facilitate this we therefore frame the 
research question based on the preceding reviews taking into consideration the context of 
Ghanaian contracting environment with emphasis on pre-contractual relation. This allowed us 
to develop a model to examine Lonsdale arguments and also to explore new aspects of 
impediments to balanced bilateral contracting from developing country perspective. The 
model developed in Figure 4.1 allows us to address Lonsdale critique of TCE framework.  
 















The central question of the two case studies, therefore, is this: ‗Does the Ghanaian public 
sector have the ability to develop post-contractual power balance and achieve good 
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performance outcomes? In order to answer the question, the researcher aims to analyse the 
pre-contractual power resource endowments of the Ghanaian public sector and its private 
sector partners as the first independent variable and the second independent variable of 
negotiation resources and capabilities. To simplify the research process this study breaks it 
into the following sub-questions: 
 
(1) Is there a power relations structure arising from endowment resources of each the public 
sector (buyer) and private sector (supplier) and what their effect on balance contract design?  
(2) What are the effects of asymmetry in negotiation resources and capabilities on designing 
balance terms in the contract? 
(3) If the public sector authorities fail to achieve post-contractual balance can adverse pre-
contractual power relations and negotiation resources and capabilities asymmetry explain that?   
(4) If the supplier failed to achieve the minimum requirements can the adverse post-
contractual balance explain that? 
 
By addressing these questions, the studies also address their broader implication for future 
PPP practice in Ghana with emphasis on the role of the World Bank as the major sponsor of 




4.3 Justification of Ghana Choice 
 
Ghana provides a good case country for examining the introduction of PPP management 
contracts from a developing country context. Its selection for the study is justified by the 
following reasons. The concept and practice of PPP in Ghana is relatively new, although 
evidence indicates that there is a long tradition whereby the state and the society have 
collaborated at the community level to manage sanitation, refuse collection and maintenance 
of public toilets (Gibbon, 2002: Post et al., 2003; Cook and Aryee, 2006; Londero, 2009). 
Since the two PPP projects are first of its kind, one can reasonably expect implementation 
problems. The study will help policy makers to understand the challenges involved in the 
area of achieving balance and good supplier performance. 
 
As it has been noted, the Ghanaian government has been in control of the two utilities for 
several decades but due to political interferences, mismanagement and waste had failed to 
provide efficient services. In an effort to provide a sustainable financial and managerial 
reforms in the two companies brought in the World Bank with its market reforms via the PPP 
route. A persuasive argument advanced by the World Bank was that the Ghanaian 
government will be able to gain more from the private sector through improved services and 
cost savings  than it was then achieving (McIntosh, 2003; Kirkpatrick and Parker; 2004).  
 
The implementation of the PPP model in these two utility companies has been characterised 
by domestic agitation and protests. At the heart of the opposition is the concern that the two 
management contracts were structured to favour the private sector provider and that technical 
issues were over-emphasised as against national interests of protection against commercial 
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protection is ignored (ISODEC, 2001; Green, 2003). Some reports (see Tearfund and Water 
Aid, 2003; CCOD Peace Report, 2005) argued that the implementation of market reforms in 
the utility sectors was undertaken without sufficient debate, and questioned the World Bank 
claims that the private sector, in managing these utilities, could deliver services efficiently. 
The study offers us a unique opportunity to obtain empirical evidence as to whether this new 
way of using the private sector to manage public utilities in the country has been beneficial to 
the country and what lessons that could be drawn. Although the adoption of PPP in 
developing countries and Ghana in particular is a welcomed idea, there is a need for empirical 
study to examine whether effective institutional structures are in place to secure the delivery 
of cost savings and benefits from the private sector to the public sector.   
 
Finally, Ghana is also chosen to study the issue of post-contractual balance because, like all 
other democratic countries, public projects are public information and World Bank projects 
are also in the public domain which makes it relative easy to access key information on the 
two contracts. 
 
4.4 Hypothesis and Rationale for the Study 
 
 
On the basis of the literature review, we identify PPP has the potential to transfer risk to the 
private sector to achieve  value for money for the public sector in functionality delivery in the 
most cost effective way. However, given the resemblance of PPP to bilateral governance of 
TCE, the implementation of PPP policy is expected to be beset with risk of hold-ups and 
supplier opportunism that could lead to loss of potential benefits possible from partnership. 
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However, TCE provides a credible commitment model for buying organisations as an 
effective mechanism to prevent hold-ups through equitable share of transaction specific 
assets or, if that is not practicable, posting of appropriate financial bonds. However, empirical 
results show that successful application of Williamson logic is not universal. While other 
studies found empirical support for contractual balance others did not (Bigelow 2001; Parker 
and Hartley, 2003; Nickerson and Silverman 2003; Lonsdale, 2005a). 
 
The mixed results from the literature reviewed imply that there might be some unexplained 
factors responsible for the mixed results when asset specificity explanatory variable is held 
constant. With few exemptions (eg Cox et al, 2001; Lonsdale 2005a; 2005b; Sanderson, 
2004), critical factors impacting on the ability of public sector managers to develop a balance 
using TCE guidelines have not been widely addressed. This is a clear omission in 
Williamson‘s assumption who had ignored power in his analysis. The aim of this study is to 
fill the gap in our understanding by investigating Lonsdale arguments that public sector 
buying managers will struggle to balance their relation because of its adverse pre-contractual 
power relations, asymmetry in resources and capabilities in contract negotiations using two 
PPP cases in Ghana. At this stage, and consistent with what has been discussed so far, the 




Adverse pre-contractual power relations, asymmetry in negotiating resources and capabilities, 
are likely to make it difficult for the Ghanaian public sector to achieve post-contractual power 




Most studies show that adverse post-contractual balance design impacts on the extent to 
which the public sector will achieve superior performance from suppliers. This is because the 
resource dependence relationship imposes limitations on the ability of the public sector to 
force the supplier to fulfil its pre-contractual promises, which in turn leads to poor supplier 
performance.  However, the other consideration is that if the Ghanaian public sector was able 
to achieve a post-contractual balance, then it can be assumed that the public sector may be 








In this chapter, the research problem and the two hypotheses were formulated while stating 
the rationale behind them. The author now proceeds to test these hypotheses. In the next 
chapter we develop a research design and data collection method to be used to study the 
Ghanaian PPP telecommunication and water contracts to test the proposition that the 
Ghanaian public authorities would not be able to balance their bilateral governance with the 




CHAPTER 5  
 
METHODOLOGY   
 
    5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research philosophy and research methods for the study and 
provides a justification for the choice of the research approach adopted by the author. The 
central proposition of this thesis is that the public sector may struggle to balance their 
relationship with the private sector. The thesis argument is that achieving a balance with the 
private sector under PPP is not straight forward matter as TCE prescribes in both the 
transaction cost theory and in PPP policy documents.  
 
The research goal of this study is to investigate whether the Ghanaian public sector 
authorities have the ability to achieve post-contractual balance with the private sector. In 
order to answer the question this thesis is testing the primary hypothesis that adverse pre-
contractual power relations, asymmetry in negotiating resources and capabilities, are likely to 
make it difficult for the Ghanaian public sector to achieve post-contractual power balance 
with the private sector as prescribed in transaction cost theory. The second hypothesis is lack 
of balance would result in poor performance outcomes by the supplier.  
 
To achieve this objective, this chapter examines the different paradigms within which 
management research can be located, and then explores the different research designs and 
methods available. This leads us to consider the main research philosophical paradigms 
commonly found in social research. The chapter is organised as follows. First, the author 
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outlines the epistemological approach that underpins the study. This is followed by the 
research design and methods and the choice of a qualitative research design. The second 
section discusses the definitions and operationalisation of the key independent and dependent 
variables and measures. The final part discusses the actual evidence gathering and processing 
of data for eventual analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Epistemological Approach to the Study 
 
The choice of methodology is influenced by the studies of ontology and epistemology. This 
entails the analysis of how research proceeds and the consideration of, for example, the kind 
of logic used in the generation and testing of theories and the criteria that must be considered 
knowledge. The tradition has been that researchers decide first the ontology and 
epistemology of any research, laying out the research assumptions (Rorty, 1979; Hammersley 
1996; Smith, 1996) Ontology is concerned with researcher assumptions about the world view 
and what can be represented. Epistemology on the other hand is concerned with the nature, 
sources and limits of knowledge (Rorty, 1979; Smith, 1996). Broadly, there are three main 
core research philosophical assumptions in contemporary social research, identified as 
positivism, interpretivism and critical realism (Guba and Lincoln, 1998; Ratcliff, 2002).  
 
In selecting the research philosophy for this study, positivist approach was chosen. In 
selecting the positivist approach, consideration is given to the objective of this research which 
is to test propositions concerning power and agency factors in Ghana with an attempt to 
uncover possible causal relationships to post-contractual imbalance and supplier 
performance. This suggests that alternative approaches like interpretivism and critical reality 
are inappropriate for this study for reasons to be discussed later. Positivism approach puts the 
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epistemological position of the researcher as one that assumes reality of the world is external 
objective (Hammersley 1996). From this view point, the researcher proceeds from the 
position that reality can only be understood through scientific analysis of a phenomenon 
being observed. Some writers (Berger and Luckmann (1966) contend that positivism 
orientation assumes that reality is external and objective and that the objective reality 
provides the foundation of human knowledge.  The key strength of positivism as pointed out 
by Hammersley, (1996) was that positivist research has provided management with an ability 
to understand the ways in which organisations operate and be better able to predict and 
control their environments (see also Smith, 1983: Creswell.1994; Smith, 1996).  
 
However, the other two competing paradigms of interpretivism and critical reality and other 
variant ones offer different world view of generating knowledge.  For example, interpretivism 
is concerned with exploring the meanings of other people‘s action. In contrast to positivist 
assumptions, interpretivist views a reality as not external to the observer. From this view 
point the interpretivists argue that the social world can only be understood through direct 
participation and that knowledge is acquired through discovery from the perspective of the 
participants (Eisenhardt 1989; Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  
 
However, both pure positivist and interpretivist approaches have been criticised by many 
writers (see Patton, 1990). Among others the key criticism of positivist pardigm is centred on 
its rigid structured design approach that imposes severe constraints on the researcher‘s ability 
to probe deeper for a fuller understanding of a social phenomenon (Morgan, 1998). 
Interpretivism on the other hand is criticised for being descriptive to generate theory to test 
(Smith 1996; Cresswell, 1994). As a result of the key weaknesses of the two paradigms, 
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Bhasker (1998) proposed critical realism to blend the two. Realism is the ontological position 
like positivism, recognises that external reality exists, and leaning on interprevism 
assumption insist that there are unobservable events that cause the observed ones and that 
knowledge can be acquired through discovery (critical realism) (Bhasker, 1998; Fleetwood 
and Ackroyd, 2004)  
 
Although this study adopts a positivist approach, it also recognises that to properly 
understand power structure in PPP, it is important to seek in-depth understanding through 
probing and testing systems. Adopting this philosophy will help investigating the causal 
relation between individuals and agency, which is central to answering the research question 
of this thesis. The next section discusses the research approach, the techniques and 
procedures applied to the study. 
 
5.2.2 Research Design 
 
This section discusses the research approach used in this study, the sources and methods of 
data collection, the limitations and problems encountered during the research. The key 
consideration that forms the basis for the data collection and analysis is derived from the 
research question of whether the Ghanaian public sector authorities have the ability to 
achieve post-contractual balance with the private sector. The research approach is framed by 
the results of the literature review that achieving a balance with the private sector is affected 
by power structure and the characteristics of the negotiation team affect the process and 




The goal of the study is to investigate and explain the impact of power on contractual design 
and not to make predictions. In line with the research objectives, the case study design is 
chosen, and the techniques for gathering data and generating evidence are mainly qualitative, 
using a semi-structured interview method. We discuss each in turn in subsequent relevant 
sections. Our discussions start with case study design. 
 
5.2.3 Case Study 
 
The main consideration that confronts a management researcher is which research design to 
choose- sampling, experimental or case study- that best answer the research question (Patton, 
1987; Eisenhardt 1989).  In choosing the case study, consideration is given to the aim of this 
thesis which is concerned with explanation, rather than prediction. The use of case study 
research helps provide a clear understanding of the phenomenon being studied, in this case 
the adverse pre-contractual power relations and asymmetry in resources and negotiation 
capabilities of the public sector and their effect on the contract design. This research aims 
requires greater attention to in-depth research and deep probing. In this sense, the case study 
excels in comparison to either experimental or survey designs. In the case of the experimental 
design, its inappropriateness in relation to this study lies in the fact that the researcher has no 
control over the behaviour of the individuals and their motivation concerning the 
management of the two contracts and therefore there is no means of manipulating the 
officials involved in order to arrive at results as is normally done in a laboratory setting. In 
similar reasoning, the survey approach was not suitable for this study. The sampling 
approach, although suitable for large populations, is not appropriate in this study because 
they do not move beyond snapshots of ‗what ‗ or ‗how many‘ questions to probe the ‗how 
and ‗why‘ questions that are required in this case to provide deep and rich understanding of a 
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functional problem in public sector management and  post-contractual balance. Moreover, the 
sampling approach is appropriate where the population is large enough and spread to support 
reasonable sample sizes and questionnaires (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 2003).  
 
 According to Yin (2003):  
‗A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, 
when the boundaries between a real life phenomenon and content are not clearly evident, and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used.‘  
 
In the field of management studies, Yin (2003) noted that case study design provides an 
effective design for understanding and explaining causal links in real life interventions that 
are too complex or which cannot be played out in a controlled environment in order for 
survey or experimental research designs to be used (see also Punch, 2005). As it has been 
pointed out, a case research method in itself will not provide answers to the problems being 
investigated, but provides the phenomenon being investigated with a deeper and rich 
understanding of the social context in which the individuals involved in the two cases work 
and their level of understanding of the problems and possibilities of solutions (Scapens, 1990; 
Yin, 1993). In other words, since case studies provide ways of identifying management 
problems, it is considered as an important tool for management research in the Ghanaian 
case. 
A further consideration after choosing a case study is whether to adopt a single or multiple 
case study design. A multiple case design is chosen instead of a single case with the aim to 
provide a more profound insight into problems affecting a balance contract that could provide 
a better understanding than single cases as recommended (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). One 
125 
 
option has been to select a perfect typical one from another African country but this idea was 
dropped when it became clear that negotiation access to conduct sensitive research on the 
issue of PPP in African studies, particularly for a non-citizen, was difficult.  
 
The choice of research setting: the Ghana telecoms and GWCL partnership arrangements 
with the international suppliers reflects the significant problems of power relations and 
supplier performance given the uncertainties over World Bank conditions on its project 
financing loans and implication for PPP practice in Ghana. In addition, the selection criteria 
are primarily based on the ability of the two companies to contribute new insights to the 
constraints to PPP balance and the possibility of replication of the Lonsdale study in a 
different environmental context. Furthermore, the selection is guided by the reason that both 
cases offer a unique opportunity to contribute to both the theoretical and empirical strength of 
the study.  
 
5.2.4 Quantitative vs Qualitative  
 
This research, just as any other research in social science, was confronted with the choice 
between quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. Researchers are 
often guided by the relative value of any of the approaches to their research objective. Whilst 
some researchers prefer quantitative methods to qualitative methods, as more scientific, 
objective and reliable, others hold the view that qualitative methods offer researchers an in-
depth understanding of the phenomena being investigated (Morgan, 1998). Proponents of 
quantitative methods argue that the approach uses quantifiable and measurable variables by 
utilising statistical tools like mathematical models and graphs to draw a causal relationship of 
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what is being observed (Morgan, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). However, the word ‗qualitative‘, according to Guba and Lincoln (1994), connotes ‗an 
emphasis on the quality of entities and of process and meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency. Despite the 
debate on the two techniques, the choice of one or both techniques, however, depends on the 
nature of the phenomena being investigated, the research objectives and the state of existing 
knowledge. 
 
This research adopted qualitative study. The nature of the research topic does not make it 
easy to adopt quantitative approaches. This study is principally dealing with PPP policy 
implementation issue focusing on power constraints and capacity.  In that sense, one needs to 
conduct an in-depth study into context and obtain greater understanding from the key stake 
holders and implementers to know their views and perception on specific issues of power and 
dependence. In addition, motivation of key actors, their behaviours, institutional and 
organisation and their stake holders are all factors needed to build a sample size to make the 
use of quantitative techniques feasible. This requires that key individuals and organisations 
involved in the implementation and management of the contract needed to be traced. Besides, 
the role of informants differed from one organisation to another and which made the design 
of a structured questionnaire for quantitative methods difficult and unreliable.  
 
In view of the above reasons, the research used a combination of case study design and the 
qualitative techniques in data collection: semi-structured interviews, and documentary 
sources. Similar use of qualitative case study design have been used in the study of policy 
and implementation (for example, Ayee, 2001); supply chain management (Cox et al., 2002), 
PPP policy implementation (Lonsdale, 2005a). One important feature of these studies is that 
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they deal with phenomena that are complex and which involves many stakeholders, several 
actors and their behaviour in the process of implementation of strategies and policies. Under 
such circumstances, defining sample becomes difficult for quantitative approach to capture 
all the necessary motivation and the contextual explanations. This is because quantitative 
approaches mostly use close-ended questionnaires and the responses are restrictive, often 
leaving no room for further explanations (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Guba and Lincoln, 
1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
 
 
Despite these key strengths of a case study approach, critics contend it lacks academic rigour 
and results produced are not generalisable. However, measures have been adopted to 
minimise reliability and validity problems. Raimond (1993), for example, suggested that 
researchers should subject their work to a reliability test by asking the question: ‗will the 
evidence and my conclusion stand up to the closest scrutiny?‘ The thesis followed the 
research tradition of linking the two hypotheses constructed from the literature review to 
provide guidance in planning the research and its execution. Care has also been taken to 
guide the reader through every stage in the research process to enable an independent 
assessment on how the researcher may have been influenced in arriving at the conclusions. 
Following Eisenhardt (1989) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) and others this thesis used 
different sources of evidence as a form of triangulation. Thus the virtue of the qualitative 
approach used for this study is that it allowed a combination of in-depth interviews with key 
informants, and use of variety of documents.  The sources of information and methods of data 
collection are discussed later in the chapter. Meanwhile, the next sector discusses the 




5.3 Operational Definitions of Constructs 
 
A construct is a concept usually used to describe a characteristic or a property that underlines 
the measurement of a phenomenon (Mendoza and Prabhu, 2002). An indicator, on the other 
hand provides information about a variable to be measured. Indicators can be viewed as 
variables and can be used to measure the status or a condition of a phenomenon or process 
(Bell and Mores, 1999; Mendoza and Prabhu, 2002). This study uses indicators to assess the 
pre-contractual power relations and other variables as described by Lonsdale in the risk 
transfer model for PPP. Owing to the critical role that indicators play in measuring a 
phenomenon in a piece of qualitative research, a set of indicators should be robust and 
holistic to allow abstract variables be broken down into their constituent elements which in 
turn can lend themselves to formal analysis (Bell and Mores, 1999; Mendoza and Prabhu, 
2002). 
 
5.3.1 Qualifying Variables 
 
The study used the qualifying variables (explained below) provided in the TCE framework.  
These are identified as asset specificity, uncertainty and switching cost in the TCE framework 
and underpins the TCE explanatory (variables).  In a contract where there is no significant 
level of asset specificity, uncertainty, and switching costs, it is easier for the transacting 
partners to use market exchange. On the other hand, where these are present raises the 
possibility of risk hold-ups and supplier opportunism. These variables could frustrate any 
genuine attempts to build sustainable balance unless the appropriate incentive and sanction 




Asset specificity is defined in the study as fixed assets and any relationship specific 
adaptations needed to support a relation. It is important during the research process to 
establish whether a relation qualifies as bilateral governance in terms of the criteria lay down 
in the TCE framework. If it is found that asset specificity, uncertainty and switching costs are 
trivial then the case does not merit this research attention. On the other hand, if these 
variables are significant, it validates the choice of the case for the research enquiry. However, 
this study considers asset specificity as a controlled variable. Firstly, the investments that had 
been made in the past or that would be made during the course of the project implementation 
were done as a normal necessity and not at the insistence of the suppliers. Secondly, although 
they are specialised assets there are not subject to diminution of value or write offs as they 
would continue to be used in the two companies‘ operations even if the contract terminates 
prematurely. Third the property rights control and ownership rests with the government 
which means all intellectual property that may arise from the collaboration belongs to the 
government and not a subject of conflictorial negotiations. All the above reasons meant the 
issue of joint contribution to the dedicated assets, although important consideration in the two 
cases, their impact on hold-up of Ghana government in the relation is minimal. The added 
advantage to this research agenda is that by controlling assets specificity, it would be possible 




Switching cost refers to the cost of transferring from one supplier to another and includes 
costs of: (i) Searching the market again; (2) re-negotiation costs: and (3) bringing the new 
supplier up to a satisfactory level. If the cost of switching is higher for the buyer than for the 




In the context of this study, uncertainty refers to prevailing conditions that arise in the course 
of contract performance that were not anticipated or foreseen at the time the contract was 
signed and as a result of which parties would have to make costly adjustments. This includes 
tariff increases, regulations and the unpredictable strategic behaviour of partners in relation to 
post-contractual opportunism.  
 
5.3.2 Definitions and Operationalisation of Concepts 
 
This section focuses on the review of the key concepts which supports the two hypotheses. 
Both the dependent variables and independent variables are defined and indicators to measure 
them are provided. Given the two hypotheses developed from the literature review two 
independent variables for the study are: pre-contractual power relations, negotiation resources 
and capabilities. These are operationalised in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.3.3 Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables used in the testing of the first hypothesis are identified as follows: 
(a) Pre-contractual power balance 
(b) Balance of resource and capabilities between the negotiation teams 
The pre-contractual power relation, following Cox et al. (2002) is defined in this study as the 
ax-ante power structure between a buyer and the supplier in a business exchange relationship. 
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Following the resource dependency model, power structure arises from resource endowment 
of parties in an exchange relation.  There are utility, scarcity and uncertainty.  
 
These variables are defined as follows: 
Utility is used in the context of buyer-supplier relationship to refer to the importance of the 
resource to the other party‘s operations (Houston and Gassenheimer, 1987; Cox et al, 2000). 
In other words it is the measure of an individual satisfaction in any given outcome from an 
exchange. Target value is assumed in this thesis. It is the extent to which a buyer and a 
supplier hold in importance the resources the other party brings into the relation. 
 
To the Ghanaian public sector, future utility of the supplier‘s offering is measured by the 
expected outcome in the fulfilment of its mandatory public and political obligations to the 
people. To the supplier its future utility is defined by the extent to which the transaction 
results in operation performance and commercial gain.  
 
To fully understand the concept of utility, the relative degree between a buyer and a supplier 
in an exchange relation is distinguished along the indicators of the operational and 
commercial/strategic importance of the transaction to each party (see Cox et al., 2002; 










The concept of the operational and commercial/strategic importance of a resource, product or 
service is defined below to provide more understanding for their measurement. 
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Of the buyer resources: 
i.e. expenditure and 
prestige 
Supplier‘s resources: 





buyer‘s transaction or 
supplier‘s resources for 
the other party 




Access to information 
on cost base and rate of 
returns. Verify claims 
made by the other party 
Operational importance of the resource 
Commercial/strategic importance of the 
resource 
Ratio of transaction value to the 
supplier‘s overall turnover 
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Targets set for supplier 
to achieve over the 
contract period 
Meeting the 
satisfaction of the 
public sector company 
Achieving minimum performance 
required by the government. 





(a) Operational importance of a resource: This refers to the extent to which a particular 
resource, product or service is considered by either the buyer or supplier to be critical its day 
to day performance in fulfilling its mundane functions. From the supplier‘s perspective, a 
buyer‘s business is operationally important if the supplier depended on that transaction to 
serve its customer needs or markets. In the case of the public sector (i.e. buyer), the supplier‘s 
service is operationally important if the government depends on it to keep vital public 
services running. On the other hand, if the buyer or the supplier‘s business or services merely 
plays only a supportive or insignificant role in achieving its objectives, it has a low 
operational value. 
(b) Commercial/Strategic Importance: The commercial importance of a good or service refers 
to its relative value in monetary terms to the supplier‘s overall revenue generating activities. 
If the ratio of the value of the buyer‘s expenditure (contract price) to the overall turnover of 
the supplier firm is high with no other business opportunities available in the market then the 
buyer‘s transaction is considered high. On the other hand, if the ratio of the business volume 
is low then in terms of commercial value, the transaction is measured as low. From the 
buyer‘s side, a supplier‘s service offering is considered high strategic importance when it 
forms the core function of public responsibility to meet its mandated responsibilities.  
 
The second indicator in the pre-contractual power resources is Scarcity:  This is defined as 
the degree of availability or non-availability of sources of a resource to meet a need outside 
the buyer-supplier relation. The degree of buyer‘s or supplier‘s scarcity is dependent on 
whether the buyer or supplier has alternative or substitutes for meeting their respective needs. 
Substitutes for the supplier market refer to the existence of products or services to those 




Supplier Scarcity: supplier power: The degree of a supplier Scarcity to a buyer is measured 
by the degree of competition that the buyer can stimulate during the bidding process. If there 
are few suppliers in the market or when there are few or no alternatives or substitutes. These 
conditions when present in the supply market would make the buyer become dependent on 
the supplier for all of its needs, which, in turn, will affect its bargaining position with the 
supplier if that supplier has other buyers to do business with.  
 
Conversely, if the supplier‘s product or service could easily be substituted with another one 
or alternative suppliers exist, the buyer‘s requirements could be procured from other available 




The supplier faces buyer scarcity, if the supplier has no other business opportunity elsewhere 
outside the buyer‘s transaction. If the buyer is the dominant trading partner in terms of 
business volume and the supplier has no prospect of developing other business opportunities 
elsewhere then the buyer‘s scarcity is high. However, if there are other business opportunities 
besides the buyer‘s business, then the supplier faces low buyer scarcity. In both scenarios, 
bargaining power is determined by availability or non-availability of alternative sources of a 
resource. In combination, the proposition is that the more a transaction is to its operational or 
strategic needs, the more it is likely to be locked-into the supplier.   
Information Asymmetry: This refers to the availability of critical information about a 
transaction that would enable the buyer and the supplier to verify each other‘s claims and 
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propositions. This study limits the information requirements to costs sheets, returns and 
operational requirements and efforts to complete the transaction.  
 
 
This thesis take the position as indicated in the literature (see Cox et, al, 2000 and 2004) that 
when information about pricing and costs supplier‘s costs sheets or buyers value attached and 
what he is willing to pay for a resource  who ever has private information and asymmetry has 
a bargaining advantage. If the buyer has limited information on a supplier‘s cost sheets and 
rate of returns, and the supplier has limited  information of buyer‘s budget then there is no 
bargaining advantage to any of  them, They either in independence or interdependence 
relation. On the other hand, if the buyer has limited information on suppliers level of efforts, 
cost sheets and rate of return and the supplier has information on buyer‘s budget for the 
project then the supplier has bargaining advantage over the buyer if the supplier‘s private 
information is not revealed.  The reverse is true. If the supplier has limited information on the 
buyer‘s needs in the transaction and the buyer has full knowledge about the supplier‘s profit 
margins gives the buyer an advantage to challenge supplier‘s price proposals. 
 
It is important to point out that the three variables of utility, scarcity and information are 
interact with each other, although relative critical resources and possibilities of relative 
availability outside are strong indicators of pre-contractual bargaining power (Emerson, 
1962; Cox et al., 2001). If a resource or services required in an exchange is important to the 
buyer but not available outside the relation then the utility of the supplier‘s offerings to the 
buyer is high and the buyer becomes dependent on the supplier. This indicates supplier 
dominance in the relation. If the buyer‘s transaction is critical to the supplier‘s business and 
difficult to replace then the supplier‘s utility is high indicating dependence relation for the 
supplier. Similar reasoning applies to a situation where the buyer and the supplier utility is 
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similar and none has no other means to satisfy their needs outside have equal bargaining 
power inter-dependence relation). In the same way lack of information about the 
vulnerabilities of the other party may limit the ability to exercise its bargaining power and 
leverage. Thus, the degree to which all three pre-contractual power indicators together impact 
on the buyer and supplier provide the basis of their comparison and measurement of their 
relative power structure. As a sequence, the data gathered during the interview and 
documentary sources were used to construct and analyse the pre-contractual power structure 





Table 5.2 Framework to Determine the Pre-contractual Power Relation 
Adapted from Cox et al, 2001 
Contract power 
resources 
Buyer Supplier  Pre-contractual 
power structure 
Utility                 
Scarcity             







The buyer is more dependent 
on supplier services 
 
Supplier Dominant  
Utility                 
Scarcity              







The supplier is more 
dependent on the buyer‘s 
transaction 
Buyer Dominant 
Utility                  
Scarcity  







The transaction is of equal 
importance to the both the 
buyer and supplier. 
Inter-dependent  









The transaction is of no 
importance to either the buyer 
or the supplier 
Independence (i.e. a 
Each partner has 
power but 





Pre-contractual power can be viewed alongside agency factors such as negotiation resources 
and capability, and internal politics. It is hypothesised in the risk transfer model that these 
two factors augment the pre-contractual power relation. 
 
Negotiation Resources and Capabilities 
 
The pre-contractual negotiations is the most crucial process in negotiating better terms and 
incentives schemes to create balance in the contract design. The objective to operationalise 
negotiation resources and capabilities is to derive key indicators that will make it possible to 
measure the relative strength of the two negotiation teams from the public and the private 
sector bodies. We modify the model provided by Karass (1994) that of Lonsdale (2005a) to 
account for the differences from Ghanaian perspective.  
 
The prior development of these 5 indicators from the literature defines the relative strength of 
each negotiation team. Negotiation resources are defined in this study as productive factors or 
the collective wealth of the negotiation team which creates negotiation advantage in pre-
contractual negotiations. 
 
 The concept of resources is distinguished into competence and to measure the relative degree 
of ability between a buying negotiation team and the supplier team (Karass (1994; Lacity et 
al, 1996). 
 
The factor ‗experience‘ refers to previous engagement or familiarity with field knowledge in 
similar negotiations or over a period of years in actual practice which has resulted in superior 
understanding of the negotiations.  
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The commercial resources in negotiation are operationalised as follows: 
Skills: refers to the ability and capacity acquired through deliberate adaptive efforts involving 
acquiring and understanding of knowledge (professional training) that enables an individual 
to undertake bargaining process successfully (Lacity et al, 2009). It is the ability to 
understand technical requirements of a transaction, market conditions and the use of 
analytical skills to make a choice that promotes organisation interests. 
 
Independence refers to ability to apply objective and professional judgement in the 
negotiation without undue influence from political authority or any other authority outside the 
body with the requisite competence to make professional judgement.  
 
Deploying of Resources: It is the ability to deploy resources and expertise the negotiation 
team needs in order to perform its core negotiation function relative to achieve the 
organisations objectives relative to the other party.  This part is introduced to demonstrate the 
extent to which the bargaining resources are employed during contesting bargaining process 
to gain an advantage over the other party. It is assumed that both the buyer and supplier 
aimed at using the negotiation process to acquire control in the distribution of risk and value 
capture (Karass. 1994).  
 
 The following predictions are made concerning combination of the inequality between 
buyer‘s negotiation team and supplier‘s team. 
(1) The buyer will have poor deals if negotiation team is not in possession of these resources 
or/and not able to deploy them during the negotiation with the supplier‘s team. 
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(2) The buyer will not be ‗outplayed‘ if its negotiation team is able to deploy the resources 
and capacities that matches or in superior to the supplier‘s negotiation team. That also 
implies that if the buyer is in adverse pre-contractual power balance with the supplier, 
could still make the best out of the situation if it is well resourced relative to the 
supplier‘s team   capable of negotiating competently.  
 
Similarly, if the supplier is able to deploy superior negotiation resources and capabilities then 
the supplier will outplay the buyer by getting the best out of the negotiation. The framework 
to measure the relative resources and capabilities are illustrated in Table 5.3 below. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Framework to Determine the Relative Resources and Capabilities in Negotiations  
Indicators Buyer  Supplier   
Negotiation 
Resources   






















Equally matched to engage in 
intelligent and professional 


























Buyer is more positioned to 
make better contract  
judgement than the supplier 
























Supplier more positioned to 
make better contract  
judgement than the buyer 
Supplier is more competent 
(supplier‘s superiority) 




The relative measurement is based on the assumption that, the wider gap the supplier 
negotiation team opens up between themselves and the buyer, the less prospects to create a 
level playing field for the buyer to negotiate on arm‘s-length basis.  
 
5.3.4 Dependent Variable 
 
In Chapter 3 and further developed in Chapter 4, the need for the public sector to develop a 
post-contractual balance with the private sector was underlined as a prerequisite for good 
supplier performance. A case was made, however, that the ability of the public sector to 
achieve post-contractual balance with the private sector may be made more difficult by an 
adverse pre-contractual power relation. 
 
5.3.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Dependent Variable: Post Contractual Balance 
 
In order to answer the research question of whether the Ghanaian public sector has the ability 
to achieve post-contractual balance with the private sector operators, we make the assumption 
that the public sector is seeking to balance its relation with the private sector, which in turn, 
provides opportunity to minimise transaction costs whilst maximising value for money in the 
transaction (Pollock et al., 2001; Grahame, 2003). The term ‗post-contractual balance‘ is used 
in this study to mean that there is no domination of either the government as a contracting 
party or the supplier (Buchanan, 1992; Cox et al,, 2000). In this sense both parties adopt a 
shared way of working together that allows each of them to achieve their minimum 
performance outcomes. Previous studies (Cox et al., 2002; 2004) and recent studies by 
Lonsdale (2005a) establish that post-contractual balance is achieved in a partnership when 
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there is no dominant partner in the relation to exercise control over the other. In this study, 
working arrangements is related to all deliberately induced administrative and governance 
structures) that support the equal allocation and distribution of risk and sharing of benefits in 
the relation. Contracts can be understood to be institutionaliased and the administrative 
structures as those agreed arrangements that spell out the rights, obligations and expectations 
of the performance. 
 
  
The indicators for post-contractual balance used as proxies in the study.  
 
i) Balance in the allocation of risks. If risk is equitably distributed by parties ie equal 
investment in assets or through the posting of financial bonds. 
ii) The contract design integrates the necessary incentive structures and self-enforcement 
agreements with necessary incentive structures. 
iii) Provisions available for exit/ contract reviews. 
iv) Access to information and regular submission of reports.  
 
It is assumed that these indicators when present in the contract constitute a balance ie exhibits 
a fair representation that do not impose onerous obligations on one party and not the other. 
On the other hand, the relation will be unbalanced if these indicators favour the Ghanaian 





5.3.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Dependent Variable: Supplier Performance 
 
The research considers the issue of supplier performance in the second hypothesis. This study 
uses proxies to assess supplier performance (Skelcher, 2008). This thesis takes the view that 
buyers are usually satisfied if they receive the minimum functionality expected at the 
negotiated cost (Cox et al, 2004). From this premises, the targets set for the supplier in each 
case (ie installation of public facilities, extension of services, cost efficiency and service 
quality) represent the minimum functionality and the cost savings Ghana government expects 
from the private service providers to achieve.  If these performance targets are achieved, it is 
presumed that the supplier has fulfilled its pre-contractual promises and to the satisfaction of 
Ghana government (public sector). On the other hand, if the minimum performance required 
is not received at the end of the contract then the government has failed to achieve good 
supplier performance. Using pre-agreed targets to measure a supplier‘s performance is widely 
used in qualitative research (Rouse and Hodge, 2006) and in buyer-supplier long term 
collaborative relationships (Cox et al, 2004). Moreover, the same methodology was applied 
to measure the performance of the earlier telecom contract between GT and TMP and is 
expected to be used by the government in the contract between GWCL and the AVRL (Amin, 
2007; Ainuson, 2009). Additional proxy is used and that is related to the conduct of the 
supplier during the contract execution stage. The objective is to enable us measure whether or 
not the supplier took advantage of the power circumstances to hold up the Ghana government 
in the delivery of functionality and cost. In other words whether adverse post-contractual 
balance had an effect on the ability of the Ghana government to achieve minimum 
performance from the supplier or implicitly or explicitly engaged in acts that went against the 




5.3.4.3 Measuring Instruments (Measures) 
 
Having defined the concepts of the independent and dependent variables, there is a need to 
create an appropriate instrument for data collection for the case study.  The data for the two 
cases were collected using semi-structured question formats with the same questions for both 
the buyer and supplier. The research questions allowed relevant data to be collected from 
both the public and the private sector side. In the case of the suppliers, the research questions 
allowed data to be collected about their power resources endowment and to be compared and 
measured. Thus, the development towards post-contractual balance is linked with the relative 
pre-contractual power resources in the relationship. The questions were grouped according to 
their specific format and presented in different sections to measure each variable construct. A 
total of thirteen variables were measured in the present study with the objective of capturing 
the public sector‘s and supplier‘s perspective on the following: 
 
 
 (i) Their respective pre-contractual power resources focusing on utility, scarcity and 
information.  
(ii) Their respective resource and capability in relation to the contract negotiation. 
(iii) The purpose was to identify both the public and private sector points of view and how 
they arrived at the point of view. 
 
In relation to contract design, the objective is to: 
(i1) Obtain the public sector‘s perspective on whether the contract was balanced. 
(ii) Obtain the supplier‘s perspective on whether the contract was balanced.  




(iv) Obtain the supplier‘s perspective on whether they performed as expected. 
 
The purpose here is identifying why they hold that point of view and the basis for that, and in 
addition to find out how public sector dissatisfaction with the supplier‘s performance, if any, 
was handled and the view of the supplier on that issue. 
  
Five of the variables were ‗pre-contractual power variables‘ as they relate to the assessment 
of a pre-contractual power balance between the public sector and the private sector. Five 
variables were around resource and capability as they relate to the assessment of the relative 
negotiating strength of the GT and GWCL with their respective private sector service 
providers. Two variables were related to the internal politics as they relate to the degree to 
which decisions were taken to maximise private sector benefits from the relationship. Finally, 
two variables - one for the assessment of post-contractual balance and the other for the 
assessment of the supplier‘s performance are provided. 
 
5.4.1 Measures used in Part of the Semi-structured Interview 
 
The main aim of this section is to outline the design of the semi-structured interview question 
guide that allows data to be collected in a form that facilitates the assessment of power 
resources of the public sector (buyer) on one side against the assessment of the power 
resources of the private sector supplier.  
 
The interview schedule is divided into six parts. Part A is related to general questions on 
personal information. Three of the questions contained in the interview schedule were more 
general to collect information on whether the transactions were characterised by qualifying 
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variables. Part B of the interview schedule measured the utility, scarcity and information 
variables. Seven of the questions measured the pre-contractual power relations. Part C of the 
question schedule measured the indicators of the resource and capability asymmetry. Eight of 
the questions measured the remaining variables of training, experience, qualification. Part D 
of the schedule measured the indicators of internal politics in decision-making in 
procurement.   
 
Part E of the interview questions measured the post-contractual balance and  
Part F measured supplier performance.  
 




5.4.2 Measures used in the Interview Questions 
 
 
The researcher interviewed each representative of the buyer side, i.e. seven directly working 
with the two public sector companies, and six managers from the supply side.  
Independent Variables: utility, scarcity and information 
 
1a). The semi-structured questions were used to measure variables related to the assessment 
of pre-contractual relations in the relationship. The interviewees both from the buyers (i.e. the 
two public sector companies) and their suppliers were asked about the relative utility of the 
transaction to them (operational and strategic importance of the transaction to their business 




In relation to the measurement of the relative scarcity between the public sector and the 
private sector, questions were asked about the availability or otherwise of either the buyer‘s 
transactions to the supplier and about the degree of the availability of alternative suppliers of 
management services to the public sector.   
 
The semi-structured questions measured the information variable by asking questions on the 
extent to which the relevant information about key areas of the transaction (i.e. cost, profit 
levels) were freely available to each of the parties.   
 
1b) The independent variables: Resource and Capability Three questions contained in the 
interview measured the relative symmetry of resource and capability of the buyer and 
supplier negotiation teams by interviewing both the public sector and the private sector. 
Issues asked about included professional qualifications and the experience of each member of 
the negotiation team had in handling similar transactions in the past. 
 
Other interested stakeholders - two government ministers and a World Bank country 
corporate affairs representative - were interviewed on areas pertaining to their particular role 
leading to the award and management of the contract. The questions focused on their impact 
on the ability of the public sector to develop a balanced contract. 
 
(2a) Dependent variables: 
 
The interview asked questions to establish the degree of contractual balance from the buyer 




(2b) Supplier performance 
 
The interview asked three questions in determining supplier‘s performance, asking what 
targets were set for the supplier to achieve at the end of their management tenure with the 
company.  The aim of this part of three interviews was to establish whether the public sector 
thought that the supplier achieved the agreed performance targets.  
 
In order to determine the actual performance of the service provider from both the buyer and 
the supplier, the researcher has to identify the clear targets and expectation of the public 
sector before the commencement of the contract.  
 
The approach was to ask the public sector to identify the following. 
(i) Each of their needs, and their motivation for entering into the contract. 
 (iii) The minimum requirements the private service provider is expected to achieve at the end 
of the contract period.  
(iv) Whether the service provider achieved this minimum performance and to the satisfaction 
of the Ghana government 
 (v). Assess the impact of adverse post-contractual power on the impact of supplier 
performance and if service providers performance was below expectation, their opinions on 
their performance.  
(v). How does the Ghanaian public sector company assess the performance of the private 
sector in terms of the key criteria set in the contract? 
 
Items (i) and (ii) sets capture what the public sector expects from the contract. Items (iii) and 
(v) provide the means of assessing the supplier performance. Item (iv) captures the supplier‘s 
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perspective on its performance and explanations. This is necessary because the service 
provider may have its own interpretation of performance, and about factors that may have 
impacted negatively on its performance. 
Other supporting performance information was obtained from GT and GWCL published 
reports, supplier websites and press releases from the government sources. 
 
 
5.4.3 Procedures for Interview Data Collection. 
 
This section describes how the semi-structured interview schedule was developed and tested 
for the study. It also describes the format that was used to collect the data using semi-
structured interview questions. 
Based on the conceptual framework, derived from previous works (Cox et al., 2000; 
Lonsdale, 2005a) a list of indicators also derived from previous works was chosen to measure 
the variables. As a consequence, the interview questions were developed to measure the 
variables operationalised so that evidence from the data obtained would allow for conclusions 
to be drawn as to whether the two hypotheses were supported.  The use of semi-structured 
interviewing is a powerful method of data collection and is preferred by many management 
researchers. It allows the researcher to collect the perceptions and experiences of informants 
(Hoepfl, 1997). Miles and Huberman (1994) observed that interviews provide opportunities 
for investigators to ask for further clarification of responses and also for the respondents to 




However, as stated by Saunders et al. (2007), the first draft of an interview schedule is never 
perfect. This can be problematic when interviewing informants to capture perceptions and 
judgements from senior managers. For example, Saunders et al. (2007) pointed out that 
managers are more likely to respond to what is supposed to be done and not what is actually 
done. This increases the danger of bias being introduced into the interview that will seriously 
impact on the reliability of the evidence gathered (Scapens, 1990). This requires that the data 
collection instrument should be tested to establish that the responses obtained would be 
appropriate for the measurement of the variables. In this case the questionnaires were tested 
in a pilot study as this would provide valuable information to make the necessary changes in 
the questionnaires and to eliminate potential biases. A pilot study was conducted in this study 
and is now explained. 
 
5.4.4 Pilot Study  
 
A pilot study of the questions was conducted on the water company and the telecom company 
for two reasons. First, the purpose was to introduce the research project to the potential 
informants and to ensure that all misconceptions about the research were cleared for the 
purpose of data collection. Second, the interviews were carried out to explain the concepts 
and their meanings and to gather initial information about how the potential respondents 
understood them. All the interviews were less formal, allowing free discussions about their 
understanding of the research areas. The pilot included the following steps. First, a letter of 
introduction was sent to the managing director of GWCL explaining the purpose of the 
research. Four managers from GWCL and GT on the buy side and two representatives from 
the supply side were interviewed. Three of the answers obtained revealed potential 
difficulties for the respondents, particularly with the questions directed towards the functional 
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managers on political questions. The pilot phase helped in the identification of the 
performance metrics criteria that reflected both the public and private sector perspectives. 
They believed that assessing supplier performance based on the targets set in the contract 
fairly reflected performance assessment. The information was used in designing the questions 
to reflect that perspective. The main problems included the following: 
 
(a) The respondents on the public side were reluctant to answer questions related to financial 
data and the political nature of the contract, partly because of their sensitive nature and partly 
because of the official secrecy oath taken by the public sector managers.  
(b) The information requested on absolute hard figures was deemed as time difficult by 
respondents because most data had been sent to the archives or destroyed.  
(c)  Details of procurement staff strengths and actual qualifications were considered sensitive 
to make public. 
 
Feedback from the pilot study was used to produce the final version of the questions (see 
Appendix A). For example, regarding items (a) and (b) instead of asking direct questions and 
demanding copies of the financial information, the questions were designed broadly to 
capture their views about how the organisation has performed in terms of their finances.   
 
 In relation to item (c) the questions were redesigned to capture broadly their views about 
professional background, training and experience of the procurement staff and about the 
negotiation team that represented the company vis-a-vis the private sector team. This 
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approach worked well as the relevant evidence was successfully teased out of the responses 
from the interviewees to build a clear picture of the financial situation and the degree of 
differences in their resources and capabilities with the private sector. At the end of the 
interview process, the researcher was able to establish the relative staff strengths and broad 
qualifications of the procurement staff and their training needs that made it easier to compare 
them with the service provider.  
 
The pilot study also brought out the importance of designing specific questions to capture the 
views of the World Bank and another set of questions to obtain the views of the two 
government officials interviewed.   
 
In summary, Table 5.4 below shows the detail research method used in the entire research. 
 
 
    Table 5.4 Approaches to Data Collection and Analysis  
 
Phases 
Strategy Instrument Analysis and Findings 
1 Pilot Semi-structured 
interview 
 
2 Qualitative: Interview Semi –structured 
(Appendix A) 
Recording, transcription and  coding the 
themes in relation to the variables 
2b Collection of documentary 
evidence 
 Public sector findings documented 
Private sector findings documented 
Integrate both results into the third phase 
of data analysis 
3 Results and Conclusions Qualitative analysis Findings Compared Public companies 






5.4.5 Sources and Evidence: Selecting Interviews 
 
This section describes how the companies involved in the Ghana telecom and water contracts 
were contacted, what was done to obtain from the managers. According to research tradition, 
the researcher must find ways of gaining the respondents‘ co-operation to participate in a 
research project (Oppenheim, 1998). 
 
The main aim of this section is to show the procedures adopted to collect data from both sides 
of the transaction to help in the determination as to whether there was contractual balance and 
good supplier performance. The researcher used a multiple data gathering approach from the 
buyers and suppliers, the World Bank and government officials. This allowed the researcher 
to arrive at a conclusion from multiple sources of evidence from different perspectives on 
PPP contract design and supply performance. In view of this, the key factors that reflected the 
public sector perspective of pre-contractual power, resource and capability in contract 
negotiation and the two criteria of supplier performance were considered.  
 
The interview schedule was directed at the managers of Ghana Telecom and Ghana Water 
Company Limited and senior managers of the service providers. The principal aim was to get 
first-hand information from the right people. On the supply side, the senior management of 
both TMP and AVRL and other senior seconded staff were interviewed. Overall, these people 
were the key decision-makers and implementers, and given their unique role in the whole 
contract management process, more reliable information was obtained than what possibly 
could be gathered from lower-level staff that had nothing to do with the transaction.  
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The research also identified other key stakeholders linked with both contracts. The World 
Bank was directly involved in the two cases of PPP projects as both the sponsors and 
financiers leading to the award of the contract. A World Bank representative in the country 
was interviewed. Second, the interview was extended to include the government side. 
 
The decision to adopt PPP for the utility companies needed political approval, and these 
informants were major influencers leading to the adoption of PPP for the two projects. For 
example, the two ministries - the Ministry of Communication and Ministry of Water 
Resources, Works and Housing Offices - were recognised interested bodies that played a 
leading role in the contract award and performance of the GT and GWCL respectively.  
 
 
Table 5.5 Codes for the Interviewees  
GT  and TMP Water Contract  
PO2                                    Procurement Manager (GT) 
HRM2   Human Resources (GT) 
DCEO2  Deputy Chief Executive (GT) 
EBM2   EX-Board Member (GT) 
AD2  Administrative Manager (GT) 
DA2  Director of Administration (GT) 
ID2           Internal Auditor (GT) 
PM2   Project Manager 
 DOO2   Technical Manager (TMP) 
AD2   Internal Auditor (TMP) 
OP2   Operations Manager (TMP) 
COP2 Corporate Affairs (TMP) 
 
  
DCEO                               Managing Director GWCL 
 ADO1                     Ops/Technical Director (GWCL) 
 PO1                         Procurement Officer (GWCL) 
 AM1              Accounts Manager (GWCL) 
PMU                Project Mgt Unit Director (GWCL) 
COP1                   Communication Officer (GWCL) 
SM1            Sales and Marketing (GWCL) 
DHR1                 Deputy Human Resource (GWCL) 
DOA1         Director Administration (GWCL) 
CEOW      CEO Aqua Vitten Rand Limited   
HRM1  Human Resource Manager (AVRL) 
COP        Research and Business Planning (AVRL) 
CSM             Customer Services Manager (AVRL) 
WM                     Works and Maintenance (AVRL) 
 
World Bank Government Officials 
Communication Officer: Ghana World Bank Country 
Office 
GOFI Minister for Private Sector Development  




It was deemed important to capture their perceptions on the PPP contracts. The codes for the 
interviewees are shown in Table 5.5 and the breakdown of the interviews for each case is 












The table shows that 17 interviews were carried out in the water case and 15 for the telecom 
case. Czaja et al., (1982) recommended that when seeking information from a small group of 
identifiable people it is necessary to focus on the most knowledgeable people who can 
provide accurate information.  
 
Furthermore, with the relatively small number of informants, the researcher was able to 
maintain close associations with the informants and took advantage of being able to ask 
follow-up questions (Hoepfl, 1997). In gaining access, a telephone call was made to the 
organisations concerned, the World Bank country representative, and the two government 
ministers. A follow-up letter was written to confirm the objective of the research and the type 
of information expected to be collected. 
 












Telecom Contract 8 2 1 4 15 
Water Contract 9 2 1 5 17 
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The reliability of the key informants was taken into consideration. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994) one of the possible errors of a researcher is to speak to people found to be 
available, but who might not have good knowledge of the subject matter. To minimise this 
problem, the researcher made an appointment first with the Managing Director for each of 
GT and GWCL. These top executives were contacted first as it is the standard practice in 
Ghana that in order to interview the staff of a public sector controlled body in relation to a 
research project, permission must be cleared first with the Chief Executive of that company. 
In the case of the buyers, the MD of GWCL was first contacted and in the case of GT, the 
Deputy Managing Director was contacted. The pilot phase became useful in confirming that 
their contribution could be useful to the research.  The key informants were selected by their 
respective companies‘ CEOs based on the roles each played on behalf of their respective 
companies in the whole transaction. Three of the recommended managers, two from GT and 
one from GWCL, declined the offer to participate in the interview. One was then preparing to 
travel abroad and the other two declined for personal reasons.  
 
5.5 Interview Process 
 
The fieldwork was conducted during a five month period from October 2010 to February 
2011. Interviews ranged from one and half to two hours.  In all, 28 individuals were 
interviewed covering both sides of the transaction, (i.e. the public sector and the private 
sector service providers). However, some of the interviewees were interviewed twice making 
it to 32 interviews. The Deputy Managing Director for GT and the managers for procurement 
and Human Resources respectively were interviewed twice in the first case. Similarly, four 
interviewees from the second case, namely, the Managing Director for GWCL, and the 
Human Resource and Procurement Officer Managers, were interviewed twice. A follow-up 
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interview became necessary to address some inaccuracies revealed during the subsequent 
review of the data collected from interviewees. Although some appointments had to be 
rescheduled, the interview targets were successfully accomplished. 
 
 
As indicated by Miles and Huberman (1994) before each interview segment commenced, the 
purpose and all the key concepts and terminology were carefully defined and explained to the 
informants. This was done in order to have the assurance that all respondents had a clear idea 
of the purpose of the research and a common understanding of what the questions are 
specifically asking for to avoid potential misleading interpretations. 
 
During the pilot study all the prospective interviewees agreed to be recorded, which made it 
easier to play back the recorded tape in case further checks become necessary. However, at 
the time of the interview four of the managers asked not to be recorded. To minimise the 
possibility of missing vital information on what was being said, notes were taken at all the 
interviews and what was written was read back to the informants for confirmation. Despite 
the initial view that the level of cooperation from the managers would be low, it actually 
turned out that co-operation was positive. On reflection, the managers interviewed were very 
cooperative and the information given was insightful and riching.  
 
 
5.5.1 Documentary sources 
 
 
Documentary evidence formed an integral part of evidence for the research. Documentary 
evidence is a valuable source to improve the quality of the analysis (Yin, 1994). For example, 
Bryman (2007) noted that documents reveal some important aspects of social reality. An 
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advantage to the social researcher is that because those documents were not purposely created 
for the research they represent a reliable source with which to validate the data. 
 
In analysing the issues raised in this study, primary and secondary data were gathered from a 
variety of sources in Ghana and in the UK. The main sources of documentary evidence are 
primary and secondary data. These are made up of published and unpublished documents, 
company reports, committee reports, and newspaper articles. Both GT and GWCL, together 
with their respective suppliers, had their corporate websites analysed for relevant information 
leading up to, and subsequent to, the signing of the contract. In the GT contract, evidential 
value was obtained from a ministerial report that investigated the operations of GT from 2001 
to the eventual sale of GT to the private sector in 2008, and part of the report covered TMP‘s 
management tenure. GWCL‘s published reports from 2006 to 2010 were analysed, including 
various press reports. The list of documents is depicted in Table 5.7 
 
  
Table 5.7 List of Documents Analysed  
Item Particulars  
1 GT  Memoranda./Files 
2 GWCL Memoranda/Files 
3 Newspapers, Articles Local and Foreign, Staff newsletters   
4 Policy Document on PPP Private Sector Development  
5 Inter-ministerial Report on the sale of GT to  Vodaphone UK 
6 GT Audit Reports 2002-2005  
7 GWCL Audit Reports 2005-2009 
 
 
In addition, information was obtained from newspaper and magazine articles. Lastly, other 
sources of evidence were obtained from World Bank reports and newspaper articles.  These 
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documents though limited in their uses have proved useful in providing valuable information 
and insights about the two PPP projects (ie policy issues, management and outcomes. 
However, documentary evidence has obvious limitations. Official documentation may not 
contain all information and could also be biased (Scot, 1990). For these reasons, they need to 
be used with caution. However, as Yin, (1989) has stated ‗Because their overall value, 
documents play an explicit role in any data collection in doing case studies.‘  
 
5.5.2. Data Processing 
 
The aim of this section is to discuss the data processing method for the analysis and 
interpretation of the data in the research.  A large volume of data was produced and had to be  
taken through various stages of processing. Since the interview questions are qualitative in 
nature, there was a need to identify and evaluate their relevance to the main study.  
 
 
 Eisenhardt‘s (1989) two-stage method of within-case and across-case analysis guided the 
analysis of the interviews. The method involved writing up a summary of each individual 
case in order to identify important case level phenomena. Following this process, a coding 
scheme was developed to assist with the cross–case analysis with a view to sorting out the 
patterns to obtain an overall view of the cases being studied.  Coding is a way of sorting 
information from a mass of data into distinctive categories and labelling them according to 
their characteristics (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The coding scheme was specifically 
helpful at the analysis stage to capture the pre-contractual power variables operationalised 
(i.e. utilities, scarcity and information), the variables for resources and negotiation 
capabilities (see Appendix B) 
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  Using the coding technique what was considered was the independent and dependent 
variables, categories, and patterns (Miles and Huberman, 1984, 1989). Coding alpha 
numerals is assigned to each of the power variable of utility, scarcity information, in the first 
independent variables. Each is further categorised using the topic guide and the research 
questions. For example the pre-contractual power relation was further coded into operational 
and commercial, scarcity and information. Each theme was further categorised using the topic 
guide and the research questions. For example the pre-contractual power relation was further 
coded into operational and commercial, scarcity and information. In relation to dependent 
variable of post-contractual balance /imbalance is further categorised into the risk sharing in 
fixed assets and incentives design. In the second stage, the initial groupings was later refined 
and reviewed and then filtered them through several stages to arrive at a clear pattern. 
Attempts were made to use the Nvivo package, but this was abandoned in favour of a manual 
technique because the software was not helpful in mapping the various variables as intended. 
When the above steps were taken, it was possible for the researcher to give an answer to the 
research question and to form a conclusion about the whole case study. 
 
5.5.3 Alternative Methods Considered 
 
In the research tradition, there are many research approaches to gather data and also different 
ways to measure a phenomenon. The question of whether to use alternative approaches is 
determined by the purpose to which such an approach can add to the value of the research. In 
some cases, alternative methods may be appropriate to offer alternative views. In this sense, a 




In relation to measuring the variables in the research, alternative measure such as Likert scale 
were considered to ensure that findings are supported by other measures. This could have 
created a need to engage in the complicated process of weighing opinions by rating such 
criteria, and there is no doubt that some researchers would have felt compelled and excited to 
do so by using statistical analysis tools. This was not the case here, and the justification was 
provided by the fact that the interviewees in both cases exhibited sound knowledge and 
judgements in analysing the problems confronting them in the management of the contracts 
and had good idea what went wrong. Their views and perceptions were candid and they were 
able to provide their own assessments on the key variables and their bargaining positions with 
the suppliers thus rendering unnecessary further weighing and ranking their view to give 
meaning to what their perceptions.  
 
The use of telephone interviews and questionnaires was considered. However, given the 
sensitive nature of the issues involved in the two cases, the use of telephone interviews was 
eliminated, as it was considered security risk and participants prefer direct face to face 
interviews. This could be explained by the point that respondents might be hesitant to 
disclose confidential information in such a way and that could undermine the integrity of the 
answers and their value for the research.  
 
In the case of using structured questionnaires, this was considered but dismissed as it was felt 
that it would limit further probing and discussion on the number of issues that came up during 
the interviews. Using the quantitative approach as a form of triangulation, as already 
explained, may lead to duplication and using that approach on its own might not be helpful in 
exploring deeper the constraints that public sector authorities face in developing post-
contractual balance. Considering the number and duration of the interviews and considering 
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that five different actors (two each from the public sector and the private sectors and the 
World Bank) and government representatives and the variables and indicators used, providing 
an alternative method would not offer the necessary advantages expected. In practical terms 
such a task would be difficult to complete because of the sheer volume of work involved and 
the repetitive information obtained from the original discussion. On the other hand, the 
volume of information will not only be confusing but will be difficult for the readers to read 
and understand the key points that the research seeks to highlight. In the end, it may not add 
any new evidential value to the research to justify additional resources used in the exercise. 
More importantly, a good research practice requires that a  good researcher should access his 
or her work and know when to stop collecting further data (Morgan, Eisenhardt, 1989; 1998). 
 
5.5.3.1  Objectivity and Validity 
 
Maintaining research objectivity in qualitative research is of paramount importance to 
researchers (Miles and Huberman, 1984; 1994). For example, the tools used should be able to 
measure the data that reflects and describes the true state of power relations in the project by 
mapping the outcomes against set standards. In addition, maintaining objectivity and 
minimisation of research bias provides the assurance that the findings and conclusions can 
stand strict scrutiny. In order to meet research standards that satisfy the reliability of findings, 
the research process has been made more rigorous in many ways. First, the questions were 
designed guided by the hypothesis and the epistemological position of positivism 
underpinning the research. This is clearly outlined so that readers are informed of what 
knowledge is to be arrived at. Additionally, the research is triangulated at different levels so 




The following protocols were observed, following Bourque and Fielder (1995). The draft 
questions were pre-tested in the pilot study using the administrative procedures that would be 
used in the study. Furthermore, as part of the preparation towards data collection, all 
conceptual issues were clarified with the informants and areas prone to bias were identified 
beforehand and addressed. A standard interviewing format was adopted and followed 
consistently throughout the data collection exercise. Additionally, a strict regime of field and 
observation note taking was followed alongside the interview recordings. The objective was 
to compare what was captured in the electronic recording as a way to validate what 
information was recorded.  
 
Furthermore, care was taken to minimise bias during the selection of what evidence is 
relevant and what is not. Thus all informants were given equal opportunities and encouraged 
to comment on the same issues as previous respondents.  This was one of the effective 
methods used to ensure that the research subjects and topics were kept central to the research. 
This is to avoid misunderstanding of the meaning of what was said as well as to help put each 
theme in its proper context before the data was analysed. The feedback loop also provided a 
solid basis for checking consistency and contradictions at the analysis stage. An objective 
picture was also built by interviewing both the suppliers and the public sector for their 
perspectives. The information obtained was later discussed with respondents for their 
feedback. Both perspectives were consequently used for intra-triangulation and inter-
triangulation to further enhance the objectivity of the research findings.  
 
As is the case in semi-structured interviews of evidence gathering, reporting depends on such 
factors as the subjective state and the personal and cultural frames of the researcher. These 
may involve influencing persons to describe what constitutes factual issues and what 
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constitutes inaccurate information on such topics. However, neutrality is upheld at all times 
by avoiding the problems of interviewing, by minimising giving off body language to suggest 
responding in a particular way.  
 
Finally, there is also a sound caution in social research that a researcher must take care not to 
be biased in selecting what appeals to the researcher and ignoring important ideas. This is of 
particular importance in qualitative research where the researcher is deeply involved as a 
participant in gathering information, selection of method of analysis and interpretation of 
research outcomes, where the criteria that apply in judging validity differ from those of 
quantitative methods. With this in mind, and observing best academic research practice, the 
combination of methods employed in this study took into consideration  all these problems to 




This chapter has described the research strategy used to test the hypotheses of the three risk 
factor model developed in Chapter 4. The chapter has discussed the major research paradigms 
and research strategies mostly found in management research in forming the research 
objectives and qualitative case study was employed in the structuring the primary research 
requirement.  An important part of this chapter was devoted to the description in detail of the 
definitions and operationalisation, and of the constructs and indices used to measure them. In 






CHAPTER 6  
The Ghana PPP Contracts: GT and GWCL 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter laid out the methodological framework for the gathering of evidence. In 
Chapter1 we noted that private-sector participation enables governments to develop 
infrastructure and service provision at a cheaper cost than under traditional procurement 
practices. The large and growing literature on PPP policy in Western countries have 
emphasised the importance of private sector involvement in public sector infrastructure and 
service provision. In this chapter we discuss the two PPP cases and analyse two different 
public provisions within the public sector one in the telecoms sector and the other in the 
water sector. Each case provides description of management contracting of PPP and the 
structure of power, post-contractual balance and supplier performance for the specific public 
services analysed. Particular attention is paid to conditions that led to the public sector 
reforms in each case and the political and financial context within which PPP policy is 
implemented in Ghana. This will allow us to understand the internal and external 
environmental factors affecting the participation of the private partners and the expectation of 
the efficient outcomes. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 discusses the factors 
that led to the introduction of private sector initiative.  Section 6.2 discusses the political 
context of the PPP reforms. Section 6.3 examines the GT‘s operational and financial 
problems and the introduction of a private sector partner to manage the company. In the 
second case, section 6.4 highlights the background problems of GWCL. Section 6.5 examines 




6.2 The Ghana and PPP policy  
 
 In countries like UK and USA the combination of public and private sector commitments 
contributed to impressive results in areas of health, education, roads and IT projects which 
are key areas to national development. There have also been criticisms against the use of 
private sector in public provision as costly. However, its relevance to World Bank economic 
policies in developing countries is best illustrated in the centrality of private sector 
participation in its strategic policies World Bank, 1989, 2002). The Business Partnership an 
outreach group of the World Bank, developed broad policies with International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) all affiliates of the 
World Bank to work with other international and governmental agencies to increase the 
awareness and adoption of private sector model into their developing agenda in low income 
countries (World Bank, 2002, 2004). In Ghana, the driving force may be identified as 
economic, political and social interventions to support failing public sector services.  
 
6.2.1 Factors Driving PPP Reforms  
 
Before and after independence in 1957, all public utilities were under the control of the state. 
The state continued to manage public utilities providing subsidies well until the 1980s when 
the economy begun to flutter in the wake of world financial crises. By 1990 through to 2000, 
Ghana‘s debt has increased beyond safety levels and micro economic indicators such as 
annual growth rate reduced from 122% in 1983 to 9% by early 1990‘s and inflation has 
increased with standard of living falling drastically (World Bank, 1989, 2002). This brought 
along other problems. 
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 The government could no longer support the utility companies with the amount of subsidies 
required to keep services going. In addition, condition of the infrastructure of these utilities 
was fast deteriorating and internal generated funds were not sufficient to support normal 
operations. Furthermore, mismanagement, and excessive bureaucracy affected the financial 
performance of these public companies. This in turn, affected their ability to raise sufficient 
funds to run and expand services to meet demand. It is within these challenges that the two 
state-owned utility companies; telecoms and water services came to sharp focus as the most 
affected utility companies in the country. Frempong, (2007) reports indicate that limited 
resources of GT created a big gap in customer demands for improved and expanded services. 
In the case of the piped water supply, water coverage was low although government‘s 
financial support has been sustained over the years to keep supply of water to the people. 
Although general access to safe water supply appears to have improved, increased population 
drift to the urban centres and demand for more water indicates that the there was a need to 
pursue aggressive policies to modernise infrastructure and improve services. 
 
 The other reason for the reforms has to do with the weak capacity of governments and its 
rigid bureaucratic administrative structures that also contributed to poor quality of public 
services, high transaction costs, and widespread corruption resulting in inefficient 
management (see World Bank, 1989; 1996; Larbi, 2008). The World Bank, on its part 
recognised that given the state control and poor public management of telecommunication 





6.2.2 Political Context of PPP reforms 
 
The first significant step towards privatisation in Ghana was the implementation of the World 
Bank‘s Accelerated Development Plan (ADP) in 1994. The initiative was one of several long-
term policy frameworks aimed at transforming the publicly controlled utility companies 
through a gradual transition towards privatisation. For example, it sets the agenda for 
introducing private operators and competition into the industry and for its eventual 
privatisation (Haggarty et al., 2002; Ahortor, 2003; Frempong, 2007). The recommendations 
under the ADP framework for public utilities are a sale or a form of partnership or similar 
private sector participation schemes. The decision to privatise or not in many ways generated 
a lot of debate and controversy in the country between the World Bank and the government, 
civil society and interest groups.  
 
Despite the urgent need for public procurement reforms, the orientation for the political 
leadership was not entirely pro-market even though the rule of law remains strong in the 
country (Larbi, 1998). This partly accounts for the delay in the implementation of PPP 
reforms in the country. There is evidence that the idea of privatisation was welcomed at the 
time, however, the government was reluctant to sell public utilities to the private sector for 
political reasons (Haggarty et al., 2002; Whitfield, 2007; Frempong, 2007).  
 
 Another problem was that potential private partners were reluctant to invest in developing 
countries perceived to have weak legal structures to protect their business interests (Caves, 
1996; Tan and Litschert, 1994). Given the political context in Ghana and its nascent liberal 
democracy, the international service providers wanted assurances that their assets and 
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interests will be protected against state expropriation. Thus strong political commitment from 
the government had to be provided to assure the international suppliers about the safety of 
their investments. In addition to the need for property rights protection, appropriate 
institutional structures to facilitate sound project implementation are required to be put in 
place by the government. 
 
6.3 The 1980s: A Decade of Decay and Delays 
 
6.3.1 Ghana Telecom 
 
In Ghana, GP&T could not respond to the growing demand for more telephone services and 
improved quality coverage. Analysis showed that the distribution of telephone services across 
the country at this time was low. Even in the 1990s only 3 out of 1000 inhabitants had access 
to a phone, and even this low level was limited to urban dwellers (Frimong, 2007). Accra, the 
capital, accounted for about 57% of the total lines in the country, yet in this period, demand 
for telephone lines increased dramatically. Experts estimated that demand at the period was 
over new 150,000 lines per year, while supply increased by only 1,000 lines a year. 
 
Subsequent feasibility studies conducted in the 1990s showed that the realistic projected 
demand was between 300,000 and 500,000 lines by the end of 2020 to meet growing local 
demands and international standards (Ghana Vision 2020, 1997), and by 2002, statistics 
showed that Ghana had in total only 455,000 telephone subscribers both fixed and mobile 




Table 6.1 Basic Telecommunications Network Indicators  
 
Source: ITTU World Telecom Indicators (2002) and National Communication Authority  
 
 
Internet user growth was also hampered due to the inadequate infrastructure of GP&T. 
Surveys showed that internet services were low in the country and limited to a few large 
businesses in the financial institutions, government and corporate bodies (Osiakwan, 2003; 
Dzidonu, 2004). In the educational sector, the picture was not encouraging either. About 79% 
of secondary schools were reported to have an average of 19 computers to support both 
administrative work and teaching (Dzidonu, 2004).  Thus emphasis was placed on increasing 
broadband services and extending them to other educational institutions not yet connected at 
all. 
Under the ADP plan in 1994, the telecommunication sector was proposed to be re-structured 
as follows:  
1. The sale of GP&T to local or foreign investors 
2. Partnership deals on Build Operate and Transfer or similar private sector participation 
schemes 
3. The establishment of a regulatory body. 
Particulars Level of Access 
Total  no. of  telephone subscribers fixed-mobile) 455,000 
Total  fixed line  subscribers 225,000 
Mobile system subscribers 230,000 
Total number of subscribers (per, 100 inhabitants)  2.08 
Waiting list for main lines 15,567 
Mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants 0.93 
Main Telephone line (Residential %) 42.0% 
ICT  
PC (per 1000 persons 3 
Internet Hosts 235 




A significant step taken in the reform process was the separation of the postal services from 
the telecommunications, which led to the creation of Ghana Telecom (GT). The separation 
was strategic, in that it was meant to make GT attractive to prospective investors. In addition, 
an independent regulatory body, the National Communication Authority (NCA), was 
established in the same year to regulate the activities of various private operators, including 
the formulation of policies and quality standards. 
 
Despite many positive efforts to transform GT into a modern telecoms company, its technical 
and operational problems remained unsolved. It is important to note that the problems of GT 
were not confined to only financial, but also has managerial challenges. Many attempts were 
made in the past to inject capital into GT to improve infrastructure development but the 
supervision of the projects was not properly handled by the GT management. For example, as 
part of the telecommunication rehabilitation programme, a project known as the Second 
Telecommunication Project (STP) was initiated in 1988.  
 
     Table 6.2 Source of Funding for STP in Million USD  
 
Source: P&T Corporation, 1993 (in ―The World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies (WDR). 
 
 
Source Foreign  Local Total 
Government of Ghana 1.5 9.8 11.3 
France (CCCE) 21.7 - 21.7 
Netherlands (NKF) 18.8 - 18.8 
Japanese Grant (JICA) 9.2 -   9.2 
Japan (EXIM) 7.0 -  7.0 
Japan (OECF) 69.5 6.7 76.2 
Ireland 1.7 -   1.7 
IDA 18.3 0.7  19.0 
Ghana P&T 2.3 5.5    7.8 
Total 150.0 22.7 172.7 
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The government, through the World Bank and other multilateral donors in 1988, made 
available US$173 million to provide further rehabilitation; upgrading and expansion of the 
telecommunications facilities in the country (see Table 6.2). This was to be completed by 
1991. Unfortunately, as a result of managerial incompetency and political interference, the 
project was completed three years behind schedule (Haggarty et al., 2002). As can be seen 
from Table 6.2, the vast majority of funds for STP were foreign – US$150 million out of 
US$172.7 million.  
 
However, despite all of the inadequacies of GT, when the decision was taken to privatise it, 
local opposition delayed early implementation. The government on its part however, realised 
it had no choice in the matter if it was to solve GT‘s increasing financial and operational 
problems. As a compromise, and in 1997, the government brought in Telecom Malaysia 
(TM). Under the arrangement, TM bought 30% of GT shares for US$38m, but with 5:3 
majorities on the Board and promises of further investment funds (Haggarty et al., 2002; 
Frimpong, 2007; Amin, 2007).  
  
However, the Malaysian company reneged on those promises and, in 2002 the new NPP 
government led by Mr. Kuffour decided to change the composition of the Board from 5:3 to 
3:5 to reflect on their shareholdings ratios. TM rejected these changes and subsequently sold 
back its stake in GT to the government for US$55m. Consequently, GT control reverted back 
to the government, but now with even more financial problems: The government had to find 
money both to settle TM compensation and to provide further capital to keep the GT 
operations going. To make it worse for GT, the International Financial Corporation (IFC), a 
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member of the World Bank withdrew an earlier approved loan of US$100 million from GT as 
a punishment for disrupting the privatisation process (see Haggarty et al., 2002). 
 
6.3.2 The  GT Contract  with Telenor PPP 
 
Shortly after the TM debacle, in the same year 2002, the government finally took a decisive 
step to experiment with private participation idea under the banner of public-private 
partnership based on the policy guidelines of the World Bank. The new government was 
convinced that the poor operational and commercial operations of the GT could be reversed 
to make it more viable to meet domestic and business expectation including prospective 
foreign investor‘s is reliant on the  private sector initiative (Frimpong, 2007).  
 
Following a tender process that resulted in one bidder responding, the contract was awarded 
to Telenor Management Partners (TMP management consulting partners from Telenor 
Norway in August 2002.  The management contract was signed in January 2003 for a three 
year mandate under which TMP is to take over the operations and management of the 
company. It was subsequently extended for an additional year. As part of the terms the 
private partner is to take over the management of the company under a three year contract.    
 
 
The specific targets for Telenor in the 2003 agreement are summarised as follows: 




2. Install and fix broadband to every telephone subscriber in every town, including 
secondary schools. 
3. Provide Ghana Telecom with management expertise and technical services. 
4. Improve the quality of service on the existing infrastructure and introduce multi-
media applications including the internet and e-commerce  
5. Develop and implement a human resource strategy for GT. 
6. Develop effective methods to investigate malpractices in the telecommunication 
sector  
 
Under the terms of the contract, the Ghana government was assigned the responsibility of 
providing investments funds for the infrastructure and equipment required for the project. 
The government signed a loan agreement with the World Bank and also got some financial 
support from other multilateral donors to implement the telecoms projects.  
 
The government expected the project to provide social and economic benefits and revenues 
from operations. Firstly, savings is expected to come from a number of areas. It is assumed 
that the incoming private sector partner would put in place measures to reduce losses from 
fraud and staff malfeasance and waste. Secondly, it is projected that political interference that 
had resulted in poor management of the company‘s affairs will be minimised leading to high 
staff productivity. Thirdly, the private sector model is expected to undertake revenue 
generating activities through its expansion programmes and also generate savings through the 
introduction of business-like models and commercial work practices.  
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6.4 Ghana Urban Water Contract Case 
 
6.4.1  Background to the Case 
 
The Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), formerly called the Ghana Water and 
Sewerage Corporation (GWSC), was established in 1965 as a state-owned company 
responsible for producing and distributing water to the people of Ghana. It also had the 
responsibility of managing the sewerage system in the country. GWSC operated as an 
integrated state utility company until 1999, when the sewerage and rural water segments were 
separated from the core water supply operations. Following this, GWSC was changed to a 
liability company and was solely responsible for the management of Ghana‘s urban water 
supply under a World Bank Urban Water Project.  
 
Similar to GT, the rural water segment from urban water was to make the urban water project 
more attractive to prospective investors. The rural water segment came under the control of 
the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) with the responsibility of managing 
water supply to the rural areas; discussions of this company are outside the scope of this 
study.  
 
Prior to 2005, the idea to privatise urban water in Ghana was first proposed by the World 
Bank as far back as 1994 (Katharina, 2001; Finger and Allouche, 2002; Lobina and Hall, 
2003).  This was also in line with the official UN recognition in 1992 that ―‘water has an 
economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic good‘ 
(Quoted in Castro, 2007, p.27).  
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GWSC‘s financial position was made worse by the fact that the company could not raise 
sufficient revenue from its operations to run the company independent of government 
financial support. One key reason for this was that the company was losing revenues through 
water losses from water leakages, bursting of old pipes and illegal connections. At the time 
water losses through inefficiency were as high as 50%, indicating that that the company was 
getting only half of its potential income. The other reason is managerial problem. Lack of 
motivation, politic interference and bureaucracy affected water operations. Lack of adequate 
funding played a key role in the deplorable condition in GWSC infrastructure.  
 
Statistics available showed that people with access to potable water were not encouraging 
despite financial support from international donors. The percentage of people with access to 
water dropped from 76% in 1992 to 59% in 2002. Accra, the capital city, has a 3million 
population but just about 60% of the people had access to good drinking water (Whitfield, 
2007). As a result, water was rationed to certain parts of the city on either a daily or weekly 
basis, while some rich households had to rely on expensive water tankers services for their 
daily water needs. The situation was even worse in other urban areas in the country, where 
some communities went without water during dry spells that last more than three months.  
 
The cost of infrastructure and rehabilitation of water systems and expansion works was 
estimated at $1.8billion (Foster and Pushak, 2011; Whitfield, 2007). As a first step towards 
privatisation, however, the Ministry of Works and Housing commissioned a series of 
consultancy groups, Halcrow from the UK and Louise Berger from the US, to study and 
made recommendations on GWSC‘s operations (Katharina, 2001; Whitfield, 2007). The 
Halcrow report concluded that GWSC‘s poor performance was the result of inadequate 
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financing and managerial inefficiency. Based on its findings, the report recommended 
handing over the urban water services to the private sector to manage. These 
recommendations had political backing from the IMF and the World Bank, who used this 
recommendation and intensified their pressure on the government to bring in private investors 
to manage the urban water segment. 
 
6.4.2 Move to the Market  
 
Private sector involvement in the provision and distribution of potable water to the urban 
areas was given further impetus when the government could not raise about $1.8billion for 
both expansion works and rehabilitation works to meet MDGs target of getting water to all 
communities by 2020. The government had nowhere to turn other than the World Bank. That 
meant the government had to consider the question of privatising water services for which the 
World Bank had been pushing all along.  
 
However, two critical issues delayed early water reforms. First is lack of political will on the 
part of the government given the intense civil society opposition to any form of privatisation 
of the water sector. As is always the case in developing countries, the argument against water 
privatisation was centred on the need to protect public interest against commercial 
exploitation by the private sector. Sustained opposition by trade unions and civil societies on 
one hand, and the government‘s own reservations concerning the political wisdom of 
privatising water on the other, were the internal issues that delayed early implementation of 
the reforms (ISODEC, 2001). The other factor was external. Due to political risk concerns, 
the government was finding it hard to find a foreign investor to invest in the water sector 
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anyway. Meanwhile, GWCL operations continued to worsen and many people were denied 
access to water.  
 
6.4.3 The AVRL PPP 
 
The World Bank came to the conclusion that only hard conditions through project financing 
policies could force the government to undertake procurement reforms (Martey, 1991). 
Eventually, the opportunity to restructure the public utility sector came when the government 
under Kuffour came to power in 2001 and decided to apply for World Bank debt relief under 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme. A HIPC programme is a World 
Bank debt relieving policy in which countries whose debt portfolio has become unsustainable, 
and therefore difficult to service are offered a way out for all of its debts and by which all 
outstanding debts are written off under strict conditions and supervision (Whitfield, 2007; 
Frimpong, 2007). When Ghana opted for HIPC, the World Bank made water privatisation a 
key condition for writing off the country‘s debt and providing further financial support for the 
rehabilitation and extension of urban water coverage in the country (Whitfield, 2007, 
Frimpong, 2007). This was a turning point in the history of the GWCL. Even so, it took the 
government another 4 years before a suitable partner was found, largely because investors felt 
that the country‘s political and economic environment was not secured for private investment 
of such magnitude. 
 
After the government succumbed to World Bank pressure, the choice of a PPP framework 
created a stalemate. Ghana favoured the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme but the 
investor community showed no interest, as they regarded it as too risky. However, the few 
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foreign investors who indicated their interest in the two projects rejected any PPP 
arrangement that would require them to invest in the water company. As a result, the 
proposed lease contract was rejected. Eventually when it became clear that no foreign 
company was willing to enter into a lease contract with government on GWCL project and 
that there was no suitably qualified local private company in the country, the World Bank 
confronted the government of Ghana with two options. If the government pursued a 
management contract with the private sector, the Bank would provide $100million and 
leverage other resources for an additional $30million. On the other hand, if the management 
contract option was rejected, then the Bank would provide only $30million (Whitfield, 2005; 
World Bank, 2004a). Convinced that there was no other choice, the government chose the 
World Bank‘s option with tacit approval of the interested international suppliers.  
 
In the tendering process, three companies of Saur of Paris, BiWater of the UK and AVRL, 
from Netherlands. Out of the three AVRL submitted its bid documents as Saur, and BiWater 
withdrew their bids. The contract was consequently awarded to International BV of 
Netherlands of Netherlands; Ghana government signed a 5 year contract with Aqua Vittens 
Rand Limited (AVRL) in 2006).  The management company AVRL is formed by two 
consortia Vittens International BV of Netherlands and Rand Water Services of South Africa.  
The specific targets for AVRL in the 2006 agreement are summarized below. 
1. Reduce non-revenue water losses from the current levels of 48% to 26% by 2011 




3.   Assist the GWCL to improve the management of the water sector and pursue its 
long-term financial viability strategies 
4. Reduce customer response times 
5. Reduce chemical usage and content in water 
6. Reduction of staff per 1000 connections to below 10. 
 
 
The contract covers 80 urban water systems and is financed from a World Bank grant of 
$103million, with Nordic Development support of $5million and $12million from the 
Ghanaian government itself (World Bank, 2004a, 2004b; GWCL, 2010). Under the contract 
GWCL management is responsible for providing fixed asset and for monitoring the AVRL 
executives with the assistance of a financial technical auditor. Thus the introduction of 
private sector initiative seems to hold high expectation both from the government, the World 
Bank perspective that genuine partnership has been put in place that would lead to significant 
improvement in GWCL operations and finances (Whitfield, 2007; Katharina, 2001).  
 
Several areas were identified for basis of savings. The government and the World Bank 
expected that the incoming private sector partner will apply market-led principles in the 
management of the company to make savings. AVRL executives were expected to introduce 
standardise its procurement portfolio and reduce the incidence of non-revenue water losses to 
improve financial performance. In brief, the Ghana Urban Water project is an international 
collaboration arrangement involving the Ghana government as the main client, AVRL the 
service provider, the World Bank and other donors as the financiers for the water project. 
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6.5 The Structure of the Telecoms and Water Management Contracting of PPP 
 
The management of the two PPP projects in developing countries is complex. They are made 
of three major stakeholders of Ghana government, the contracting country, the private sector 
partners and the World Bank and other multilateral donors as project financiers.  
 
Under this typical management contracting, Ghana government is the principal party 
contracting on behalf of GT and GWCL. The government is responsible for the provision of 
the required capital for the two projects tendering, selection and award of the contracts. 
Internally, there are many individuals and government ministries who also perform some 
specialised functions. In a typical public sector administrative structures in Ghana, sector 
ministries exercise oversight responsibilities over agencies and organisations under them. 
This means GT comes under the Ministry of Communication while GWCL is under Ministry 
of Water Resources, Works and Housing (MRWH). Regulatory bodies were put in place to 
deal with specific issues of exploitation, quality and standard of performance; namely 
Regulatory Commission (PURC) for water and National Communication Authority (NCA) 
for telecom operators in the country. A Project Management Unit (PMU) is set up by the 
government to for that purpose for planning and implementation of the two projects to meet 
planning objectives. 
The next stake holders are the private sector partners working in collaboration with the 
government in the telecoms and water contract. A private sector partner is expected to 
execute the contract according to government requirements and specifications which in this 




The last major stakeholder is the World Bank. The World Bank is responsible for providing 
loans to the Ghana government to finance the two projects. Although these stakeholder have 
a different role to play in the implementation and execution of PPP policy in both the 
telecoms and water contract the structure is like any typical network with their activities 
interlinked. In recent years, the role of the World Bank has taken a centre stage in PPP policy 
implementation in developing countries and seeks to control the direction of the project 
through its project technical and financial support.  
 
         









On one hand, the World Bank would want to minimise financing risks in the projects and 
does so through conditions attached to the loans. Typically, the condition includes 
competitive tendering, project implementation milestones and reporting and withholding of 
funds for missing specified key indicators. The structure in Figure 6.1 indicates that the 
government depends on the World Bank for financial support on one hand, and on the private 
Ghana Government  Service Providers 
  








sector on the other to meet its stated objectives in the two projects. The private sector on the 
other hand, revenues is dependent on the Ghana. This is the general structure of collaboration 
that shapes the implementation of PPP in Ghana.   
 
6.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented the background of the study which is the subject of the empirical 
study. There are three major stakeholders, the government, the service providers and the 
World Bank. There are two issues of interest here. While the objective of private sector 
companies is to maximise profits from the relation, Ghana government on the other hand, has 
set of objectives to maximise welfare benefits in the form of increased functionality at 
reducing cost. Both the government and the private sector can achieve their objectives when 
risk and uncertainty are appropriately allocated between them. Given the economic rationale 
for PPP initiative regarding mutual risk sharing it is worthwhile to empirically examine both 
the telecom contract and the water contracts whether the empirical evidence supporting this 
assertion is strong. In the next three chapters, the empirical study examines the relationship 








Chapter 7  
Presentation of Interview Data 
 
7.1.1 Pre-contractual power resources of GT and TMP 
 
This section presented the interview data obtained from GT-TMP telecoms contract using 
semi-structured interviews. From the data obtained from the research the contract 
management strategies of all the parties are analysed and the impediments and facilitators to 
post-contractual balance are highlighted. Particular attention is paid to conditions that enable 
the public sector to obtain key power resources both structural and external which post-
contractual balance is dependent to facilitate good supplier performance.  
 
The discussion of the results of the interview is presented in two parts. The first part relates to 
the key characteristics independent variables of pre-contractual power influencing the design 
of a balanced contract while the second part relates asymmetry in resources and negotiation 
capabilities and other factors that may be found to have positive impact on the development 
of post-contractual balance. General perception of all interviewees, as well as differences in 
perception between the public and private sectors parties are presented. After this 
presentation of data, the author provides analysis within the context of determining power 
relations. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 presents the interview data on two 
independent variables of pre-contractual power resources and resources and negotiation 
capabilities from the GT side. Section 7.2 presents the supplier side of the interview. Both the 
interview results are analysed and evaluated their pre-contractual power structure in section 
7.3.  In the second part, the interview data on GWCL and AVRL and the results are analysed.  
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7.1.2 Independent Variables  Utility –GT interview Data 
 
 
The main interview was preceded by asking interviewees from the public sector managers 
and the private sector representatives in order to confirm the evidence obtained during the 
pilot stage that PPP telecom contract contained significant asset specific investments and 
switching cost. At the pilot stage, it was established that the PPP contract asset specificity and 
switching costs were involved. After obtaining the confirmation, further discussion on its 
effect on the contract relation was deferred until later part of the post-contractual balance 
analysis stage. The consequently interview shifted to the next stage which is obtaining 
evidence on pre-contractual power resources from the interviewees.  
 
Operational Importance: Interviewees were asked about relevance of the telecoms contract 
with the private sector.  First, there was broad agreement that the partnership was established 
in order to address inadequate telecommunications infrastructure, and service delivery 
problems in the country. At the heart of GT‘s problems was financing requirements to 
rehabilitate and modernise the telecoms equipment. The Deputy Chief Executive (DCEO) 
explained: 
 
 ‗Our telecommunication services were down at the time and, we could hardly serve our customer‘s needs for 
fast and reliable telecom services. All the existing equipment in use were old and could not handle a large 
volume of traffic, particularly international calls, at one time‘. 
The GOFI also added that the past government decided to take immediate action to sort out 
the basic infrastructure financing needs of the company to keep operations going but unable 
to meet these financing needs from their resources. It emerged from the interviews that other 
options were explored including privatising the company‘s operations but the deteriorated 
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nature of the existing facilities was unattractive for buyers. The other reason given was that 
the Ghanaian public opinion was against the privatisation. The government minister (GOF1) 
revealed that as a result of public agitation against privatisation the only option was to seek 
external funding and that took them to the idea of forming a partnership. He admitted that:  
 
‗Without the partnership with TMP, GT could face serious operational problems of inability to meet customers 
demand for telephonic and internet services. The investors we are encouraging to invest in various sections of 
the economy required efficient telecom services and that responsibilities falls on our telecom company.‘  
 
Other interviewees (DCEO, AD2, and PO2), although not entirely happy about private sector 
involvement in the company‘s management, agreed that TMP‘s partnership allowed GT to 
expand its services, enabling the government to keep vital telecoms services operational by 
serving the business and domestic needs of the  people including extending internet facilities 
to schools  in the country. 
 
Strategic Importance: On the issue of the strategic importance of the telecoms contract the 
Minister for Communication (GOF1) described the telecommunications contract as follows:  
‗We considered the sector very important as the key area to provide infrastructure base to support foreign 
investors... our economic development and our ability to attract investors into the country depended on GT 
being able to provide a reliable, good telecommunication network in the country… At the time we signed the 
telecom contract GT operations had almost ground to a halt… barely covering five per cent of the service area in 
the country.‘ 
 
 The government minister (GOF1) confirmed this problem and added that the rehabilitation 
and survival of the telecommunications infrastructure was important to the achievement of 
Millennium Development Goals, and maintenance of national security. 
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On the importance of TMP services to GT‘s vision run a modern fast and cost effective 
telecommunication services, the view of the interviewees was that they considered the service 
provider as key to the ability of the government to attract investment and ICT development 
into the country. The DCEO noted:  
 
‗Our country can only develop its economy when we have effective communication networks, and increase ICT 
knowledge in our educational institutions for rapid technological development. We could not have achieved 
these objectives using the old systems and equipment we had at the time. ‗These were our priorities we sought 
to achieve with the help of TMP.‘ 
 
 There were other compelling reasons for the TMP contract which is to with government 
policy to improve with computer literacy in schools and computerisation of government 
business for national development and economic growth.  
As GOFI and DCEO both explained the survival of the telecom industry is important to the 
government and pointed that its poor infrastructure meant that they were losing their market 
share to private mobile telephone companies.  He explained that: 
 
 ‗Our rivals ―Areeba‖ and ―Mobitel‖ have virtually taken our market because our customers were becoming 
dissatisfied with our services and were changing from fixed lines to mobile phones services offered by our rivals. 
Analysis done by our experts and the World Bank recommended that we bring in private sector partner to 
manage the facility for us and the Bank will provide funding.‘ 
 
 According to the DCEO and GOF1, the government was reluctant to engage a private sector 




7.1.3 Scarcity:  Available of Suppliers 
 
This section presents the interview responses to questions about the availability of number of 
suppliers for competitive bidding for the telecoms project. 
 
Although the interviewees acknowledged the importance of competitive bidding, they 
believed that this objective of getting value for money was not achieved in this particular 
contract and was attributed to lack of competitive bidding leading to the award of the contract 
to TMP. The reason given for lack of many suppliers was two-fold. The first is related to 
limited suppliers in the telecoms market. Two interviewees DCEO and COP2 explained that 
the global telecommunications market is technological based and complex and restricted to 
only specialised suppliers. GOF1 observed:  
 
‗Our search on the international market revealed that few suppliers were active in professional management 
services in the telecom industry and the response from those qualified operators were disappointing‘  
 
The other reason given is to do with the unwillingness of foreign suppliers to work with the 
government. According to OP2 going to the international market has its own challenges 
which he attributed to investors fear of investing in the country.  As he explained:   
‗Potential foreign partners we got to know feared to invest in the country because of our previous track record 
of nationalising foreign companies during military rule in the 1980s.‘ 
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 According to the government official, only TMP remained interested in the contract up to the 
preferred supplier stage even though the vacancy was widely advertised. He further explained 
that:  
‗We got the three companies who indicated their interest in the project and upon inspection and found the poor 
state of our infrastructure and systems withdrew their interest.‘   
 
To complicate matters for GT, they found out that no local company was qualified to 
compete and win the contract in terms of resources and experience. It was evident from the 
interviews that attracting qualified and willing foreign suppliers to bid for the telecoms 
contract became difficult for GT.  DCEO expressed disappointment that they could not attract 
potential suppliers for the project. 
 
Beyond the problem of supplier scarcity there appears to poor handling of the selection 
process. The question as to whether TMP selection process was transparent interview 
responses were varied and mixed but the general impression was that it was not transparent.  
 
A former GT manager (OP2) who observed that the selection process as not transparent said:  
‗The selection of TMP was shrouded in secrecy and smacked of underhand dealings which we know happens 
whenever sole sourcing approach is used in procurement contract.‘ 
  
He further explained that TMP was first contracted to prepare a business plan for the 
company but GT management was surprised when TMP was later asked to form a partnership 
to implement their own-designed business plan. There is a further suspicion coming from the 
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procurement officer and the selection of TMP as a partner was a foregone government 
decision. His basis was the manner the contract was advertised at a short notice. According to 
the procurement officer and also corroborated by other informants from GT, the government 
had placed an advertisement in the local media on April 9, 2002, with a deadline of April 30 
for investors to respond. According to them reputable suppliers would need more than the 
short period stipulated in the contract to submit their bidding documents.  GT interviewees 
therefore suspected that the government caused the contract to be advertised in order to  
satisfy World Bank‘s requirements for all its sponsored projects to be advertised for 
competitive bidding. The DCEO explained his views further: 
 
‗There seems to be the feeling in my opinion that the contract awarding process was hastily done ‗If we look at 
the short period given for prospective bidders to submit their tender, it is obvious that the deadline was mean to 
cut off all other competitors, to the benefit of TMP.‘ 
 
However, GOF1 disagreed with the idea that the tendering process was deliberately done to 
favour TMP. He explained that: 
 ‗I agree that, TMP originally contracted under a memorandum of understanding to prepare a business plan to 
transform GT into a modern telecom company; but because no other company indicated its interest to compete, 
and TMP was confident of successfully executing its business plan, it was decided to awarded the contract to the 
company without further delay.‘  
 
The government officials explained in the absence of other rival bidders, the choice of TMP 
was also informed by the fact that the government found the business plan of TMP 
commercially sound and believed that the company has good appreciation of the Ghana 
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transactional environment and government‘s objective than any new supplier unfamiliar with 
the challenges facing the company. 
 
Despite these divergent views on the question of transparency or otherwise, what was clear 
from the interviews was that GT had faced limited supplier competitive bidding for the 
telecommunications project which in turn, suggest that the bargaining process is not going to 
be an arm‘s-length bargaining. GOF1 admitted this and commented as follows:  
‗From hindsight, we now realised that we were at the mercy of TMP as the sole supplier…and our 
experience from the negotiation showed us that you cannot make any impact when negotiating with a 
single supplier.‘ 
 
7.1.4. Information on the contract  
 
This section presents the TMP interview responses to questions about information on the 
contract. Results of the interview on accessibility to the relevant information on the contract 
that affected their negotiation strategies were outlined.  
As mentioned earlier in the Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, many accounts of power move beyond 
questions of scarcity and utility but also consider the relative information resources of the two 
parties as well (Cox et al., 2000). In negotiations, information is regarded as power and this  
was recognised by the interviewees. Interviewees noted that reliable information makes it 
easier for the authorities to plan, communicate and negotiate with the contractor on equal 
terms. They also mentioned the importance of information to the design and effective 
monitoring. Unfortunately, however, interviewees DCEO2, PO2, AD2 and EBM2 found this 
not to have been the case with TMP negotiation.  
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These interviewees catalogued key information gathering problems pertaining to the 
complexity of the transaction and the unco-operative attitude of the service provider 
regarding key information on their cost and mark-ups. An ex-board member (DCOE2) was 
particularly emphatic that GT had little or no strategic information about TMP these matters 
before the negotiation started: 
 ‗I have my doubts the negotiation team had a full knowledge about the technical requirements of the telecom 
industry in the area of its costs estimates and mark ups.‘ 
 
 He further noted that:  
‗Since we could not work out what efforts were involved in the management work and the methodology to value 
such efforts we could not challenge them effectively on their claims on the contract cost and salaries they 
requested. The information we had on TMP was basic on their line of business, financial viability and 
experience from their websites and our transaction advisers also sponsored by the World Bank.‘  
 
According him the government decision to sign the contract was based on the limited 
information given to them TMP because they did not have the time and resources to search 
for the needed information.  
 
7.2.1 Supplier Side TMP 
 
This section presents the TMP interview responses to questions about their evaluation on the 
importance of the project to their businesses. On the question of utility of the GT project, it 
emerged that the transaction had lower operational and commercial value to them in relation 




Operational Importance: An interviewee representing TMP (ADO2) described the contract as 
desirable but not as operationally or commercially as important to them: 
 ‗When we looked at the telecom contract and compared it to our main operations of the parent company, it did 
not serve as an important component part of our business offering to our existing market and customers... GT 
business was considered as another business opportunity we explored, but the loss of that contract would not 
have had any significant effect on the survivability of the parent company of Telenor Norway.‘  
 
He further explained that:   
‗The TMP company was specifically formed and incorporated in Ghana, and all our staff who worked were 
posted here on secondment and after the contract ended went back to their posts in Norway.‘ 
 
However, COF2, also representing TMP, provided a slightly different picture. He viewed the 
transaction as not equally important to them as to GT but admitted that the telecoms contract 
was central to their business objective of gaining a foothold in Africa: 
 ‗From a purely business perspective, the transaction increases our business portfolio and presence in Africa; 
and we considered at that time by accepting the GT contract which was by standard low value it was going to 
give us advantage in winning future contracts in Africa.‘ 
 
Commercial Importance: Similarly, from commercial point of view, it was evident that in 
terms of value and size, the telecoms contract was not materially significance. The Deputy 
CEO (DCEO) working with TMP and information from its websites the total volume of 
business and annual turnover of the parent company. The DCEO outlined the business profile 
of the company that had business dealing in a number of European countries. According to 
DCEO, in terms of value and size the winning or loss of the telecoms contract would not have 




In relation to information, it was evident from the interview that TMP was well informed than 
the GT. Manager EBM2 stated:  
‗We shared every bit of information we think they should know at the negotiation but admitted that there could 
be some information that had to be kept private‘.  
 
Although, the interview could not obtain confirmation that the cost structures were openly 
made available to GT, responses indicated that the service provider had an advantage in the 
critical aspects of the transaction on what efforts were required on executing the contract and 
required returns they want for taking risk in the contract.   
 
7.2.2 Interview and Other Data: Negotiations and Resources and Capabilities  
 
In this part, we assess the evidence relating to the second independent variable of resources 
and capabilities in negotiations within the argument being tested in this thesis. We begin the 
analyses by examining the relative resources and capabilities of both GT and TMP, in terms 
of their ability to communicate and negotiate effectively with each other, and on equal terms. 
This is followed by an analysis of their effect on the contract negotiations and design.  
 
7.2.3 The Negotiation Resources and Capability of GT and TMP 
 
This section presents the GT interview responses to questions about their evaluation on their 
commercial resources and capabilities.  
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Resource and Capability Asymmetry: Contract negotiations are always considered important 
in business exchanges: They set out precisely each party‘s obligations and responsibilities, 
risk and rewards. Since what a party gets out of a contract is based on the negotiate outcome, 
the conventional wisdom has been for companies to carefully choose their negotiation team, 
people with the requisite knowledge and skills to handle the demands posed by a particular 
transaction. Yet this appears not to have been the case in the telecoms contract; asymmetry of 
resources and capabilities between GT and TMP. 
 
It emerged from the interviews that the negotiation team was made up of selected people 
from the Ministry of Finance to serve as an observer, a legal representative from the Attorney 
General department and three other government appointees. According to PO2, the 
negotiation team was headed by the Minister for Communication who exercised real 
authority when it came to approval and signing of the contract DCEO admitted that the 
selection was not based on professional knowledge in negotiation or proven experience in 
contract negotiations. DCEO further explained that: 
 ‗The Minister who led the team had no record of experience in business negotiating, and the Ministry of 
Finance staff were included in the team for the reason that they would be handling the receipts and disbursement 
of funds under the contract.‘   
 
The explanation offered by a GT interviewee (GOF1), on the direct involvement of the 
government was that: 
 ‗It is an established practice for the state to undertake negotiations, and sign on behalf of a public sector body 
when the value of the project has serious effect on the national budget. The Ministry of Finance is mandated by 




The findings suggest that the negotiation team. apart from its relative lack of experience and 
commercial skills did not act independently of government influence. The idea that the GT 
negotiation team‘s performance is routinely influenced by government political interests was 
also articulated by EBM2 who was part of the negotiation team. He stressed the point that 
government right to appoint negotiators is not the problem but it is the act of dictating to the 
team what to do is the issue with GT contract.  
He conceded that the political authorities directly influences the contract negotiation whose directives 
difficult to refuse in Ghana. He noted that: 
 
‗The political authorities and ministers tell you to award the contract against your professional judgement but 
you have no choice because you cannot defy the government authority in these matters. I must admit that the 
TMP had prepared the final contract document and then presented to us to approve within three days.‘  Except 
the person from the attorney general department who had legal background , the rest of us found the language 
[in the contract document] confusing and difficult to understand...and we were asked to read through and 
approve it as it was……and had to approve the contract the way it was without any amendment.‘  
 
He therefore explained that the problem of poor performance of the government negotiating 
team with the private sector was not because of poor training and experience but it was the 
because the political authorities interfered in the pre-contractual negotiations and dictated to 
the negotiation team to sign the contract.  
PO2 also added that: 
 ‗Because people with professional qualifications and knowledge were not selected, the negotiation team had no 
strategy to counter what the service providers threw at them... definitely our negotiation team was overwhelmed 




In terms of specific ways in which the public sector negotiation team could be strengthened, 
interviewees from GT (PO2, AD2, and EBM2) admitted that this could be difficult in the 
case of international contracts but proposed that the procurement department should be 
empowered to handle future contracts. The procurement officer (PO2) emphasised this 
clearly:  
‗Resourcing the procurement department in terms of professionally qualified staff, training and logistics and 
political support and allow the professionals to take decisions on behalf of the government.‘ 
 
Overall, the general perception from the interviewees from the public sector (GT 
management and government) was that the government negotiation team did not perform 
well because they were ill-equipped to match the competency of the service provider.  
 
7.3 Analysis of the Pre-contractual Power Relationship 
 
This section reviews the pre-contractual power variables from the interview data to assess 
whether the pre-contractual power relations was symmetrical, or asymmetrical for GT.  Based 
on measurement constructs outlined in Chapter 5 the determinants of the pre-contractual 
power relations between the client and the service provider are the demand and supply 
characteristics of the transaction: i.e. utility, scarcity and information. As a test of this 
hypothesis, empirical analysis is from the interviews and documentary sources. In this section 
the empirical analysis presented here is to compare qualitatively the pre-contractual power 
resource of GT and TMP. The objective is to determine whether or not GT was in adverse 




7.3.1 Pre-contractual Power Analysis:  
 
From a buyer‘s perspective utility of supplier‘s services refers to the use value of the item to 
its needs. The results of the interview displaced in Table 7.1 shows that the GT utility 
(operational and strategic importance) of the transaction was relatively higher than that of the 
supplier. It is the objective of the government‘s objective of opening up the country to local 
and foreign investors and also to raise the status of GT operations to international status.  
Additionally, the government wants to extend ICT to schools and colleges in order to equip 
young adult with basic computer skills before they leave school. Thus the government 
consider the service offerings as both strategic and operational importance to achieve these 
objectives. 
 
 From the supplier‘s side, utility refers to the attractiveness of the value of the transaction that 
increases its revenue or profits (Lonsdale, 2005a; Cox et al, 2001). The main consideration 
for TMP will be whether the telecoms contract value forms a higher percentage of its total 
revenue operations. 
 
In comparison to TMP, Table 7.2 shows that the contract constitutes about 0.083% of Telenor 
Norway‘s total turnover. The annual turnover of Telenor Norway was over $6.5 billion at the 
time of the transaction as compared to the GT contract value of $5.4million. From 
commercial and operational perspective, given the low ratio of the telecoms transaction it is 
likely that TMP executives may not consider it as an attractive enough for them to divert 
resources towards securing the contract. At the utility level, it is evident that GT‘s utility is 





Table 7.1 Summary of Results: Pre-contractual Analysis of GT and TMP  
 
 
Key: A= Buyer Dominance 
         B= Supplier Dominance 
         C= independence 











TMP transaction both operationally and 
strategically critical to government agenda: 
country‘s socio-economic development agenda. 
ICT to businesses and schools. 
 
Contract value forms less than 1% of TMP parent‘s 
total annual turnover. Limited volume of demand 





i.No alternative suppliers. 
 
ii.Limited opportunities to stimulate bidding 
competition 
 
iii.Few suppliers available to take on management 
services with GT. 
 
iv.Cannot substitute or redefine telecoms 
transaction to increase options. 
  
v.Restrictions imposed by World Bank Conditions. 









Limited information on supplier‘s costs and 
returns. 
Limited information on supplier‘s management 




Supplier‘s services critical to GTs 
strategic and  
operational objectives  
 
Larger share of GT‘s business needs 
Lower transaction value to total 
business turnover. 
GT‘s transaction desirable but not of 





i.Lack of active interest from foreign 
companies to compete for the project.   
ii restricted by perceived political risk 
in the delivery of telecom services 
 
iii.Natural monopoly of telecom 
market: High entry barriers with few 
qualified suppliers. 
 
Non-substitutability of telecom  
services 
 
Wide business network  and  options 
available to develop business 





Information on project budget 
available. 
Keeping private information  on cost 





























In terms of scarcity, from buyers‘ side this refers to the number of potential or actual 
suppliers that could be obtained in a market for a particular transaction (Cox et al, 2001). If 
there are few suppliers in the market a buyer will have less leverage over price negotiations 
than if there are many suppliers engaging in competitive bidding. From the Table 7.2 and 
Table 7.3 we find that GT had only one supplier to select for the contract. The explanation 
given is that only one qualified supplier responded to the advertised contract suggesting that 
there were no potential suppliers to choose from in the market.  In this case, the government 
has few opportunities to leverage the buyer and will be reacting to the only supplier available.   
By contrast, Table 7.2 shows that TMP has business opportunities to develop its business in 
other markets should the GT contract fail.  A consideration TMP executives might consider is 
whether it is possible to obtain similar transaction elsewhere. Another possible consideration 
for the supplier would be to look beyond the current transaction into examining possibilities 
of future business with GT. If the future possibilities exist for future business are high, the 
typical supplier would consider the relationship as strategic value. In that case, GT will have 
opportunities to leverage the supplier for good deals. However, the present case does not 
appear fit into those circumstances. Analysis shows TMP‘s parent company Telenor Norway 
has extensive operations in 18 countries in Europe, South East Asia and North America. It is 
one of the world‘s largest suppliers of mobile satellite communications, and the world‘s third 
largest supplier of satellite services via the Inmarsat system (Telenor Norway, 2010). This 
implies that TMP will be indifference if it fails to win the telecoms contract.  The reason is 
that utility of a transaction is related to other business opportunity that can be developed 
elsewhere as an opportunity cost. Given their extensive market and diversified business 
portfolio, it is logical to assume that the private sector company has many options in the 
market to develop its business reinforcing the conclusion that the contract may not be 
attractive to TMP. This gives TMP leverage over the Ghanaian government. The last key 
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power resource that structure pre-contractual bargaining positions are information. Results 
reported in Table 7.2 and 7.3 show that the TMP is better informed than GT in terms of 
contract pricing and margins.  
 
Table 7.2 summary of Findings for TMP (Supplier)  
 Supplier  TMP  
Operationally: telecoms contract considered as an additional investments; 
Transaction not considered as key account 
 Contract serving as a stepping stone for GT to enter the African sub-region 





The consortium operates in other markets in Europe, South East Asia and North 
America.  Opportunities to develop further markets. 




Supplier had full access to GT project budget information about what TMP wants 
from the transaction From World Bank websites, Ghanaian public officials, Ghana 
websites. Past experience, industry wide pricing formula 
 
 




Got options in other 
markets. 
Could easily replace GT 
contract with a high 
value/volume contract 
 Informed about the 
project budget and 
mode of financing.  
Private information on 
how much the Ghana 
government prepared to 
pay 
High  information 
 
TMP obtained information from the World Bank website and tender documents with prior 
knowledge about the budget for the contract and possibly how much GT is willing to offer. 
 
By contrast, GT officials had limited information on the lowest price the service provider is 
prepare to accept. We found no evidence from the interviewees on GT side that TMP shared 
private information on cost schedules for the project with GT officials.   
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Meanwhile, information asymmetry on the part of the government may make it difficult for 
the government to cross-check whether cost and mark ups of GT are genuine and reasonable. 
From this perspective, TMP has bargaining advantage over the government in terms of price.  
  
 
Table 7.3 Summary of Findings for GT Interviews  
Buyer (GT) Suppliers (TMP) 
Utility 
Operational:  The contract with GT critical to the continued operations of the company. 
  
Importance: To support foreign investment drive; Key to economic recovery agenda. 
To extend and increase telephone density; introduction of broadband internet penetration 
 
 
ICT development in schools and universities. 
To support government computerisation  of services and e-commerce 
TMP transaction: linked to World Bank financing support. 
 
 
Scarcity:  sole sourcing; Only TMP submitted a bid. 
Telecoms market structural barriers: no competitive bidding 




The negotiation team had limited information on the minimum price acceptable to 
suppliers. Limited information on supplier‘s cost and rate of return.  
 
 













The above analysis shown in Table 7.1 clearly shows that the utility of the TMP offerings is 
higher to the Ghanaian government than it is to TMP operational and commercial needs. In 
terms of scarcity, it is evident that GT faced limited choice in supplier selection. Some factors 
like entry barriers and the difficulty of getting alternative suppliers indicate that TMP is 
irreplaceable, at least, in the short term and may account for some difficulties of GT. 
Furthermore, TMP is better informed about key issues of price and costs of the transaction 
whist TMP had little information on how much value TMP has placed on the contract, 
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therefor is not in position to challenge TMP proposals.  From this consideration, GT is likely 
to have less bargain power to leverage TMP. In combining the three power resource variables 
of utility, scarcity and information we can reasonably conclude that GT may found itself in a 
weaker bargaining position with TMP.  
 
 Despite the above analysis, it is important also to observe that suppliers may not fully 
disclose their high utility in a particular transaction for commercial reasons, to the buyer. This 
question came up during the interview and the DCEO2 was hesitant to make definite stand on 
actual commercial or operational importance to TMP. Therefore there is a possibility that, 
although analysis suggests that the telecoms contract is relatively attractive to the GT, there is 
possibility that TMP considers the telecoms contract equally high.   
 
7.3.2 Analysis of Factors Resource and Negotiation Capabilities 
 
This section uses the evidence from the interviews to evaluate the potential existence of 
resource and capability asymmetry negotiations between GT and TMP. The primary 
hypothesis predicted that asymmetry in resource and capability will impact on the ability of 
public sector manager to design a balanced contract.  Interview data was collected from both 
GT and TMP executives Findings showed that the resources and capabilities between the 
government and TMP negotiation teams is asymmetrical in favour of the service provider. 
   
To establish that an asymmetry exist between the GT and TMP, key indicators were 
negotiators experience, commercial knowledge, technical competence and independence in 
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taking the contract decisions were obtained and compared. Using the metrics we designed in 
Chapter 5 results showed that there was indeed asymmetry between the GT negotiation team 
and the TMP representatives. 
 
Results in Table 7.4 and 7.5 show the composition of the both GT and TMP negotiation 
teams.   
 
Table 7.4 Summary of Interviews on Negotiation Resources and Capabilities  
Indicators GT TMP 
Composition Adhoc negotiation teams ie each from 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
and Attorney General Depts. Technical 
Director of GT and a  minister of state. 
 Sales and marketing department 
Mr. Illiamson expert and head of 
Contract Negotiation and two others 
from sales department. 
Experience  Negotiation team had no previous 
engagement in similar transaction 
Negotiation team has engaged in 
similar contract negotiation elsewhere 
Skills Exhibited low commercial and understanding 
of the transaction. Did not conduct project 
economic analysis 
Exhibited profound sound commercial 
understanding, analysis  and technical 
understanding of project requirements 
Independence  Team was prevailed upon  to accept the 
contract terms  
Team was independent and applied 
professional judgement in line with 
organisation’s objective 
Deployment  of  Unable to challenge  supplier’s contract 
proposals  
Able to push their proposals as against  
GT’s team strategies 
  
 
The GT negotiation team is made up of representatives each from GT (technical side) 
Ministry of Finance as a witness and a representative from the Attorney General‘s department. 
From this composition, it is evident that none of the GT‘s team has any strong procurement 
background. We note that whilst the GT‘s negotiation team is composed of selected 
individuals with little or no commercial skills or experience, TMP team is made of 
individuals with sufficient knowledge in commercials and past negotiation experience. It 
could also be infer from the display from the table that GT appeared to view the bargaining 
process as given and may have not planned adequately towards it. Or it is also possible that 
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they trusted the service provider and did not see the need to subject TMP to strict arm‘s-
length contractual bargaining.  
 
Table 7.5 Mapping the Resources and Capabilities of Negotiations  
Indicators  GT TMP Symmetry/ 
Asymmetry 






No member of procurement 
background was included in the 
negotiation team  
.Strong indications but 





knowledge of the 
project  
Yes. One Technical Director 
included. 
The three member 
negotiation team had 
strong background in 
contract negotiations Used 
their technical staff and 
project/ investment 







None of the members had prior 
experience in similar transaction 
The three member team 
had previous in contract 






None of the members had strong 
commercial knowledge in 
negotiations 
 Obtained from training 
and experience  
 
asymmetry 
Independence Members appointed by 
government: reliance on 








By contrast, the supplier side‘s perspective on the contract is quite different. TMP appeared 
to have full idea of what they want from the telecoms contract and the understood the 
importance of securing good contract to maximise their returns through the contract design 
by presenting a strong negotiation team. The leader of the TMP, Mr.Illamson is described as 
forceful negotiator who had built a reputation as someone who does not give away 
concessions often, or compromise on it in past negotiation activities in Europe (COP2; 
ADO2).  This implies that the team negotiating on behalf of GT came up against a tough 
negotiator The Corporate Affairs of the company explained that TMP followed a standard 
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procedure of approaching any contract negotiations from a purely business point of view and 
this is reflected by the way nothing was left for chance by selecting a seasoned negotiator to 
negotiate with the government.  
 
 The superiority of TMP over GT team is made more evident during the negotiation process. 
We found that the contract document was drafted by the service provider and presented to the 
GT side.  The contract terms was approved without subjecting them to intense scrutiny and 
negotiations. This can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either the GT team lacked basic 
commercial knowledge and experience to challenge supplier‘s proposals or they trusted the 
TMP to be honest in the drafting of the terms and conditions. Given that the TMP negotiation 
team singlehandedly designed the contract document, two possibilities could be pointed out. 
Firstly, TMP negotiation team may have craft favourable terms for itself. Given the 
background of the members TMP‘s negotiation it is reasonable to expect their project 
appraisal team to be able to identify the general and specific risk in the industry. Secondly, 
GT signed the contract containing supplier‘s traps that will be used to hold GT in the relation. 
Given that the TMP is looking for opportunities to design good terms, it is reasonable to 
assume that the public sector might have been outwitted. Despite this analysis, we find that 
the relationship between the variable negotiation resources and capabilities and contractual 




The pre-contractual power analysis showed that the supplier has a favourable bargaining 
power in the relationship. Firstly, the utility in the supplier‘s offerings is found to be higher 
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than the commercial attractiveness of GT transaction to TMP. Secondly, TMP was 
irreplaceable as a result of lack of equal qualified suppliers in the industry.  Finally, TMP is 
better informed about the critical information about cost and returns than GT.  
 
With regards to the second independent variable of resources and negotiation capabilities, 
TMP raised a superior negotiation team and dominated the negotiation proceedings. However, 
we find that the relations between the second independent variable and the hold-up that 
occurred as weak. 
 
 In the next section, we investigate whether or not the contract was balanced in terms of risk 
sharing and uncertainty and if the adverse pre-contractual power relations can explain it.    
 
7.4 Analysis Post-Contractual Imbalance  
 
The main aim of this section is to analyse from the empirical data whether there is evidence 
of post-contractual balance between GT and TMP. The first hypothesis is that adverse pre-
contractual power relations on the part of the public sector will make it difficult for the 
government to achieve post-contractual balance. In other words, adverse pre-contractual 
power relations lead to post-contractual imbalance. Consistent with the proxies in our 





i) The terms and conditions of the contract exhibit a fair representation of what each 
party in the relationship expects and do not impose onerous obligations on one party 
and not the other.  
ii) Underlying specific assets were equitably shared, or in the absence of that, financial 
hostages were posted. 
iii) The contract design integrates the necessary incentive structures and self-enforcement 
agreements with the necessary incentive structures i.e. postings of ‗financial bonds‘ 
to sustain mutually inter-dependent relations post-contractually.  
iv) There was open sharing of information and transparency (open book system). 
 
The analysis is conducted based on the results of the study of the telecom contract, in order to 
evaluate from the case whether or not post-contractual balance occurred. There are, many 
issues in the contract suggest that risk and uncertainty were not shared equally in terms of 
transaction-specific investments, incentive contracting, inflexibility and information sharing. 
We will examine these in detail. 
 
7.4.1 Risk Sharing: Fixed Assets  
 
 
The analysis in this section evaluates the data collected from the PPP-run telecoms contract. 
The objective of the empirical analysis presented here is to investigate whether adverse pre-
contractual power relations of the GT created post-contractual imbalance. Typical standard 
TCE theory dictates that the public sector should share risk and uncertainty in relation to the 
private sector when the relationship is supported by transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 
1983; UK Treasury, 1995). In PPP, it is argued that if risk and uncertainty in a relationship 
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are not shared equitably with the private sector, the public sector will find itself locked into 
the transaction and contractual dependency. 
 
According to the contract terms, GT was responsible for the provision of investments into the 
infrastructure and rehabilitation and the purchase of new equipment. Thus the contract 
excludes TMP from contributing to the transaction-specific investments in GT. The 
explanation from GT during the interview was that even though they made efforts to 
encourage any incoming partner to invest in the company‘s infrastructure, suppliers were not 
interested in taking up risk in the company. On the supplier side, it became evident during the 
research that TMP were concerned about the potential risk in investing in the telecoms 
company. The other possible reason for TMP decision is that if the incoming partner does not 
see the need to work collaboratively with the government for a long time will not divert its 
resources to develop the relationship. In the precious section, we notice that GT‘s transaction 
is of low volume to its strategic needs and the three year contract with no possibilities of 
further extension might have influenced the decision not to accept risk in the relation.  
 
From TMP‘s perspective, although the management saw the need to jointly invest in the 
relation, probably considered the risk in the relationship and the uncertainty regarding  the 
telecoms operations and government‘s behaviour to be high and thought it appropriate for the 
government to manage its own risk i.e. infrastructure investments, tariff policy and debt 
collection. GT on its part, decided to take the risk since it seems GT had difficulty in getting 
TMP to accept risk. Given the non-availability of alternative suppliers, two choices faced GT 
to get TMP to agree to form the management partnership- through inducement or accepting 
TMP‘s terms. Analysis showed that GT was forced to take up all the risk of the telecoms 
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infrastructure investment costs in order to get TMP to enter into the partnership. This placed 
TMP in a dominant position.  
 
7.4.2  Risk Sharing in the Contract: Cost Plus Incentives 
 
 
In the incentive contracting literature, there are three common ways of pricing a contract: 
fixed contract fees; fixed contract plus costs fees; and variable pricing plan (Weitzman, 1980; 
Laffront and Tirole, 1993). With the fixed contract pricing plan, the service provider receives 
fixed revenue to execute the contract. The advantage to the buyer is that the risk and 
uncertainty in the relationship are passed to the buyer to manage. From the perspective of 
economic efficiency, the supplier bears the cost uncertainty and that provides a strong 
incentive for the adoption of cost-effective means to minimise cost and maximise profit (see 
Weitzman, 1980; Mcfee and Macmilan 1986; Laffront and Tirole, 1993). The only drawback 
for the buyer side is that such a contract price includes a risk premium to account for 
uncertainties.  
 
The other more flexible plan is the variable contract, which ties payment to the units of 
service or product produced, with bonus systems. This is the best pricing plan for the buyer, 
as it involves sharing risk and uncertainty with supplier. Another advantage is that it allows 




The alternative pricing plan is the cost plus pricing plan. In this pricing plan the supplier, is 
reimbursed for all expenses incurred, in addition to the fixed revenues. This means that the 
buyer effectively insures the supplier against all cost uncertainty. Since all cost inefficiencies 
are reimbursed, the supplier is not motivated to be efficient in delivering good value for 
money. On the buyer side, the choice of contract plan will be the one that makes the supplier 
take the risk and uncertainty, which is the variable contract price. On the supplier side, the 
pricing plan guarantees its income and cost refunds which is to say that the buyer takes on all 
risk and uncertainty in the relation.  
 
In brief, commercial sense dictates that the buyer will choose variable contract price where 
risk and uncertainty is passed on the supplier if it in power dominance. On the other hand the 
supplier will choose fixed cost plus pricing plan when it is in dominance a situation that 
makes it possible to pass risk and uncertainty to the buyer. This contrasting preference 
scenario allows us to determine who has the power to make the other party to accept their 
contract pricing plan.   
 
The telecom industry is a service industry and the complexity of its operations means that 
considerable risk and uncertainties characterise its operational and commercial outcomes. 
Revenues depend on subscriptions and the level of expenditure subscribers are willing to 
make in a month. This, in turn, may be affected by levels of disposable income of 
subscribers. In a developing country like Ghana with low incomes, it is difficult to determine 
sales levels at any given time. Similar uncertainties affect cost. This is particularly the case 
because telecoms operations are subject to political interventions in terms of tariff policies, 
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foreign currency fluctuations and financing cost of infrastructure and equipment, none of 
which can be predicted with reasonable accuracy for investment decisions.  
 
A potential risk in the relation is political risk. Concerns over political risk in developing 
countries means that foreign companies avoid taking on risk and uncertainty if they are to 
accept working in collaboration with the government. From TMP‘s perspective, the 
combination of these factors may mean that the telecoms contract is characterised with high 
risk. From business point of view, and in order to protect its investments and maximises its 
returns, the TMP will take less risk in the relation by choosing cost plus fixed contract. The 
service provider can only do that when it is in dominance 
 
On the buyer side, it is appreciated that in a management contract the operational and 
commercial performance of the project depends on the efficiency of the agent. A contracting 
party is confronted with uncertainty if the contracting party cannot know beforehand the level 
of effort required to perform a particular task. The same uncertainty pertains when the track 
record of the agent is not known raising a probability of moral hazards (Holstrom, 1979; 
Eisenhardt. 1989. To the management of GT,  this aspect of the relation poses considerable 
risk because of lack of information on the kind of value adding activities that the service 
provider should employ to achieve cost savings and functionality Given the concern for 
moral hazards, two options are open to a contracting party ie GT. First option is to take on 
less risk and transfer more of it to the private service provider. The other option is use risk-
incentive trade-offs in the contract design. That means using variable contract price plan. 
This form of contract design allows the government to achieve its strategic objectives of 
providing essential telecoms services to the people, and at the same time allows the service 
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provider to make reasonable returns on its services. However, this strategic move will get the 
supplier to take some risk which the service provider if he in dominance will resist.  
 
Analysis showed that the service provider is receiving its revenues under cost plus plan. The 
signing of fixed cost plus contract has the implication that it reduces the uncertainty in the 
transaction for TMP. However, fixed contract price can be risky for TMP in case revenues 
from GT operation increases beyond budgeted. In that case, GT will lose possible future net 
contributions from accepting fixed instead of variable and fixed guarantee income. It appears 
that TMP achieved this purpose by its exclusivity access to revenues cost disbursements in 
the company. The exclusive control of the GT accounts is confirmed during the interviews 
(DOO2; AD2; EBM2) and also with supporting evidence from the Ministerial Report that 
investigated  the sale of GT to UK Vodaphone (Inter Ministerial Review Committee Report, 
2009). The evidence that cost plus contract is chosen and the fact that the service provider 
strategically avoided in contributing to the dedicated assets presupposes provide indication 
that risk sharing is not balanced. In other words, the ability to force the government to take up 
all risk upfront suggests that TMP is the dominant party and also has significant leverage 
over the government.  
 
7.4.3 Sovereign Guarantees and Switching Costs. 
 
TCE logic provides that the party, whose investments are at risk, in this case the government, 
should demand from the other party credible commitment in the form of financial bond to 
mitigate the risk. We find no evidence TMP was made to post any financial hostages. Instead, 
we found that the government was forced into providing financial bond instrument in the 
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form of government sovereign guarantee. A sovereign guarantee is a form of a promissory 
financial commitment issued by a state used as collateral that entitles the holder to enforce 
contractual commitment against state opportunism or unlawful contract termination (Hall, 
2003; Mosley et al., 2004; Johnson, 2005). 
 
Although the rationale for demanding sovereign guarantee is meant to increase contractual 
predictability of the governments behaviour over the contract period, international suppliers 
take advantage of that to create switching costs for the government. Since sovereign 
guarantees put a country‘s all assets including airlines, ships, buildings and any other 
sovereign state movable and immovable assets on the stake (high switching cost) 
governments seldom issued it unless it is compelled to do so. Given that the supplier forced 
the government to issue one and without the ability to demand similar financial bond from 
the service provider suggest that the relationship is not a balanced one. Given the little 
opportunities to leverage the supplier, it seems reasonable to expect  the government to have 
less power to force the service provider to post the appropriate financial hostages to balance. 
 
7.4.4 Contract Inflexibility and Post-Contractual-renegotiation 
 
One major indicator that the telecoms contract might not be one of balance is related to 
contract flexibility regarding future events. In long term contracts, the parties may not know 
how future events are going to shape the relationship. As a result, parties to an exchange 
make provisions for future renegotiations when found necessary to restore the original 




In the GT and TMP contract, we notice that the contract provision was rigid and inflexible 
towards the government. While the TMP could initiate steps on its own to re-open 
negotiations, GT on its part need to seek the service provider‘s approval. The problem with 
this arrangement is that service provider reserves the right to refuse contract variations or to 
more crucially to block any renegotiation except on its own terms. This could be described as 
one-sided contract arrangements in favour of TMP. This is made evident when the 
government made an attempt to re-negotiate the original terms with TMP executives 
regarding salaries paid to the expatriates which was considered to be on the high side. 
 
The salaries and allowances paid to TMP and their executive management totalled $300,000 
tax free a month and paid direct from the GT accounts. When the salaries became public 
knowledge, the public was enraged over what they considered ‗excessive‘ salaries and fat 
bonuses paid to TMP executives. As a consequence, the government came under pressure 
from the civil society and the press to renegotiate the salaries paid to TMP executives (Public 
Agenda, 2004; Insight, 2004). A subsequent government attempt to re-open negotiation to 
review salaries failed partly, because it was met with a credible threat of withdrawal from the 
partnership (DCEO2; DA2) and partly because the government did not want to take this path 
because any disputes have the potential to disrupt the services of GT.   
 
Perhaps the major reason for abandoning the idea is specifically to do with the Malaysian 
Telecom contract termination that cost the government both financially and politically 
(Haggartey et al., 2002), which were fresh in the minds of the government officials.  
Moreover, it is the same government involved on the Malaysian Telecom compensation saga 
is handling the current TMP case. Thus it is reasonable to link the two cases and conclude 
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that threats of contract termination and possible compensation payments may have influenced 
the government‘s decision not to pursue the case.  
 
It should be pointed out that Ghana‘s government‘s attempts to change the salaries failed for 
some other reason. Instead of seeking changes to the salaries levels, the government should 
rather be seeking to increase service delivery in return for increased fees. This indirect 
approach would have been more acceptable to the service provider (see Bajari and Tadelis, 
2002). However, it comes back to the same point of its weak power position vis-a-vis the 
service provider. 
 
7.4.5  Information and Moral Hazards: 
 
Information sharing and transparency are at the heart of agency partnerships (Pollock et al., 
1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Holstrom, 1979). However, it appears that information sharing in the 
telecoms contract was problematic. Analysis suggests that TMP‘s relationship with GT was 
characterised by a high level of information asymmetry. Some interviewees from the GT side 
(DCEO2; DA2; HRM2) explained that they received irregular reports and critical information 
was selectively released by TMP. One of the executives (DA2) further explained that the 
information gap was high, but traced the problem to the fact that the three top offices of Chief 
Executive Officer, Head of Finance/ Administration and Head of Technical were occupied by 
TMP executives. Given the positions held by the service provider, it is natural that all 
operational and commercial decisions were taken by them. The technical auditor appointed to 




Further investigation revealed that whilst the local staff cooperated with the service provider 
by sharing important information about the company‘s operations, TMP executives hardly 
exchanged any information, particularly on the basis on which expenses were incurred on 
behalf of GT (DA2. Meanwhile, the lack of access to key information was affecting the work 
of the GT management, but they could not do anything about it, which further suggests IT 
weak power position with TMP.  
 
Evidence in the case also showed that the supplier controlled information flow and took every 
opportunity to deny GT management to the books. Not only did TMP executives selectively  
made information about revenues and costs but also frustrated genuine  GT management‘ s 
attempt to secure a bank loan of  $200million  to support GT operations (see Inter Ministerial 
Review Committee Report, 2009). There is further evidence that showed that TMP is 
dominant when it comes to financial decisions in the relationship. The CEO of TMP applied 
for and took out an overdraft facility of about US$5.5million from Ghana Commercial Bank 
Ltd without seeking clearance from GT board (Inter-Ministerial Review Committee Report, 
2009: 21, paragraphs 35&36). In both instances the service provider got away with without 
the government applying sanctions (Inter Ministerial Review Committee Report, 2009). The 
government have not got sufficient power resources to control the behaviour of the service 
provider indicating that the power balance is in favour of the supplier. 
 
In summary, and based on the above analysis, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that GT 
is in post-contractual imbalance with TMP. Firstly, TMP did not contribute to the dedicated 
assets; the contractual terms were skewed towards TMP. Secondly, TMP chose incentive 
contract pricing as a fixed contract price plan with scope for cost disbursements, thus leading 
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it to take on little or none of the risks and uncertainty in the relation the service provider. 
Thirdly, the service provider hardly shared any critical information on how it is operating the 
accounts. In effect, the relationship between the government and TMP can be classified as 
adversarial in favour of the service provider. In combination, and based on the weakness of 
the government to force the service provider to operate an open book system, one can 
reasonably conclude that the Ghanaian government is in adverse post-contractual balance 
with TMP. 
 
Having first established that the post-contractual balance was in favour of TMP, we proceed 
to examine whether this was caused by the adverse pre-contractual power relations. The first 
hypothesis is that the adverse pre-contractual position of the public sector organisation will 
make it difficult for it to develop post-contractual balance. In making this analysis, we could 
examine the agreement itself, but in this specific instance we are interested in the level of 
relative power of each of the parties before the agreement is signed, and how that impacted 
on the design of the contract. The rationale behind this approach will enable us to determine 
which of the two parties was in a favourable pre-contractual power relation to dictate the 
terms of the contract to his benefits. This brings us to the power theories earlier discussed that 
the party who enjoys favourable pre-contractual bargaining power dictates the terms of 
contract.  From the Emersion (1962) power and dependency model and power regime model 
(Cox et, al., 2000), the dominant party will force the weaker party to take more risk at the 
contract design stage, The results from our earlier analysis on pre-contractual power relations 
in Section 7.3.1 which showed that the GT enjoyed favourable pre-contractual power 
relations significantly contributed to the weak power position for the government. Predictions 
from the resource dependency theory hold that the party that enjoys favourable pre-
contractual bargaining power dictates the terms of contract under which it is prepared to co-
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operate (Cox et al., 2001; Emerson, 1962). The implication is that TMP‘s ability to force the 
government to take more of the risks and manage the relationship uncertainty, while it 
retained little or no risk. Based on the above considerations we can assume that the service 
provider took advantage of its pre-contractual power position to design a contract that 
maximised its returns while taking less risk and uncertainty in the relationship.  
 
From GT‘s perspective, the public sector company may have accepted the terms of the TMP 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the telecoms transaction is of relative importance to the 
government‘s social and economic objectives and it was keen to form the collaborative 
relationship with TMP. Secondly, in order to get the service provider to agree to the 
collaborative relationship in running GT‘s operations, it had to take on the risk and 
uncertainty upfront. Thus it appears that adverse pre-contractual bargaining power (as defined 
by utility, uncertainty and information), and to some extent asymmetry in resource 
negotiation, contributed significantly to the inability of the GT to develop post-contractual 
balance with the TMP. The government‘s pre-contractual bargaining is made worse by its 
negotiation team unable to subject the proposed contract terms and conditions to strict 
scrutiny and the loopholes created a legal enforcement which the service provider could 
exploit to hold the government in the relation. 
   
Based on the above analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that the adverse pre-contractual 
power relations position of the Ghanaian government significantly contributed to the adverse 
post-contractual relationship balance with TMP. An important observation can be made 
concerning this conclusion. It may not always be the case that adverse pre-contractual power 
exclusively caused adverse post-contractual balance. Other factors may be present apart from 
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the variables analysed in this study. Therefore it is difficult to conclude from the limited 
available information that the contractual imbalance (hold up) that occurred was exclusively, 
as a result from the adverse pre-contractual bargaining power. With the same reasoning, if a 
buyer is in an adverse pre-contractual relationship, it does not necessarily mean that a hold-up 
has occurred or the buyer is in an adversarial relationship. For this reason we examine 
whether the adverse post-contractual balance of GWCL had any impact on supplier 
performance in the next chapter. 
 
7.4.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, this section presented the interview data and also analysed the power structure 
and found that the government was in adverse post-contractual balance. Analysis from the 
case shows that this adverse pre-contractual power relation contributed significantly to the 
post-contractual imbalance with TMP.  In order to maximise its returns, TMP needs strong 
backing power to consolidate its structural power in the relation. This appeared to have been 
achieved through three strategies of creating high switching cost for the government through 
sovereign guarantee and rigid contract that virtually leaves no option for government to 
renegotiate the contract terms. Information asymmetry seems to reinforce this power 
positioning of the TMP. In this circumstance the supplier put the government under a state of 
dependency. Based on the evidence analysed, the first hypothesis is supported. In the next 
section, we examine whether the adverse pre-contractual balance of the Ghanaian public 
sector in the water contract had an impact on the level of supplier performance and post-








The Water Contract: Presentation of Data 
7.5.1 Independent Variables : Pre-Contractual Data 
 
This section presents the interview and follows similar pattern as in the first case. Discussions 
on the pre-contractual power resources presented in two parts. The first part concentrated on 
the key pre-contractual variables of utility, scarcity and information, while the second part 
deals with factors that had indirect influence on pre-contractual power relation. Consistent 
with the pattern set in the first case the main interview was preceded by confirming from 
interviewees that the telecom contract contains significant asset specific investments and 
switching costs. When this was confirmed the interview proceeded to gather evidence of pre-
contractual power resources from the interviewees. 
 
The interview started by interviewing GWCL staff first. All interviewees from both public 
and private sectors were asked about the same question about the problems that triggered the 
need to bring in a private service provider to manage the water supply on behalf GWCL. 
Generally, the perception was that inadequate infrastructure, poor financial performance and 
inadequacy of water supply in the urban areas and the need to introduce improvement in 
service delivery was the key driver for the partnership. Infrastructure needs were identified in 
terms of water treatment plants, distribution pipes and technical needs. A government 
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minister (GOF1) who was interviewed provided government‘s justification on why 
continuation of water supplies under AVRL was central to the realisation of its mandate to 
the people:  
‗Water is life and we have to do all that is possible to ensure everybody gets access to water. It was the 
responsibility of government to make water accessible to everyone, and we believed that our partner AVRL was 
supporting us to achieve our objective.‘ 
 
On the question of operational importance, it emerged that the operations of GWCL had 
almost come to a halt at the time the contract was agreed with AVRL.  The managing director 
of GWCL (DCEO) explained that:  
‗Our basic infrastructure to support continuous supply of water to the people had deteriorated to the extent that 
most communities in the urban areas went for days without getting water. In other cities like Tamale, Koforidua 
and Cape Coast the situation was worse. Our water treatment plants had either broken down or could not cope 
with demand. All governmental interventions with its little budgetary support were not enough to change our 
water systems. AVRL came to our rescue at a time the GWCL was struggling to keep its water production and 
distribution to the urban centres going.‘ 
 
Strategic Importance: Concerning the strategic importance of the water contract to the 
government, two factors stood out as most significant. First, as already mentioned, the 
government was pushed by the demands of its people for a reliable, accessible water supply. 
As government minister, GOF1 reiterated the responsibility of the government to satisfy the 
people with reliable water but this objective cannot be achieved without external funding and 
proper management. The search for external funding led the government to consider the 
private sector participation idea the World Bank had been proposing. The strategic 
importance of AVRL was summarised by the minister in charge of Water Resources Works 




‗AVRL expertise helped the government to achieve its social goals in the provision of potable water and in 
support of health and sanitation programmes under the World Health Organisation and nothing could have been 
achieved, even modestly, at this stage.‘  
7.5.2 Scarcity:  Supplier Availability 
 
This section presents the GT interview responses to questions about their evaluation on the 
relative scarcity/options. With regards to scarcity, two distinct problems stood out – lack of 
competitive bidding and limited supplier market from structural entry barriers were the major 
reasons the government failed to simulate competitive bidding. GOF1 explained that:  
‗Although GWCL put out a tender in the newspapers inviting bids, the response was disappointing with three 
companies showing their indication of interest in the project.‘  
 
GOF1 further explained that between 2002 and 2005, global events particularly, financial 
losses in some Latin American countries, led to the collapse of water privatisation as leading 
water companies were reluctant to undertake investment activities worldwide. The effect was 
that most of the international water companies reduced their investment portfolios in other 
third world countries like Ghana. From these global events, GOF1 explained that the few 
suppliers within the industry reacted by reducing their investment portfolios. He said: 
‗ Even the established water companies, such as Vivendi or Saur, reacted to these events by changing their 
corporate objectives, and investing only in large scale water projects with guaranteed profits.‘ 
 
The other reason given for low supplier availability was the limited supply market and 
structural barriers to entry to the water industry. Three interviewees (DCEO, GOF2), agreed 
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that the supply market for water management services was limited to few suppliers and 
described them as difficult to attract for the urban water contract. GOF2 stated that:  
‗Our search from the international market showed that only few foreign companies have the expertise to manage 
water systems in developing countries and this limited our choice because our contract was considered 
unattractive.‘  
Some interviewees also mentioned lack of local private sector capacity. GOF1 whose sector 
is charged with private sector development in the country observed that no local private 
company in Ghana had the financial and managerial capability to participate and win 
contracts with foreign companies. He revealed that:  
‗Only one local company submitted its bidding documents but voluntarily withdrew its bid with the reason that 
it has not resources to compete successfully for the contract.‘  
 
He further pointed pointed out that the major constrains on local private sector development 
are both financial and technical capabilities which his department is focused on addressing.   
 
Another important factor which some interviewees (e.g., DCEO and GOF2) believed had 
limited the government‘s choice was simply that of time. According to DCEO and GOF2, the 
water project had been delayed for far too long. To ensure its early implementation, the 
government had to award the contract to AVRL as quickly as possible when it became clear 
that no other supplier had submitted it bids to compete with AVRL.  The DCEO expressed 
the desperate situation of the company as follows:  
‗The water systems rehabilitation project had been delayed for 4 years, whilst we continued to run losses almost 
to the point that our water production level had dropped below fifty per cent.  It was a question of getting AVRL 




GWCL management also faced additional problem. Political risks and economic uncertainty 
in many developing countries means that foreign suppliers were reluctant to invest in public 
sector projects in Ghana. 
ADO1 further explained the challenge the government faced when searching for a willing 
partner from the supply market was frustrated by reluctance of the foreign companies to take 
up financing risks through build operate and transfer or lease models. As a result of this 
problem the government finally settled on AVRL, the only supplier out of the three 
companies who initially showed interest. In explaining the lack of interests from other two 
companies, he said:  
‗The Saur‘s management did not consider the contract price to be attractive and BiWater withdrew its bid very 
quickly, before it even reached the pre-selection stage.‘ The government was left with little choice in the matter 
than to negotiate with the only company we have .‘ 
 
The thrust of the interviews is that the government of Ghana found itself stuck with the 
supplier AVRL and this may have implications on pricing and contract terms.  
 
7.5.3 Information on the contract  
 
This section presents the AVRL interview responses to questions about information on the 
contract. Results of the interview on accessibility to the relevant information on the contract 
that affected their negotiation strategies were outlined. 
 
Similar to the telecom case, interviewees were of the view that GWCL approached the water 
contract with limited information on key aspects of the transaction. When interviewees were 
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asked about constraints on effective negotiations, DHR1,HRM1 and ADO1  noted access to 
information as being critical; but the latter observed that:   
‗We had little information about how much profit the service providers earned on the contract and the 
methodology and assumptions that went into the fixing the contract price.‘ This could have resulted in GWCL 
misunderstanding the consequences of the contract it signed with AVRL. 
 
In contrast, the supplier appeared to be well informed about the water contract and about the 
key needs of the GWCL. According to HRM1, AVRL undertook a detailed audit of GWCL 
operations, and identified the key nature of the problems which affect supply of water in the 
country. They also relied on independent reports from the World Bank, and commissioned 
from independent project assessors. Therefore, it is evident from AVRL interviewees that 
they were better informed about the key aspects of the transaction than their GWCL 
counterparts.   
 
7.5.4 Supplier side: Utility 
 
 
This section presents the supplier‘s interview responses to questions to assess the utility of 
the transaction to their operational needs and commercial objectives. From the supplier side, 
evidence was collected on the utility and scarcity pertaining to the water contract. This 
resulted in a picture, indicating that the GWCL water contract was neither operationally nor 
commercially important to AVRL. According to the CEO, the company‘s overall business 
objectives and operations take place outside Ghana, which did not necessarily impact on how 
it continued to offer services to existing clients in the countries where it permanently operates. 
This point was underscored by DOA1:  
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‗We were impressed by the enthusiasm of the Ghana government to work with us on this water project in Ghana 
and we did accept their offer, but its effect on our continued services to our existing clients was not significant.‘ 
On the question as to whether the loss of the water contract would have significant impact on 
their financial position, the CEO was emphatic that though they will disappointed to miss the 
contract but its impact on the company‘s fiancés will be minimal and pointed out the 




This section presented the interview data obtained from GWCL-AVRL using semi-structured 
interviews.  Interviewees from the public sector were unanimous in their assessment that the 
water contract was of strategic importance to the government. Interviewees also believed that 
the government faced supplier scarcity but believed that the whole negotiation process was 
particularly flouted in the award of the contract to AVRL. The interviewees also mentioned 
about the lack of information about key areas of costs and pricing and relied on the estimates 
from the service provider. In contrast, the service provider responses also indicate that the 
transaction was important to them, just that it was not critical to the survival of the company.   
All these variables created adverse pre-contractual power relations for the public sector and 
consequently affect the governance design.  
 
Some interviewees believed that the World Bank played a leading role in the weak bargaining 
position of GWCL. It was commonly pointed out during the interview that the World Bank‘s 
pressure on the government to work with the private sector caused a shift in the bargaining 
power in the supplier‘s favour. From the World Bank perspective, their role seems to be 
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neutral in coordinating the partnership between the government and the service provider 
without interfering in their affairs. The World Bank rejected the suggestion that their insistent 
of transparency in the award of contracts specifically in the Ghana water case can be 
described as putting the government in weak bargaining position. The interview results also 
showed that the government was made to provide insurance to the foreign company and that 
worsened both pre-contractual negotiation and post-contractual negotiations (GOF1 and 
GOF2).  
 
7. 6 Analysis of the Pre-contractual Power Relation between GWCL and AVRL 
 
This section reviews the pre-contractual power variables from the interview data to assess 
whether the pre-contractual power relations was symmetrical, or asymmetrical for GWCL.  
Based on measurement constructs outlined in Chapter 5, the determinants of the pre-
contractual power relations between the client and the service provider are the demand and 
supply characteristics of the transaction- utility, scarcity and information. In this section, the 
empirical analysis presented is to compare qualitatively the pre-contractual power resource of 
GWCL and AVRL with the objective to determine whether or not GWCL was in adverse pre-
contractual power relations. The analysis is done based on the interview data and other 
documentary evidence summarized in Table 7.6. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
government was in a weak pre-contractual bargaining position with the AVRL.  
 
Table 7.6 shows that the GWCL utility (operational and strategic importance) of the 
transaction was relatively higher than that of the AVRL the supplier. The government has 
social and political responsibility to provide clean potable water to urban dwellers to meet its  
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Table 7.6 Summary of Results: Pre-contractual Analysis of GWCL and AVRL  
 
Key: A= Buyer Dominance 
         B= Supplier Dominance 
         C= independence 














Less share of supplier‘s turnover. Contract value 
forms 1.09% of supplier‘s total annual turnover, 
limited volume to leverage the service provider, 
 
Transaction  has substantial  appeal  
Little information on suppliers cost base  
Limited volume of demand to leverage supply 





Only AVRL reached preferred supplier status 
unchallenged. 
Time sensitive to sign the contract 
Supplier selection constrained by specialist nature 
of the service offerings 
Cannot substitute or redesign the water contract 
Few suppliers keen to take on management 
services 
Limited barriers to entry due to specialist nature of 
services  
Significant dedicated assets and high switching 
costs. 
 
 Time constraints. GT keen to sign the contract as 






Limited information on supplier‘s costs and 
returns. 
Limited information on supplier‘s management 






Larger share of GWCL‘s business 
needs 
Lower transaction value to total 
business turnover. 






Lack of active interest from foreign 




Wide business network  and  options 
available to develop business 
opportunities   
 
Entry of alternative suppliers but  
restricted by perceived political risk 
in the delivery of telecom services 
 








Full access to GWCL‘s expectation 
from the contract ie Ghanaian 
newspapers, websites, World Bank 
websites, historical experience, 
Ghanaian government officials. 


























Commitment under Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the UN by the year 2020 
(Ainuson, 2007) and also to meet its electoral promises.  
 
By contrast, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 show that the service provider‘s relative utility in the 
water transaction appears to be low.  
 





Operational: The contract with  AVRL is critical to the continued operations of the water 
company: 
Government obligation to provide water services to 80 communities. 
Government‘s is signatory to the MDGs to make water accessible to everybody. 
Water services linked to health and sanitation needs of the people.  
 
Importance: Critical to the government‘s performance in political office ie meeting 
MDGs of  safe drinking water for all by 2015 
 
Alternative suppliers:  Three companies: Suar of Paris, BiWater UK, and AVRL of 
Netherlands indicated interests but  only AVRL remained as the preferred buyer 
 
AVRL as the only supplier at the supplier preferred stage.   
 
Water market structural barriers: Few specialised suppliers in the market 
Non-substitutability: No feasible alternatives to water provision or alternatives  
Time sensitive: reliant on the AVRL for the project to take off 
 
Information: 
The negotiation team had a good idea of what they expect from the contract but had no 
information about supplier‘s lowest acceptable price. 



















One of the main issues a typical supplier might consider is whether a buyer‘s transaction is 
valuable to its operational or commercial needs, i.e. the relative size of the GT‘s expenditure 
relative to the volume of their business (Lonsdale, 2005a; Cox et al, 2001).  
 
 
Table 7.8 Summary of Results of AVRL Interviews  
 Supplier  AVRL  
Operationally:  
 
Ghana‘s water transaction not considered as core to their operational performance.  
  
 Contract serving as a stepping stone for AVRL to enter the African sub-region 
 





AVRL had other markets to take their business; is a part of Norwegian 
Telecommunications group with extensive operations in 18 countries in Europe, South 





Had a  team of experts and project risk assessment team 
AVRL had considerable experience in the past of  project pricing  
Possessed private information on prices and cost of the contract. 
GWCL shared project information including indications of how much GT was prepared 
to pay for private sector managing the facility. 


















High  information 
 
 
Documentary evidence from the company‘s websites shows that the turnover of the turnover 
of the Dutch company, Vitens-Evides, at the time the contract was signed was $700million, 
whilst that of Rand Water South Africa, the other company in the consortium was 
$400million (Vitens- Evides, 2010) totalling $1.1 billion. 
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On other hand, the contract value of the urban water is $12 million represents 1.09% (0.017 
or 017% for Viten-Evides and 0.03% for Rand Water. Given the low value of the water 
contract relative to the service provider‘s business turnover, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the GWCL contract, although has prestige value, in terms of attractiveness, is of low utility. 
In that sense the government may have limited opportunities to leverage the supplier. Another 
area that the supplier may consider is whether there is any possibility of future business after 
the end of the contract. If a typical supplier finds that a contract could be renewed then the 
supplier will consider it strategic to its future profitability prospects and may be motivated to 
work collaboratively for future business. In that case the supplier is in a favourable power 
position to leverage the supplier for cost improvement (Cox et al, 2001). However, in the 
water contract case, uncertainty remains- whether it would be fully privatised or the contract 
will not be renewed by a new government. This uncertainty will not increase the bargaining 
leverage of AVRL. 
 
In terms of supplier availability, results displayed in Table 7.8 show that GWCL faced 
supplier scarcity. At the close of the tender, AVRL remained the only supplier up to the 
preferred supplier stage. The explanation given is that out of the three companies who 
responded to the advertised contract only AVRL remained as the only interested company up 
to the preferred stage. The other possible reason is that two suppliers who withdrew their bids 
may have considered the water contract unattractive enough to warrant their diversion of 
resources elsewhere to develop the relationship. Another reason could be that they found the 
contract too risky to manage. Thus the government is confronted with the problem of creating 




By contrast, the supplier appears to have options in the market. The profile of the consortia 
behind AVRL, Vitens-Evides International Company shows that it is engaged in extensive 
business activities in Mongolia, Vietnam, Yemen, Malawi and Surinam in water management 
systems while Rand Water South Africa is working in Mozambique as well as in South 
Africa.  It is possible to assume that AVRL or the consortia can develop its business in other 
markets. In this sense, the service provider may be indifferent as to whether they win the  
water contract or not. Additionally, the position of AVRL as the only interested company 
available to the government, at least, in the short run strengthens the bargaining position of 
the service provider. 
 
Moreover, it is also possible for AVRL to substitute the water contract with another one 
easily and the actual loss of it would only constitute as opportunity cost to the company.  
From this supplier‘s perspective, loss of the contract is not likely to affect the business 
fortunes of the company. This gives AVRL more leverage over the Ghanaian government. 
 
 Turning to the low supplier interest in the water contract there may be several reasons to 
account for that. The major ones are that most foreign investors consider water industry as 
risky investments because of uncertainty over government control over water services and 
policies on tariffs especially in developing country like Ghana (Ainuson, 2009). As a result, 
only few suppliers are likely to invest or work with Ghana government albeit on their own 
terms. The other reason given at the interview is that the water industry has some technical 
and financial entry barriers for many suppliers given the specialised nature of the operations. 
In view of that the few suppliers who exist choose which country to work based on the level 
of value capture and at low risk acceptance.  
233 
 
We also note that the government faced time constraints to conclude the contract with the 
only available supplier to pave way for early commencement of the water project. The other 
option is to wait until it has been able to stimulate competitive interest among prospective 
suppliers.  The problem for the government is that over four years have been spent in search 
for a qualified and willing partner without success and now faced national water crises with 
an urgency to conclude the contract as quickly as possible. Further delay in signing the 
contract with AVRL will also mean undue delay in project completion time. Moreover, the 
government is going into an election in two years‘ time and water provision is a critical key 
electoral triumph card in a country like Ghana. Furthermore, any further delay in signing the 
project also means that the government cannot access the World Bank loan for the urban 
water project until a partnership is formed. Based on these considerations, the government 
may be prepared to sign the contract with less than ideal terms rather than incur delay and 
searching costs and possibly lose the impending elections to its political opponents. 
 
On the supplier side, it appears that AVRL is not constrained by time to sign the contract, 
therefore has the incentive to sit out on the contract until all its terms are met. In other words 
the difficulty of arranging or getting an alternative supplier in place on short notice introduces 
some form of hold-ups and loss of bargaining power (Masten, et al., 1991, p.9). Given the 
above analysis the supplier has opportunities to leverage the government for enhanced deals.   
 
 
The last key power resource is information. Results also shows that the service provider was 
better informed about the GWCL‘s budget for the water contract. While TMP obtained 
information from the World Bank website and also from the tender documents, GT officials 
may not be aware of the lowest price the service provider is prepared to accept. There is no 
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indication from the interviewees that AVRL shared their cost structures with the government. 
Given that AVRL as a profit making entity wants to maximise its profits, it has incentive to 
price its services at the maximum price obtainable in the industry. Meanwhile, information 
asymmetry on the part of the government may make it difficult for AVRL cost projections to 
be verified as to its fairness or reasonableness.  From this perspective, AVRL has bargaining 
leverage over the government. These factors are summarised in Table 7.6 
 
 In putting all the variables together we can reasonably reach the conclusion that the service 
provider has more favourable pre-contractual power than the GWCL and it fits squarely into 
the dominant partner framework. Also going by the standard power-dependency theories 
(Emerson, 1962, Pfefer, 1978; Cox et al., 2001) mean that AVRL will have more bargaining 
power and be able to dictate the terms of the contract.  
 
7.6.1 Analysis of Factors Resource and Negotiation Capabilities 
 
 
This section uses the evidence gathered at the interviews to evaluate the potential existence of 
asymmetry in resources and capabilities in negotiations between GWCL and AVRL. The 
primary hypothesis predicted that asymmetry in resources and capabilities will impact on the 
ability of public sector manager to design a balanced contract. Data used in the analysis is 
mainly from the interviews. To establish that an asymmetry exist between the GWCL and 
AVRL, key indicators used were negotiators experience, commercial knowledge and 
technical competence and independence in taking the contract decisions were obtained and 
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compared. Using the metrics we designed in Chapter 5 results showed that there was indeed 
asymmetry between the GWCL negotiation team and the AVRL representatives 
 
7.6.2 The Negotiation Resources and Capabilities of GWCL and AVRL 
 
This section analyses the relative abilities of GWCL to communicate and negotiate with the 
service provider on equal terms. One of the key factors in successfully managing a 
partnership relationship is the ability of the client‘s negotiation team to competently and 
professionally engage the private sector in negotiations at equal strength so as to design a 
balanced contract. This means that the procurement department or the negotiation team 
should be adequately resourced in terms of negotiation skills, knowledge and experience and 
ability to plan and execute negotiation strategies for best deals.. 
 
The importance of a well-resourced, capable negotiation team to the design of a balance 
contract terms was well understood by GWCL staff.  However, the study identified that, as in 
the telecoms case, less attention was paid to presenting a well-resourced and capable 
negotiation team for the water contract negotiations. All the interviewees from GWCL, 
including the DCEO and GOF1, were unanimous that the government negotiation team 
performed poorly against the service provider, because the team was ill-prepared for the 
negotiations. Specific mentions were also made about the government‘s lead role in the 
selection and award of the contract to AVRL. The GOF1 conceded that it is established 
practice for the government of the day to contract on behalf of public sector bodies, 
especially when foreign contracts and agreements are involved. He provided two reasons for 
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the rationale behind the government‘s intervention in the water contract and in other high 
profile contracts with TNCs.  First, he intimidated that the ultimate responsibility for the 
payment or liability for any default on the water contract lies with the government. Second, 
the international community only negotiates with the government and not a public sector 
body. GOF2 conceded, however, that the direct involvement of the government in the 
selection and award may have compromised the integrity of the negotiation process.   
Although the interview could not obtain the specific professional qualifications and 
experience of the negotiation team, it is easy to infer from the responses from interviewees 
that the service provider negotiation team was more resourced than the government-led team 
that represented GWCL. When asked about the quality of the team, GOF2‘s response was 
that:  
‗Members of the negotiation team were selected from the Finance Ministry, the Attorney General‘s department, 
a representative from GWCL and government officials…and looking at the selection my view is that members 
have no background or experience in contract negotiations.‘ 
 
GOF2‘s assessment was that the government team was ill-prepared for the challenge and may 
have affected their sense of judgement on contract signing. He admitted that: 
 ‗A lot of mistakes were made during the negotiation, simply because the team we sent to the negotiation table 
was ignorant about what a contract negotiation was all about and failed to plan for it.‘ 
 
  PMU2 further admitted that the contract language was too technical and except the 
representative from the Attorney-General‘s Department who seemed to have a better  




In contrast, the interview with the supply side showed a different picture, of a well prepared 
negotiation team. The background of the AVRL team was described as professional by 
HRM2:  
‗We presented a strong negotiating team who understood the market needs of the water industry in general that 
of GWCL, our own needs and developed and approach relevant to our expectations from the contract 
negotiations‘.  
 
Although he declined to give specific details of their educational backgrounds, it was clear 
that each member of the team came with unique experience, knowledge and skills. Without 
directly mentioning any specific qualifications, CEOW described the competency of 
members of the negotiation team as highly trained. According to the CEOW they approached 
the water contract pre-contractual negotiations with the right people with clear strategy to 
bring the best results. Touching on the quality and competency of the negotiation team, he 
stressed the point that 
‗We relied extensively on our experience acquired in past negotiations…we picked our team carefully. Every 
member of the negotiation team possessed both professional qualification and experience and our confidence is 
high believing that they know what to do to get us the best possible.‘  
 
Overall, the general perception from the interviewees from the public side (GWCL 
management and government) when questioned on knowledge, skills and education, admitted 
that the AVRL team were superior to that presented by the government 
 
Results in Table 7.9 and 7.10 show the composition of the both GWCL and AVRL 
negotiation teams. From the table, a representative from GWCL (technical side) Ministry of 
Finance served as a witness and a representative from the Attorney General‘s department. 
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From this composition, it is evident that none of the GWCL team has any strong procurement 
background.  
 
Table 7.9 Summary of Negotiation Resources and Capabilities in Negotiations of GWCL and AVRL 
Resource and 
Capability :  
GWCL AVRL 
Composition A representative each from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning and Attorney 
General Dept. Technical Director of GWCL and 
a representative from the government. 
 Sales and marketing department 
Negotiation team drawn from the two 
parent companies‘ Sales and marketing 
departments 
Experience  None of the members had any previous 
engagement in similar transaction 
Negotiation team has engaged in similar 
contract negotiation elsewhere 
Commercial 
knowledge/Skills 
Exhibited low commercial and understanding of 
the transaction. Did not conduct project 
economic analysis 
Two members trained in contract 
negotiation and analytical skills. 
Capable of understanding and analysing 
the technical and financial, 
requirements of the project. 
Independence  Team was prevailed upon  to accept the contract 
terms and sacrificing professional judgement 
Applied independent and professional 
judgement in line with organisation‘s 
objective of maximising profits. 
Deployment  of  Barely responded to supplier‘s contract 
proposals  
Able to push their proposals through 




By contrast, the AVRL negotiation team are all from the sales department and led by the head 
of the negotiation unit. The composition has the precise mix of negotiation attributes to 
achieve good negotiation results. There are two possible indications that either supports the 
conclusion about the superiority of the AVRL negotiation team. Firstly, the contract 
document was drafted by the service provider and presented to the GWCL side (PMU1). 
Secondly, the negotiation team did not subject the contract document to strict scrutiny. From 
the public sector side, GWCL‘s side, the reason for approving the contract document 







Table 7.10 Mapping of Negotiation Attributes of GWCL and AVRL 
 GWCL AVRL Symmetry/asymm
etry 
Previous experience  No evidence  of previous 
engagement or familiarity with 
commercial negotiation 






Low degree of training. PMU 
given two week crash course 
Formal training in   
procurement and in contract  
negotiations 
Asymmetry 
Independence Negotiation team appointed and 
directed by the government 
throughout the bargaining  
process 
 Worked independently as 
professionals 
asymmetry 
Deployment  Unable to challenge AVRL 
proposals : failure to conduct 
hard bargaining 





of the project  
 Knew the project requirements 
but less knowledge in  cost-
benefits analysis 
Used their technical staff and 






Another perspective obtained during the interviews was that the GWCL negotiation was ill-
prepared in terms of negotiation strategy. Given the background of the members AVRL 
negotiation team past experience it is reasonable to expect their project appraisal team to gain 
upper hand with weakly-resourced and ill-prepared AVRL negotiation team.  
 
The incompetency of the GWCL negotiation team is made clearer when some of the 
members found the legal language hard to comprehend and to understand. Based on the 
analysis that GWCL negotiation team lacked basis knowledge in negotiation skills and 
experience, we can reasonably assume many possibilities of the government team signing a 
contract containing traps to hold-up the government in the contract. However, we find the 
link between asymmetry in resources in negotiation and capabilities to contractual lock-in for 
the Ghanaian government to be weak but significant enough to deepen the already adverse 
pre-contractual power relation.  
240 
 
7.7 Conclusion:  
 
In summary, the analysis showed that the AVRL has a favourable bargaining power in the 
relationship with the government. Firstly, the utility in the supplier‘s offerings is found to be 
higher than the commercial attractiveness of water transaction to AVRL. Secondly, as a result 
of time constraints and lack of equal qualified suppliers in the industry, AVRL is considered 
as an important scarce resource that must be acquired. Finally, while AVRL is better 
informed about the critical information about cost and returns the public sector side had 
limited information about the suppliers cost and margins, therefore was unable to challenge 
the supplier‘s price proposals. In combination, and going by the resource and dependency 
(Emerson, 1962, Salancik, and Pfeffer, 1977; Cox et al., 2002, 20020. We can reasonably 
conclude that GWCL was in an adverse pre-contractual power position which to GWCL 
means it is in a weak pre-contractual bargaining position to leverage AVRL. 
 
Despite the above analysis, it is important also to observe that suppliers may not fully 
disclose their high utility in a particular transaction for commercial reasons, to the buyer. This 
question came up during the interview and the CEOW was hesitant to make definite stand on 
relative importance. It is therefore important to observe that our restrictive analysis suggests 
that the telecoms contract is relatively important to the GWCL; there is possibility that AVRL 
utility is equally high but this was not adequately exploited by the government.   
 
7.7 Post –Contractual Balance: the Evidence 
 
The main aim of this section is to analyse from the empirical data to establish whether there 
is evidence of post-contractual balance between GWCL and AVRL. The first hypothesis is 
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that there will be post-contractual imbalance arising from the adverse pre-contractual power 
relations. Consistent with the proxies in our methodology chapter for the measurement of 
post-contractual balance, our analysis focuses on whether: 
 
i) The terms and conditions of the contract exhibit a fair representation of what each 
party in the relation expects and do not impose onerous obligations on one party and 
not the other.  
ii) Underlying specific assets were equitably shared, or in the absence of that, financial 
hostages were posted. 
iii) The contract design integrates the necessary incentive structures and self-enforcement 
agreements with necessary incentive structures, i.e. postings of ‗financial bonds‘ to 
sustain mutual inter-dependent relations post-contractually.  
iv) There was open sharing of information and transparency (open book system). 
 
The analysis is based on the results of study obtained from the interviews and other 
documentary sources. 
 
7.7.1 Relevance of Risk and Uncertainty in the Water Supply Sector and Management  
 
 
We examine the presence of contractual balance in the water contract through the analysis of 
whether risk and uncertainty are equitably shared. The objective of the empirical analysis 
presented here is to study whether adverse pre-contractual power relation of the GWCL 
created post-contractual imbalance. In a typical standard TCE theory, dictates the public 
sector should share or allocate risk and uncertainty to the private sector to balance risk so that 
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both parties face similar high switching costs. A contract designed in this form will create 
mutual dependency relation and reduce opportunism (Williamson, 1983; Blankenburg et al, 
1999). The relevance for risk sharing and allocation is important given the level of 
uncertainty in the water supply operations in Ghana. 
 
The water company is a service industry characterised by political, social and economic 
factors and may have some inherent uncontrollable elements. Thus its operational outcomes 
may be affected by considerable risk at both the operational and commercial level for both 
the contracting party and the agent. For a contracting party to maximise its returns, it must 
understand the dynamics of the market and the commercial outcomes. This takes into 
consideration revenues and cost and factors that influence them whether controllable or 
otherwise. In the water sector, income depends on water sales, but this in turn, depends on 
water sales and tariffs policy (Gilbert, 2007; Lewis and Miller 1987). 
 
The characteristics of Ghana‘s water system do not differ significantly from most of the 
developing countries. In common with most water companies, elsewhere, the water supply 
system is shaped by government policies and unpredictable political games and 
electioneering campaigns. Another uncertainty facing the water industry is financial losses 
arising from theft, illegal connections, and defaulters. These are difficult to control and in 
case of defaulters, it is difficult to arrest for prosecution as a result of government‘s lack of 




Significant problems also exist in the water supply management owing to centralisation 
policies. Studies in developing countries suggest that most water companies run at a loss 
because the government does not allow cost recovery charges to prevail in order to protect 
the lowest income earners (Lewis and Miller, 1987). Although GWCL‘s business objective 
may be full cost recovery, political pressures have determined the actual tariff set low to 
make water affordable to all but to the investor is a loss to business operations (Katharina, 
2001).  
 
Furthermore, and related to above is uncertainty in water revenues. In most developing 
countries like Ghana, the government often intervenes in water tariff setting to make water 
affordable to people who live on US$2 a day and may not afford to meet full cost recovery 
pricing (Director-General Dept., 2010). From this perspective three issues can be identified in 
terms of revenues and costs in GWCL‘s operations. First, it is difficult to determine monthly 
revenues in advance, because that depends on how much water is demanded and paid. 
Secondly, In the case of cost, monthly expenditures are not fixed, because the cost of supplies, 
repairs and maintenance fluctuates depending on requirements. Thirdly, the government can 
nationalise foreign water companies (Lewis and Miller 1987). All of these factors have made 
it difficult to keep operating costs down or revenues up and therefore the industry is 
characterised by considerable risk and uncertainty. From the private investor perspective, 
such a venture is too risky. In those circumstances, a risk adverse investor would avoid taking 
up risk in the company where revenues cannot be guaranteed and cost fluctuation is the norm. 
 
On the buyer side, there is a need for the government to manage the relationship to achieve its 
strategic goals, but that depends on the activities of the private sector partner. The 
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government is faced with uncertainty because the level of effort required to perform the 
service in a way that satisfies its strategic objective of getting value for money is not known. 
The option opened to the buyer side is to use risk-incentive trade-offs to control the 
behaviour of the agent in a way that promotes its interests. Whether the government can 
achieve this depends on the amount of leverage it has in the relationship. Unfortunately, it 
seems that the government in this specific case has not got the sufficient amount of leverage 
to design efficient risk-incentive contract to allocate part of the risk to AVRL. There are 
many issues in the contract suggesting that risk and uncertainty were not equally shared in the 
relation with particular reference to fixed assets investments and contract pricing plan. 
Besides that the government faced high switching cost, contract rigidity and information 
asymmetry. We look at each in turns. 
 
7.7.2 Risk Sharing: Fixed Assets 
 
The water contract would have to be supported with transaction-specific investments in the 
area of water treatment plants, pumping stations, and dams. TCE logic provides these 
transaction specific assets should be shared equitably in order for the party with more risk to 
avoid becoming locked in by the party with less risk (Williamson, 1983).  
 
Evidence gathered from the interviews showed that the Ghana government, represented by 
GWCL was solely responsible for infrastructure development. We found no indication that 
AVRL made physical investment in the water company infrastructure. This means that 
GWCL took all the investment risk. This could be interpreted to mean that the government 
could not get AVRL to agree on the question of investing in the company. It also appears that 
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the government is dire need for external intervention in managing the water service delivery 
but in the absence of alterative suppliers may have to persuade AVRL to agree to the 
formation of the partnership. As a result, GWCL had to agree to accept the risk in the 
relation.   
 
The decision of the supplier  not to invest in the dedicated assets in GWCL can be explained 
by suggesting that a supplier will not invest in dedicated assets in a relation if the company 
has low volume requirements or the company offers few opportunities to develop further 
business. Either of the two appears to be absent in the water contract.  Even though, the water 
project may be subject to a renewal at the end of the contract in 2011, uncertainty remains 
over whether the contract will be renewed or sold outright. This shows that the AVRL would 
use its pre-contractual power to avoid taking risk in the relation. 
 
7.7.3 Risk Sharing:; Contract Cost and Incentive 
 
Findings show that the contract pricing plan chosen by AVRL was a fixed contract sum.  This 
means that AVRL received a guaranteed income from GWCL operations irrespective of 
performance. The implication is that AVRL strategically avoided taking risk and uncertainty 
thus shifting the relationship balance to its favour. 
 
As it happened in the first case, the service provider further retained an exclusive power to 
collect revenues and make disbursements at its discretion. In this way AVRL is able to 
minimise its own risk and uncertainty as a precaution against losing out in net contributions if 
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it turns out that future revenues are higher than what was anticipated had variable contract 
was chosen. The terms of the contract under Section 6.3.2 provide that:  
―The Grantor hereby irrevocably grants to the Operator for the Management Contract Period the care and 
control of the Revenue Collection Account, which shall be operated exclusively by the Operator pursuant to the 
terms of this Management Contract. Subject to the availability of the amounts, the Operator shall pay from the 
Revenue Collection Account operating expenses‖ (GWCL and AVRL Contract, 2006).  
 
Under the terms of the contract AVRL opened a separate account and all monthly takings 
from water sales were lodged in that account. From the account, all the administrative and 
operational expenses were paid from and balance, if any, is transferred into GWCL main 
account. This shows that the supplier had complete control of the GWCL. This arrangement 
is significant because it clearly demonstrates the power position of AVRL in the relation. 
 
7.7.4 Information Asymmetry 
 
The next indicator of the service provider‘s influence is information asymmetry. In any 
genuine and balanced partnership, partners freely share and exchange key information 
pertaining to critical areas in the relationship. One major concern among the interviewees in 
terms of information access and sharing is that AVRL did not share key information with 
them and reporting procedures were not always followed (DCEOW). AVRL reports are 
routinely released late and access to the books is restricted. In addition, AVRL ultimately did 
not observe principles of transparency and open book systems with GWCL as genuine 
partners do, clearly demonstrating that the collaboration was adversarial (Cox et al., 2003).  





7.7.5 Sovereign Guarantee and High Switching Cost 
 
Similar to the telecoms contract, the service provider forced the government to post two 
financial instruments, one in the form of government sovereign guarantee and the other in the 
form of political risk insurance cover to the benefit of the service provider. The effect is that 
the government is pushed deeper into a virtual dependency position in the relation. In such 
circumstances, the government has got an option to demand an appropriate financial bond 
from the service provider to create a balance. However, the failure of government to compel 
the service provider to do so provides further indication that the government may be in 
adverse post-contractual balance with the supplier. 
 
7.7.6 Contract Rigidity and Contract Renegotiation 
 
 
A final indication to suggest that the relationship is imbalance can be identified by how the 
contract terms are crafted to protect one of the party‘s interests in the relation. 
During the implementation period, the government probably realised that there is high 
information asymmetry in the running of the company‘s account. A subsequent attempt to 
seek a revision in the a clause that empowers the service provider to exclusively manage the 
GWCL‘s revenue accounts and disbursements with the aim of introducing transparency in the 
handling of the company‘s revenues and costs failed primarily because AVRL threatened to 
withdraw from the relationship. An appreciation from the demand side seems that the 
government considered the services rendered by AVRL to be essential and was not interested 
in creating tension and misunderstanding that may lead to contract termination (GOF1).  The 
weakness of the government relative to the service provider demonstrates clearly that the 
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government was heavily dependent on the supplier; hence power asymmetry can be seen in 
the relationship.  
In summary, the combination of risk not shared equally, information asymmetry, contract 
rigidity sovereign guarantees and switching cost one can reach the conclusion that the 
relationship is not balanced. In effect, the relationship between GWCL and AVRL can be 
classified as adversarial in favour of the service provider.  
 
Having first established that the post-contractual balance is in favour of AVRL, we proceed 
to examine whether this was caused by the adverse pre-contractual power relations. The first 
hypothesis is that the adverse pre-contractual position of the public sector organisation will 
make it difficult for it to develop post-contractual balance. In performing the analysis, we 
could examine the agreement itself, which can be a good starting point to know whether the 
contract is balanced or not but this will not serve any useful purpose since this has just been 
done. We need to look at power positioning of the two parties prior to the contract 
negotiation. In doing so, we are interested in who had the power at the pre-contractual 
contract stage to leverage the relation in his favour. In other words, the dominant party will 
most often force the weaker party to take more risks at the contract design stage. 
 
This takes us to the theory that the party who that enjoys favourable pre-contractual 
bargaining power dictates the terms of contract. The results from our earlier analysis on pre-
contractual power relations in Chapter 7.6 showed that AVRL enjoyed favourable pre-
contractual power. Supplier‘s power is derived from the importance of the AVRL services to 
the operational importance of GWCL. The supplier is enjoying its status as irreplaceable, at 
least in the short run, couple with high switching costs. Both tend to create power advantage 
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for the service provider. The implication is that AVRL had sufficient pre-contractual 
bargaining power to dictate the terms under which it is prepared to collaborate with GWCL in 
the transaction. The success application of service provider‘s dominance to its advantage is 
amply demonstrated in its ability to force the government to take more risks and uncertainty, 
while it retained little or no risk.  Additionally, the service provider may have exploited its 
power advantage to overcome any resistance from the government, and more crucially, the 
ability to determine how much of the stream of revenues coming from the collaboration go 
into GWCL‘s account.  
 
From the buyer‘s perspective, it could reasonably be inferred that the government was 
compelled by its weak pre-contractual bargaining position to accept the terms of AVRL in 
order to get the service provider to agree to collaborate. On this consideration, the 
government may be prepared to accept to take all the risk and uncertainty upfront hence 
failed to achieve a balance in the relationship.  
 
In the context of designing the contract to craft extra-safeguards to protect itself from post-
contractual hold-up and opportunism in the manner suggested by TCE ,the government failed 
principally because the government was heavily dependent on the service provider and has 
not sufficient opportunities to force the service provider to take significant portion of the risk. 
Even if the government enjoyed favourable pre-contractual power relations, the government 
credible commitment given earlier, put the government in a disadvantageous position to 




Given the above analysis, we can reasonably conclude that the adverse pre-contractual power 
relationship contributed significantly to the adverse post-contractual balance of GWCL‘s 
relationship with AVRL.  
 
Having coming to this conclusion, it is important to observe that other factors may be present 
apart from the variables analysed in this study that can contribute to post-contractual 
imbalance between a buyer and a supplier. Therefore it is difficult to conclude that any 
contractual imbalance that has occurred can be exclusively attributed to the adverse pre-
contractual bargaining power. By the same reasoning, if a buyer is in an adverse pre-
contractual position, it does not necessarily mean that a hold-up has occurred or the buyer is 
in an adversarial relationship. For this reason we examine whether the adverse post-
contractual balance of GWCL had any impact on supplier performance. 
 
To conclude, the chapter presented the interview data and proceeded to analyse the power 
structure and found that the government‘s pre-contractual balance was adverse. Evidence 
from the study, suggests that the pre-contractual power relationship contributed significantly 
to the post-contractual imbalance for GWCL. Based on the evidence analysed, the first 
hypothesis is supported. In the next section, we examine whether the adverse post-contractual 
balance of the Ghanaian public had an impact on the level of supplier performance as stated 












In this chapter, detailed analysis of PPP policy implemented by the Ghana government on 
telecoms and water service delivery is undertaken to investigate whether the post-contractual 
imbalance discussed in the previous chapter has a significant impact on supplier performance. 
The second hypothesis states that adverse post-contractual power relations would result in 
poor supplier performance. To find out, consideration is given to the minimum performance 
required by the Ghanaian government in each of the two contracts from the private sector 
partners. The objective is to establish whether the government achieved the anticipated 
minimum supplier performance in functional delivery and cost savings from the collaboration, 
and if not, whether the poor performance can be explained by its adverse pre-contractual 
balance. The chapter is structured as follows. Part I examines the supplier‘s performance in 
the telecoms contract. Part 2 examines the supplier‘s performance in the water contract.  
 
 
8.1.1 Review of TMP‘s Performance During Contract Period 
 
 
This first part of this chapter focuses on the analysis of the supplier‘s performance in the 
telecoms contract. Consideration is given to the performance that occurred between January 
2003 and December 2006 when the contract came to an end. Evaluation of supplier 
performance in the telecom contract is based on data obtained from the interviews with GT 
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and TMP executives, public officials documentary evidence including and company files, and 
audit reports. The analysis indicates that the Ghanaian government failed to obtain good 
supplier performance and that this was caused by the adverse pre-contractual balance in the 
relationship.  
 
During the tenure of TMP, significant successes were recorded. Analysis shows that there 
was an increase in the number of telephone lines fixed and internet connectivity. Before the 
introduction of the private sector management, fixed telephone lines for rural coverage 
lagged behind the urban centres. Telephone lines concentrated in the urban areas was about 
55% in the Accra region, although the population in the region houses is only about 25% of 
the country‘s population (Frimpong, 2007; Osiakwan, 2007). On taking over the management 
of the company, TMP executives increased telephone lines in rural communities by 15%, to 
close the urban digital divide.  In the case of internet users, this increased from a level of 0.15 
per 100 people in 2000 to 1.81 in 2006 (see NCA, 2006; Frimpong, 2007). With regards to 
ICT in schools, TMP executives made new internet connections to 251 educational 
institutions. Prior to the contract most secondary schools did not have access to internet and 
the few computers available were mostly used in administrative work. 
 
Prior to the PPP policy in telecom management, one of the problems identified as creating a 
drain on the resources of GT finances was over-staffing and inefficiencies. Staff response 
times were found to be poor and slow to respond to consumer complaints or attend promptly 
to fault reports. In taking over the management of GT, TMP executives was able to reduce 
the administrative staff numbers and introduced labour productivity and bonus schemes to 
motivate the staff. In addition to this, technical staff received further training, both locally 
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and abroad, to upgrade their technical skills through training schemes. As a result, staff 
efficiency and response time increased and the wage bill reduced.  
 
The above performance suggests that TMP executives made a positive contribution to the 
overall governmental socio-economic objectives and the expectations of the sponsors of PPP. 
However, to examine whether this performance clearly represents the minimum performance 
required by GT, we need to compare this performance against the pre-contractual level of 
performance. To examine this, we consider Table 8.1 which presents the expected and actual 
performance. By comparing the expected fixed telephone installations, mobile phones and 
ICT with actual numbers installed or provided, it appears that TMP failed to achieve its 
minimum targets required by the government although the performance in the fixed telephone 
lines was close to target.  
 
 











Source: Frempong 2007 
 
 
The table shows that the TMP management team was able to install only 41,857 fixed 
telephone lines out of 400,000, representing just 10% of the number that the service provider 
was supposed to provide. In the mobile phone sector, TMP achieved only 45% of the 
expected mobile subscriber base while 48% was achieved in ICT provision to schools and 





Fixed telephone lines 400,000 41.857 10% 
Mobile phones 750,000 412.618 55% 
Secondary School 
Internet Connectivity 
485 251 52% 
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colleges. It is evident that although TMP performed more creditably in the expansion of fixed 
telephone lines, than the mobile and ICT targets, overall the performance fell below the 
minimum expected performance. 
 
The other performance area with which the GT executives interviewed expressed 
dissatisfaction was service quality. Service quality remained poor in areas of voice quality, 
dropped calls, and slow internet services (Frimpong, 2007; DCEO2). There were frequent 
weak signals with some communities not covered with telephone of internet services. 
 
The explanation given was more to do with technical than administrative matters. The 
Ghanaian government usually sources funds from the donor community. Often donor 
countries require the funding should be used to purchase equipment from their countries. As a 
result, GT have in operation switches from six different manufactures, contributing not only 
to poor quality service but also to high maintenance and repair costs (Osiakwan, 2007). The 
technical director of GT also pointed out that the problems with the inter-connectivity of 
international calls remained because of the complexities associated with telecoms 
transactions.  
 
An appreciation of the problem from the supplier‘s side is that the performance of the private 
service provider may have been affected by the Ghanaian government‘s lack of resources to 
provide the required investment funds to carry out the planned rehabilitation and expansion 
programme. During the course of the interview with TMP executives (OP2; DOO2), it was 
explained that their efforts to extend telephone lines and internet services to the areas 
specified in the contract were stymied by inadequate infrastructure funding on the part of the 
government. In relation to poor quality service, TMP executives explained that the existing 
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systems and equipment were obsolete, therefore unreliable, affecting their operations. 
Although this was brought to the notice of the government and they received assurance that 
the old equipment would be replaced with modern cutting-edge technology, nothing was 
done about it. However, the service provider‘s version of the problem is challenged by 
evidence of government‘s secured funding and invested almost US$500million into 
equipment rehabilitation and new purchase (DOO2; PO2; Frimpong; 2007).  
  
8.1.2 Financial Performance 
 
The second key criterion which TMP management was required to achieve is making  GT 
financially stable by adopting waste reduction strategies including staff fraud as well as 
exploring new business activities that increase value to the company and at the same time 
adopt waste reduction strategies include staff fraud.  Although no specific target was stated 
for TMP to achieve, the government expected TMP to adopt cost effective process in its 
activities, and continuously exploring value adding processes that will save cost.  
 
This objective in cost savings is important to Ghana in the transaction. Before the 
introduction of the private sector initiative in the management of GT, the government and the 
World Bank officials were concerned about GT‘s high operating costs, although the project 
consultant saw many areas which, if exploited, could have brought about more revenues and 
profits. As a result, the government‘s expectation was that these cost savings opportunities 
would be exploited fully by the incoming private management services team for the benefit of 




 Under the old management, GT was annually turning up losses. Between 1999 and 2000, GT 
operations recorded a drop in revenue from US$170 million to US$89 million (Osiakwan, 
2007). Among the major causes were poor financial mismanagement, political interference, 
low tariffs, fraudulent practices and the impact of global developments on GT operations. 
However, this changed when TMP took over, at least, in the first year of operations.  
 
Although, there is no reliable data on operational and administrative costs because official 
data could not be obtained, this can be estimated from the company books, audit reports and 
other published data about the company‘s affairs. Between 2003 and 2004, profit increased 
from a loss of $21 million in 2003 to $12 million, representing an increase of $33 million. 
This shows a remarkable achievement given that prior to the TMP contract GT was recording 
losses (Ghana Audit Service, 2001-2003). However, it appears to the government that this 
expectation of sustained high profit levels was not entirely fulfilled. For example, profit 
started to reduce after the first year success. 
 
The data shows that despite the initial high financial performance, turning a financial loss of 
US$21 million standing in the GT books before the takeover to a profit of US$12 million (i.e. 
a profit of US$33 million) during the first year, profit started to decline significantly between 
2004 and 2005. Table 8.2 shows that GT‘s profits fell from US$33 million in 2003 to US$11 
million in 2004 and rose slightly to US$17 million in 2005. The downward trend in profits 
suggests that GT began to receive a sub-optimal performance from TMP. 
 
Furthermore, in the absence of detailed internal data to assist in determining the actual 
revenues that should have been accrued, the study decided to compare the financial 
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performance of GT to another close competitor, ‗Areeba‘ in the mobile telephony market 
using published data about the company‘s affairs.  
 
In Table 8.2 comparing GT revenues with ‗Areeba‘ telephonic company, data obtained and 
compiled from newspapers and other reports (Public Agenda, 2006)  it is noted that while 
GT‘s profits were rising by small amounts, Areeba‘s activities saw significant annual jumps 
in profit over the same period from $181.2 to $355 in 2005, between 150% and 200%. From 
this simple comparison between TMP and Areeba, not accounting for internal competencies 
and commercial drivers, it appears that TMP has not been effective in controlling costs.  The 
comparison of financial performance with ‗Areeba‘ is significant given that GT at the time 
controlled 90% of the telecoms market in Ghana (Frimpong, 2007; Osiakwan, 2007).  
 








Source:Constructed from newspaper reports and company files 
 
 
Interestingly, TMP executives believed that they had been working hard to achieve the 
objective of cost savings (DOO2; OP2; ID2). The executives argued that they faced 
considerable technical difficulties in expanding operations as a result of frequent equipment 
failure, high maintenance costs and low tariffs. They, however, attributed the problem to the 
                                                          
5










Ghana Telecom (21.0) 12.0 11.6 17.5 
Areeba 27 181.2 323 355 
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incompatible infrastructure purchased from different manufacturers that gave rise to frequent 
system breakdowns costly repairs and high maintenance.  
 
From the above analysis however, it is evident that TMP executives failed to fully deliver on 
their pre-contractual promises. In addition, the evidence suggests that operational costs 
continued to rise disproportionate with revenues increasing the probability of not making 
savings. Yet the government was not able to apply sanctions or change the prevailing 
incentive system to force TMP executives to improve their performance. Additionally, the 
government could not compel TMP to operate transparency and open book policy in running 
GT accounts. Also the service provider decides what information and the content to be shared 
with GT and got away with it.  Any of this supplier practice and behaviour is likely to occur 
when a particular supplier is dominant and the government does not have sufficient power 
resources to enforce contractual performance or to compel the service providers to pass over 
cost savings. The above analysis of government‘s failure to get good supplier performance 
warrants further careful examination, since it supports a case of supplier dominance and a 




As we noted in our earlier discussions, the telecoms operation is affected by uncertainty 
regarding revenues and cost. In telecoms business operations, the management relies on the 
subscriber base to generate the bulk of revenues and there is high level of uncertainty in 
revenue maximisation. This is because it is difficult to predict the number of people who will 
subscribe to the GT network given that there are five other competitors in the market 
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(Osiakwan, 2007). Even if it is possible to accurately predict the number of subscribers, it is 
not clear how much each subscriber will purchase. 
 
Given the high levels of information asymmetry regarding TMP‘s operations in handling the 
financial transactions in GT creates risk of post-contractual moral hazards and opportunism 
(Cox et al., 2004). Post-contractual moral hazards, refers to a situation where a supplier bids 
low to win a contract and during the contract locks the buyer into the relation and then take 
the opportunity to extract rent from the relation. In this case, post-contractual opportunism 
can take a new meaning of post-contractual moral hazards.  The initial high performance of 
TMP that was recorded during the first year of the commencement of the contract, raising 
high expectations of government started to decline. There may be one of two possible causes. 
Firstly, the sharp decline in profits may indicate of sharp increase in operation costs and 
declining revenues. In this case, inefficient operations could easily be identified and remedial 
action could have been taken against declining profits.  Secondly, the sharp decline in profits 
may suggest that some portion of the revenues was not being properly accounted for in the 
books or costs have been exaggerated or both and dishonestly being appropriated to increase 
the suppliers returns. Since, there is high information asymmetry, it is reasonable to assume 
that it would be difficult for the government to detect it.  If the supplier is extracting more 
benefits from the collaboration, raises two possibilities on the government‘s side. 
 
First, the government did not consider that profit is a function of costs and revenues, and that 
the data on cost and revenues submitted by the service provider did not consider putting a cap 
on expenses, or stating the minimum revenue target for any specific month. This omission on 
the part of governemnt provided scope for opportunistic behaviour. Given the information 
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asymmetry as a result of inability to access the books, it is difficult to monitor the service 
provider. Given that the TMP is in business to maximise profits, it is logical to assume that 
TMP has an incentive to under-report revenues and over-exaggerate costs, and appropriate 
the same to increase its return and earning economic rent. The appropriation of economic rent 
from the relationship could be higher if we consider the fact that the three year contract price 
might have been set at the maximum market price. Literature on monopoly suggests that 
when there is one supplier in the market, buyers suffer from monopoly pricing providing 
support  that GT possibly suffered from opportunistic pricing (Martimoor and Stole, 1999). 
TMP was the sole bidder and given that the supplier market has fordable entry barriers then 
we can expect TMP to have sufficient bargaining power to set its price higher than normal 
returns pertaining to the industry. Similar to single sourcing approach, the supplier scarcity, 
provides incentives for TMP to set its price at the maximum possible in the telecom industry.  
 
The standard principal agency provides that where risk of moral hazards exists, incentive 
schemes that tie performance to agent‘s payments should be considered (Holstrom, 1979; 
Eisenhardt. 1989). However, in this case, the incentive structure to promote collaborative 
relationships appears to be ineffective to address the problem of moral hazards. On the 
contrary, TMP was provided with guaranteed income as per the terms of the contract. When 
these issues are combined, it can be assumed that TMP is appropriating a larger share of the 
benefits than it is entitled. 
 
However, government action can be explained by the adverse pre-contractual power relations 
with GT at the pre-bargaining stage. The combination of the essential nature of the telecoms 
contract to the government, unavailability of alternative suppliers, threats of exit and 
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government‘s credible commitment to the relationship leads to the conclusion that TMP is 
dominant in the relation. Additionally, given the power of TMP‘s ability to force the 
government to take all the risk and uncertainty, and the ability to decide how to perform its 
side of the contract and how much of the benefit to be passed to the government and nothing 
is done about it, supports the conclusion that the government is weak post-contractually. 
 
To conclude, this section has analysed the performance of TMP. While TMP has achieved 
some success under the contract, there is evidence to show that it failed to meet the 
government‘s minimum performance requirements. Additionally, it was observed that costs 
were rising and revenues falling behind other players in the field suggesting that rent is being 
extracted from the relation. In the light of above we can reasonably conclude that the service 
provider failed to deliver on its promises and that this due to the fact that it was dominant in 
the relation.  
 
Having concluded that, the analysis presented here on evidence of post-contractual hold-up 
and rent appropriation comes with a problem. A variety of reasons may affect supplier 
performance that may not arise from shirking or opportunistic behaviour or other 
circumstances beyond the supplier‘s control. Similarly, if a hold-up occurred (adverse-pre-
contractual balance) it does not mean that economic rent was being appropriated because 
there could be a variety of other reasons as discussed by some writers (Klein, 1996; Coase, 
2006).  Similar difficulties could be observed on the buyer‘s side. The GT officials found it 
difficult to determine whether claims of rent capture occurred, presumably because they 
could not access the books to review the cost base and returns margins of TMP.  
262 
 
However, putting all the issues in the above analysis together, it is evident that TMP failed to 
provide increasing functionality and lower cost of ownership to GT. Furthermore, when 
considered against the adversarial collaboration witnessed, we can safely reach the 
conclusion that the adverse pre-contractual weakness of the Ghana government contributed to 
it failing to obtain good supplier performance and good value for money in the telecoms 
contract. 
 
8.3 Review of AVRL‘s Performance during the Contract Period 
 
In this second part of the chapter we examine the impact of the adverse power relationship on 
the performance of the supplier in delivering functionality and cost. The methodology 
adopted here is the same as in the telecom case. Consideration is given to the minimum pre-
contractual targets AVRL negotiated with GWCL at the outset of the contract and whether 
the government achieved cost savings from the collaboration. The objective of the empirical 
analysis is to determine whether the Ghanaian government received the minimum required 
performance from AVRL, the service provider. This will allow us to determine whether the 
second hypothesis that the adverse post-contractual relationship will lead to poor 
performance is supported. The next task is to determine whether or not the supplier 
performance outcome was caused by the adverse post-contractual balance. In order to analyse 
these issues, consideration is given to the performance of AVRL between the contract 
commencement in January 2003 and December 2006. Evaluation of supplier performance in 
the water contract is based on data obtained from the interviews with the GWCL and AVRL 
executives, documentary evidence including databases and files, and independent reports 
from the Ghana Audit Service. The analysis showed that the Ghanaian government failed to 
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obtain good supplier performance and that this was caused by its adverse pre-contractual 
balance in the relationship.  
 
8.3.1 Reduction of Unaccounted Water Losses 
 
 
From the data collected and documents analysed, AVRL made some significant successes 
during the period they were in charge of GWCL. From Table 8.3 there were increases in 
water production from 210.6 million cubic meters in 2005 to 231.77 million cubic metres in 
2009, increasing production by10%. In addition AVRL made 38,000 new water connections, 
serving 100,000 people providing more households to clean potable water. 
 
 
Table 8.3 GWCL and AVRL Performance 2006-2009  
 




 One of the major problems was the shortage of water meters. Under AVRL‘s administration, 
large quantities of meters were procured and installed, increasing the possibility of harvesting 
increased revenues. Billing procedures were reviewed and collection points made, with the 
result that bill collections and payments improved considerably. According to the Customer 
Item Unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % increase/decrease 
Water Production MM
2 
210.6 211.7 217.9 222.6 231.77 10% 
Water Sales MM
2 
108.88 100.1 103.9 107.6 112.3 3% 
Non-Revenue Water  % 48.3 52.8 52.3 51.7 51.5 (22%) variance 
Total Revenue  GHC/M
2 





54.32 62.41 57.81 87.99 90.5 66% 
Chemical Cost GHCM
2 
0.023 0.03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0.017 
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Care Director of AVRL, the collection rate increased from a previous 80% to 95% (DCEO; 
CSM). 
 
Another positive performance of AVRL was in the reduction in the number of administrative 
staff. The AVRL executives cut down staff numbers and offered training courses to those 
retained. As a consequence, staff inefficiencies reduced considerably and staff response times 
improved considerably.  
 
 
From above findings it appears that the AVRL executives‘ performance in running the affairs 
of the GWCL was satisfactory. The question is whether represents the accurate representation 
of the minimum performance required by the government. To analyse that, consider Table 8.4 
which presents expected achievements and actual performance.  
 
 
Table 8.4 Key Performance Benchmarks  
 
 
By comparing the number of households expected to be connected and actual number 
connected, it is evident that AVRL executives did not meet their contractual promises. The 
Particulars Pre-Contractual 
Level 
Target Set to be 
achieved by 2011 
Observed 
Outcomes 
                     
Exceeded/Shortfall 
Financial Stability -$1.3m  $10.5m Not  achieved 
Non-Revenue Losses 48% 26%  51.7% 31.7% 
Cost Recovery of total 
cost  
48.4%  66%  
Water Capacity 55% 80% 59% 20% 
New Connections to 
households 
 50,000 households and 
350 stand pipes 
38,000 25% 
Water Quality  Levels of lead and 
mercury high 




AVRL executives achieved 75% of the minimum required households to be connected by 
January 2011. In terms of public stand pipes, no reliable data was made available during the 
research, even though it was estimated that by an interviewee from the GWCL (COP1) that 




In respect of reducing non-revenue losses Table 8.4 showed that AVRL failed to achieve its 
target. Non-revenue water losses refers to the volume of water produced that is lost in 
transmission, from the water production stage to the final consumers (Farley and Trow, 2003; 
IWA, 2003). In the water industry, water losses are considered as a normal feature, and 
international benchmarks set to measure efficiency is 20% (IWA, 2003). Studies in water 
supply management indicate that losses during transmission arise for a variety of reasons. 
The major causes are leakages, burst pipes and illegal connections. In Ghana similar 
problems are found, but the other category of loss is related to unbilled water consumers. 
Unbilled consumers are mainly a category of households who, through no fault of their own, 
have not been provided with water meters to record actual water usage, and government 
institutions that happen to be heavy water users but do not often meet their paying 
commitments  (Farley and Trow, 2003; IWA, 2003).   
 
The significant of water losses is that it has direct impact on revenues generation. The higher 
the percentage losses, the less revenue are harvested for the water company. Besides the 
commercial dimension of water losses, are the social costs to the people. High water losses 
mean many households are denied access to treated water or may have to contend with 
intermittent water flows and rationing. In the case of burst pipes, if they are not unattended 
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promptly, water users are likely to be served with contaminated water leading to health 
related problem.  The government‘s intention in the contract therefore to ensure that non-
revenue losses is reduced the pre-contractual rate of 48% to acceptable levels of 26%. Table 
8.3 shows that between 2006 and 2011, the management of AVRL recorded non-revenue 
water losses of 52%, as compared to the 48% losses when the company took over the 
management of GWCL. The actual performance fell below the pre-contractual levels by 4 per 
cent points.  
 
In addition, comparing the water quality summary in Table 8.5 from the Ghana Standard 
Board, a government agency responsible for the maintenance of acceptable standards of 
products and services, indicates that AVRL met three out of five water quality standards 
(GWCL, 2010).  Two critical requirements, chlorine and E.Coli levels, are found to be higher 
than international standards allow.  
 
Table 8.5 Ghana Standard Board: Water Quality 
 













13247 12965 12815 98% 99% 0,97 
Colour 
(15Hu) 
11967 11692 11477 98% 98% 0.96 
Turbidity(5) 9487 8870 8560 93% 97% 0.90 
R Chlorine 
(0,5 mg/L) 
12944 12177 10956 94% 90% 0.85 
E- Coli 
(ocf/100ml) 
2461 2110 2107 86% 100% 0.86 
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It appears from the performance of AVRL that the technical problem on the water losses was 
complex than was first thought. The major concern of AVRL executives was that most of the 
pipes were old and subject to frequent bursts, and this became acute when some members of 
the public illegally tapped into to the main supply lines and left the water to gush out. In 
some cases, road construction works have led to pipes of the big mains and add to the 
problem of water losses. The chief executive of AVRL (CEOW) mentioned that this was 
brought to the notice of GWCL management and the government for broken pipes to be 
replaced, but little was done about the problem.  
 
In relation to the quality report, the CEO of AVRL admitted quality failures but noted that 
they should not be interpreted strictly as ‗failures‘. The explanation is that AVRL introduced 
cutting edge technology into detecting elements in water which gave more accurate data 
readings than before they took over the affairs of the company. He believed that if the new 
monitoring equipment was used in measuring water quality levels before they took over, the 
data would have shown that water quality had improved significantly. 
 
Another area of performance that AVRL was expected to achieve was to use efficient 
processes to achieve cost savings and improve the financial stability of the company. The 
researcher could not obtain financial reports for all of the relevant years from 2005 to 2011. 
The 2010 and 2011 financial reports were not yet ready to be audited by the Ghana Audit 
Service, Ghana‘s public expenditure watchdogs. However, despite these difficulties, we can 




In the case of financial performance, evidence from the interview shows that between 2005 
and 2009, quantities of water sold dipped from 108.88 million cubic metres to 107.7 in 2008 
112.3. In the same period, revenues increased from a loss of $1.3million to a profit of $2.4 
million, representing an increase of $3.7million (GWCL, 2010) indicating a strong 
performance based on water sold. The subsequent years from 2008 to 2010 continued to see 
the company recording profits in the books, even though it is difficult to verify their amount 
and accuracy since full access to the records and files during the research was denied.  
 
In the absence of confirmatory data, we rely on the assurances given by both the managing 
director of GWCL and the CEO of AVRL that the water company did not record losses in the 
books. Based on that evidence it appears that AVRL executives increased revenues to the 
GWCL‘s accounts over the period. 
 
 Despite the fact that AVRL achieved some success in running the water company, two 
questions arise: whether those achievements represent an increase in financial efficiency and  
whether it delivered cost savings to the people of Ghana. The key indicator we can reliably 
use is related to the revenues lost to GWCL as a result of water produced but lost in 
transmission before reaching the consumers. The assumption made for the purposes of this 
analysis is that about half of these losses are preventable (ie non-revenue water losses). From 
this basis and comparing the percentage of water losses and accounting for other factors, it 
appears that the AVRL executives were not efficient. The basis for that conclusion is clearly 
indicted by comparing the percentage of the water losses before the contract was signed in 
2006 and comparison of the minimum level expected by the government from the service 
provider and also with the the actual percentage achieved.   
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As seen in Table 8.4, data prepared by the GWCL shows that the pre-contractual level losses 
were 48% and AVRL was expected to reduce the percentage level to 26%. However, the 
percentage loss worsened, jumping by nearly four percentage points to 51.7%, indicating 
clearly that AVRL executives may have been inefficient. If we are to apply the losses to the 
26% targeted, it is reasonable to state the missed target is wider which in turn, indicates that 
revenue losses to GWCL could have been even higher. Although it is difficult to quantify the 
water losses in monetary terms, we draw on the indications given by interviews, the press and 
World Bank reports.  
 
According to the DCEO at GWCL, the estimated revenues lost to the company are over 
US$50 million during the same period. His estimates are based on average water tariffs 
applicable at the time. Further evidence came from the corporate affairs manager of AVRL. 
In an interview granted to a newspaper on the performance of reducing non-revenue losses, 
he estimated the non-revenue losses to be over US$100 million annually (Public Agenda, 
2009; All Africa, 2009). Similarly, the World Bank report (2011) authored by Foster Pushak, 
gave a conservative figure of US$56 million loss per year. The above estimates coming from 
independent sources clearly give us a good idea of how much savings could have been made. 
At least, 80% of the amount could have been saved. 
 
Although it is possible for AVRL executives to blame the government for not providing 
infrastructure support, is challenged by the GWCL evidence that four more dams were 
constructed, leading to an overall increase in water production.  Based on increased water 
production, revenue should have been increased well above what has been reported in the 
books.   
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8.3.2 Cost of Operations 
 
The appreciation of the cost of operations from data obtained from the company shows that 
the unit cost of water production continued to rise steadily from the 2005 level, with 66% 
increase by 2009 while unit revenues increased from 55.90 in 2006 to 106.6 in 2009, 
representing 91%, and cost per unit increased by 66% from 54.32 unit cost to 90 unit cost in 
2009, suggesting that more costs were incurred in running the company. In other words, the 
AVRL appears to having failed to make cost savings for GWCL. From the above analysis it 
is evident that the financial performance was sub-optimal, given the amount of savings that 
could have been made. 
 
Although there might be some challenges in water production resulting in poor financial 
performance, the explanation lies in the fact that the service provider had less incentive to 
adopt value adding measures to bring water losses to the level desired by the Ghanaian 
government. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, AVRL is given a guaranteed 
income irrespective of performance. As a result there is no compelling reason to adopt value 
adding process to minimise water losses. 
 
Secondly, the government did not have sufficient leverage over AVRL executives to run the 
company as it had expected, especially when incentive structures in the partnership were 
weak. This is in line with power expectation since AVRL is highly dependent on AVRL.  
From these perspectives, it is likelihood that the suppliers will exploit their power advantage 
to hold the government and perform below average. 
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It is also possible that the AVRL indirectly is influencing the poor results by not adopting the 
appropriate value adding approach. All the above suggests is that AVRL had the ability to 
decide how much of the revenues go to GWCL account. The point that stands out clearly is 
that the government is powerless to act when access to the books is restricted, providing 
further indication that AVRL is dominant and the relationship is adversarial collaboration. In 
that situation, and going by power-dependency theory, AVRL performance will fall below 
expectation.  
 
The other issue worth considering relate to information asymmetry making it difficult for 
GWCL to know whether the poor performance is opportunistic way to increase its returns. 
The contract made the service provider a sole operator of the accounts of GWCL. Although 
the idea can be  justified on the grounds that the incoming AVRL executives needed free 
hand to introduce their brand of financial management into GWCL management, the problem 
for the government  is that it does not have sufficient leverage to force the service provider to 
practice open book systems and transparency. This increases scope for moral hazards in the 
relation since information asymmetry makes it difficult for the government or GWCL 
management to know whether such attempts are opportunistic way to increase its returns 
 
There are two ways this can occur- either through cost padding or under reporting revenues 
collected.  Firstly, cost padding may occur because cost disbursements are done without any 
form of control and in the presence of cost uncertainty, GWCL will not be able to isolate the 
AVRL inefficiencies or differentiate AVRL personal expenses from that of company. Given 
that AVRL is in business to maximise its returns from the relation, it has incentives to pass on 
their inefficiency to GWCL if this could not be detected.  .  
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  Secondly, under- reporting revenues will be difficult for GWCL management to detect since 
access to the books is restricted and the only access to information about the water company 
is through the financial reports issued by the financial auditor at year end. Since it is difficult 
to determine the maximum cost to be incurred every month and minimum monthly revenue to 
be possibly generated from water commercial activities, it is reasonable to expect AVRL 
executives to have incentive to over exaggerate cost and/or under-report revenues, and 
appropriate the same for its own benefit. 
 
When the post-contractual moral hazards are combined with the guaranteed income, which 
may have contained economic rent, it is reasonable to conclude that AVRL was appropriating 
rent from the relationship. The results also show that GWCL management or the Ghanaian 
government had not considered the possibility that the service provider would exploit this 
arrangement, taking advantage to increase its returns from the relationship.  
 
In summary, the above evidence on supplier performance indicates that the GWCL received 
reduced functionality and increased operating costs while the AVRL executives were 
managing the water company. On the other hand, if there were any cost savings, it is not clear 
whether these were passed over to GWCL. Nevertheless, any of this behaviour is likely to 
occur when a particular supplier is dominant and the buyer does not have sufficient power 
resources to enforce contractual performance or to compel the service provider to pass over 
cost savings. This warrants further careful examination since it supports a case of hold up or 




This form of supplier exploitation can occur especially when the supplier is dominant and 
possibly holding-up its obligations in the contract. As we observed under the post-contractual 
balance analysis, since the service provider is irreplaceable, at least in the short run, and the 
transaction involves essential public services, the supplier may exploit its power position to 
force the government to take on all risk and uncertainty. In addition, the supplier created high 
switching cost for the government through the sovereign guarantees and the government 
become dependent in the relationship.  
 
The analysis presented here on evidence of post-contractual hold-up and rent appropriation 
comes with a problem. A variety of reasons may affect supplier performance that may not 
arise from opportunistic behaviour or shirking and this may include conditions that go 
beyond the supplier‘s control. Similarly, if the hold-up occurred, it does not mean that 
economic rent was appropriated during the contractual period and as already noted in telecom 
case, may be due to other reasons (Klein, 1996; Coase, 2006). For example, a supplier may 
not be opportunistic and is committed to the principles of genuine partnership and reciprocity 
or a supplier may not be aware of its power situation and exploit it. Therefore it is difficult to 
conclude in this case that AVRL‘s behaviour demonstrates that it appropriated economic rent. 
A similar observation can be made on the buyer side. The GWCL officials found it difficult 
to determine whether claims of rent capture occurred, presumably because they could not 
access the books to review the cost base and earning margins of AVRL as compared to 
standard benchmarks. 
 
In sum, when considered against the adversarial collaboration witnessed in each of the 
contracts with the service providers, we can reasonably conclude from the available evidence 
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that the adverse pre-contractual weakness of the Ghanaian government contributed to it 
failing to get good supplier performance and good value for money in the telecoms and water 
contracts. 
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, the impact of the adverse post-contractual balance on supplier performance 
has been explored. This is based on the hypothesis that when a public sector body is not able 
to develop a balanced relationship with the private sector, it will be difficult to get the best 
performance from the supplier. 
 
This is an interesting research problem that potentially has applications in many other areas in 
public management and private businesses. According to new developments in the world of 
businesses, risk incentive contract design is being adopted to manage risk and uncertainty 
consistent with agency arguments (Jensen and Meckling; 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt, 
1989). This is even more problematic for the government of Ghana when the transaction 
involves essential services having social, political and economic implication for the 
government.  
 
The less than the minimum performance from two suppliers can be explained by the post-
contractual power relationship they enjoyed in the relation. On the supply end of the market, 
as the two suppliers enjoyed near market monopoly status became very powerful in their own 
right took advantage of their power advantage to dictate the terms of the contract. In line with 
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the resource dependency model (Emerson, 1962, Pfefer, 1978) pre-contractual bargaining 
power is a function of the relative utility and relative scarcity of the resources each party 
brings into the a particular transaction. This means that the two service providers will have 
more bargaining power and be in a favourable position to dictate the terms of the contract by 
forcing the government to take all risk upfront.   
 
The poor performance of the two private service providers can also be attributed to the fact 
that they had a credible promise from the government on their future guarantee income. As a 
result, there was no incentive on the part of the suppliers to put in effort to achieve their 
minimum performance.  
 
Other factors like political risks also worked against the government of Ghana in both 
telecoms and water transactions. The political risk concerns in international business 
collaboration raise the possibility of sovereign guarantees, which force the government to 
take on more of the risk and uncertainty (Woodhouse, 2008). In both cases, the sovereign 
guarantee instrument created high switching costs and lock-in effect for the government.  
Thus the post-contractual bargaining power was weakened and the option to exercise its 
rights of exit became academic exercise even if the government is no longer benefiting from 
the collaboration in the face of opportunism. This is amply demonstrated in the empirical 
study of the two contracts. 
One important obstacle is one related to the government‘s responsibility in providing vital 
services and adversarial collaboration. From government‘s point of view, although the 
performance of the two suppliers was below expectation the government had to work 
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collaboratively with the two service providers. The government may have reasoned about the 
implication of exercising its option to sanction the supplier or change suppliers. However the 
government faced formidable obstacles. First is the scarcity of the suppliers, switching 
costs.in order to ensure that public vital services were not disrupted by the process of 
tendering and award of a new contract, which would also incur switching costs. Based on this 
reasoning, it could be reasonable to argue that the government may have found it beneficial 
not to change partners and may have allowed the service providers to appropriate majority of 





















Chapter 9  







This final chapter of the thesis concludes the study that investigated the arguments 
empirically that the adverse pre-contractual power relations will make it difficult for the 
public sector to achieve balance with the private sector. The major findings are highlighted 
and are followed by discussions, contributions, limitations and future research areas.  
 
 The chapter is organised as follows Section 9.2 restates the purpose and objective of the 
research.  Sections 9.3 summarises each case and findings. Section 9.4 discusses the findings 
Section 9.5 provides contributions to theory, practice and limitations. Finally section 9.6 
makes suggestions for future research. 
 
9.2 Purpose of the Study and Hypothesis 
 
The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policy has been practised by many governments in 
developed countries over several decades in the delivery of infrastructure and service 




In the developing world, recent reports released by the World Bank (2011) showed that 
governments in developing countries are increasingly being encouraged to adopt PPP policy 
with the principal aim to allocate and share risk to the private sector in a mutual satisfaction 
fashion  (Ainuson, 2009; Larbi, 2008; Ahadzi, and Bowles 2004; Akintoye et al. 2003).   
 
Whilst many writers have argued that there have been tremendous benefits to governments 
from PPP policy, it has also generated much criticism over claims that PPP-run projects have 
actually cost the taxpayer more than the traditional public procurement approach and that 
governments have failed to transfer risk to the private sector. This dissertation has covered a 
number of important theoretical and empirical issues relating to these arguments on risk 
transfer and post-contractual balance in PPP. Given the complexity of the PPP policy and its 
implementation in general, coupled with the fact that there is no single theory in contract 
design, theatrical discussions were drawn from agency, PRT, TCE and power dependency 
theories. In addition, theoretical insights were also drawn from strategic management 
literature with emphasis on contract managment. Thus the theoretical insights allow us to 
evaluate the theoretical and theoretical underpinnings pertaining to the Ghanaian case. 
 
The product of the literature reviews from TCE and resource dependency theories resulted in 
a key research question whether the Ghanaian public sector authorities have the ability to 
develop post-contractual balance and also good supplier performance. Two hypotheses were 
constructed from the literature and consistent with Lonsdale model Lonsdale (2005a). The 
first hypothesis is that: ‗Adverse pre-contractual power relations, asymmetry in negotiating 
resources and capabilities, are likely to make it difficult for the Ghanaian public sector to 
achieve post-contractual power balance with the private sector as prescribed in transaction 
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cost theory.‘ The second hypothesis ‗Lack of post-contractual balance would result in poor 
performance outcomes by the supplier‘ was constructed. This study used qualitative case 
study design for the investigation. 
 
9.3   Summary of Findings 
 
In the first PPP case between GT, a Ghanaian public telecommunications company and its 
private sector partner TMP, results showed that the first hypothesis is supported. This is 
interpreted as adverse pre-contractual power relation, asymmetry in negotiating resources 
collectively and significantly impacted on the ability of the Ghanaian public sector to develop 
post-contractual balance in the relation. The second hypothesis that post-contractual 
imbalance will lead to poor supplier performance was also supported.  In the second case, 
findings showed that both the first and second hypotheses were supported.   
 
Both GT and GWCL companies although contracted in different time periods shared 
common features of pre-contractual power and hold up problems. Specifically, both 
companies became vulnerable in terms of its transaction salience of the contracts, high 
supplier scarcity and information asymmetry. These factors created power asymmetry and a 
subsequent dependent relation on the service providers (lock-in). In relation to the other 
independent variable, the study found that both companies failed to raise competent 
negotiation team and pursued narrow political agenda. Although we found the link between 
the second independent variable to suppliers‘ hold–up (lock-in) weak it nevertheless made it 
difficult for public authorities to design balanced contractual terms with the private suppliers. 
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With regards to supplier performance, post-contractual weakness of the Ghanaian public 
sector authorities made a big contribution to it failing to get good supplier performance and 
good value for money. In the GT contract, the government failed to get the supplier deliver 
the minimum number of telephone and internet connectivity to designated areas. In the water 
sector, the government failed to get the non-revenue water losses reduced from 48% to 26%.  




Although PPP policy is an important mechanism for the delivery of essential services for 
governments in developed countries, particularly in the UK, the USA and Australia, and a 
large amount of research on this has been undertaken, the problems affecting its successful 
transfer of risk are largely unknown. One of the problems around PPP policy that has 
intrigued policymakers in the public sector is why the good intention to create a mutual inter-
dependent relationship and the transfer of risk to the private sector has not been entirely 
successful. While it may be possible to design an efficient contract, sharing risk with the 
private partner, as suggested by TCE, it is not clear whether the public sector has the ability 
to achieve that objective. The problem is power. It has been typically argued that the public 
sector is often affected by an adverse pre-contractual balance given the imbalance in the 
distribution of critical resources with the private sector. This is because the essential nature of 
the services performed on behalf of government partly account for the problem. While the 
literature is focusing on transferring risk to the private sector little attention has been paid to 
the constraints to efficient risk transfer. However, the real beneficial outcome of PPP for 
Ghana‘s government will depend on the lessons learned from the two cases and the 
challenges being appreciated and appropriate strategies adopted in future PPP transactions. 
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Against this background, this research has provided important insights about the problems of 
using PPP in public provision. 
 
The two cases that have been examined empirically in this study form part of the widely 
practised procurement policy of using the private sector to provide key public services on 
behalf of government. Both scholars and the World Bank had argued that private sector 
suppliers are more efficient in managing public utilities by bringing improvement in public 
procurement activities through risk management. As a result, the Ghanaian government was 
prevailed upon to form collaborative partnerships with the private sector aimed at benefiting 
from increasing functionality at reduced cost to the taxpayer. The two cases were examined 
for specific evidence and the results presented interesting insights into both knowledge and 
practice. 
 
When comparing the two cases some major similarities emerge. Both GT and GWCL are 
publicly controlled utility companies providing essential services in telecoms and water 
supply services, and both projects funded by World Bank loans. The empirical study provides 
evidence that there has been some measure of success in the two cases, including staff 
training, extension of telephone and internet services to schools and colleges, and installation 
and extension of water supply services to the people of Ghana. More importantly, TMP, the 
private sector partner in the telecoms contract, turned the loss-making GT into a profitable 




Beyond that, the actual performance fell below the minimum performance required by the 
government in both contracts. As a result of adverse pre-contractual power relationships, 
arising from high utility (essential services), supplier scarcity and information asymmetry, 
post-contractual dependence was created for the government. This made it difficult for either 
GT or GWCL to leverage their international suppliers for enhanced performance. More 
significantly in the two cases, despite the level of commitment shown by the government in 
both contracts, the relationships can be best be described as adversarial collaboration in 
which the each of the suppliers were in dominance position. In addition to threats of 
withdrawal and high switching costs created by sovereign guarantee bonds, the government 
could not develop the relationships into two-way collaborations, because there was little 
scope left open to create this situation. 
 
The review of the post-contractual imbalance problems as evidenced in the two cases 
highlights some important strength and shortcomings of most existing theories on contract 
design. The results found support for resource dependency theory, that the ability of the 
public sector to control PPP relationship is dependent on its ability to obtain key power 
resources in the relationship (Hingley, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Cox et al., 2001).  
 
The results of this study complement prior studies that show that rent appropriation depends 
on power. This suggests that in circumstances where the public sector is in relatively weak 
power position with the supplier will not create opportunities to leverage the suppliers to 
deliver continuous functionality and cost improvements. Thus the attitude of the Ghanaian 
authorities in not considering these power dynamics in their relationship with the private 
sector suppliers is simply demonstrated in the two case contracts. This can be explained by 
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the lack of appreciation of the profit motive of the private sector when they enter into 
business relationship and that suppliers will exploit asymmetrical lock-in to perform below 
expectations even if the buyers in control of the relationship (Cox et al., 2003; Hartley and 
Parker, 2003). This clearly had an impact on their ability to support the appropriate 
governance structures to minimise their vulnerability to hold ups and opportunism. 
 
This study also draws attention to one area that must be understood in the context of contract 
design and is related to contracting in specialised and restricted markets. Contrary to liberal 
economists‘ thinking that the private sector model encourages competitive bidding to wipe 
away rents from contract pricing, this study found that this is not always the case in PPP 
transactions. In a commodity market, where many suppliers exist, buyers are able to use 
market competition to drive prices down. However, in the public sector, such a water and 
telecoms industries most of the projects are specialised in nature, with few qualified specialist 
suppliers As a result of the high entry barriers, the few specialist suppliers in the industry 
tend to enjoy non-competitive market power and may engage in monopolistic pricing. In the 
two cases examined the problem of supplier availability is compounded by the industry both 
the telecoms and water contracts are located and the essential services run by the two 
companies (see also Ainuson, 2009; Hall, 2003). In the absence of alternative suppliers, the 
relationship was transformed into a dependency and a lock-in. This aspect of findings about 
critical resources being the cause of lock-in is significant. Although asset specific 
investments have played as a major cause of lock-in in TCE analysis, this finding is 
complementing other studies that critical resources with no alternatives can create lock-ins 
(Cox et al.2001;2002). 
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 In relation to the second independent variable, i.e negotiation resources and capabilities) the 
results found some support that inferiority of Ghanaian negotiation team in respect of 
resources and capabilities allowed the public sector to be outplayed by the private sector sales 
and negotiation team. In terms of lock-in, findings do not find a strong support that it directly 
contributed significantly to the lock-in that occurred in the two cases. However, support was 
found in terms of the inferiority of the negotiation that negotiated on behalf of both GT and 
GWCL was outsmarted by the well-prepared and resourced private sector negotiators 
superior. In this respect, the findings  from this study complement the recent PAC report 
(2009), and also relating to Lonsdale‘s (2005a) earlier discussions on the superiority of the 
supplier‘s sales and marketing team over the buyer‘s procurement team that the public sector 
often find itself outsmarted and outplayed.  
 
Useful lessons can be learned from the case and proactive measures could be taken to build 
the capacity of the negotiation team. Furthermore, given the adverse pre-contractual power 
relations of the government in the two contracts, it is doubtful even if a competent negotiation 
team might have struggled to get a better deal. Even then, neither the telecoms nor the water 
negotiation team could be described as competent, as members of both negotiation teams had 
no prior training or experience in commercial skills. It could be pointed out that although the 
new Ghana procurement law has brought about some improvements in strengthening the 
functional capacity of the procurement department, the Ghanaian government needs to do 
more to improve the independence and capacity of the agency to perform its watchdog role.  
 
In relation to supplier performance, the results found strong support for the proposition that if 
the post-contractual balance is in favour of the supplier, the buyer will find it difficult to get 
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the supplier to deliver functionality and cost savings. The results are consistent with theory: 
when the buyer is dependent on the supplier, the supplier will exploit its dominance to reduce 
level of performance and extract rent from the relation. Findings also complement TCE 
assertion that actors in misaligned governance structures are not likely to the best 
performance from suppliers (Williamson, 1985; 1991). This suggests that buyers in post-
contractual balance in a relationship have many opportunities to leverage the supplier for 
optimum performance in the area of functionality and efficient cost delivery than when in 
adverse post-contractual balance. This point is stressed by Cox et al. (2003;2004) re-echoed 
in Lonsdale‘s study (2005a; 2005b) and is related to adverse power relations reported in other 
studies, for example the ‗Libra IT project; NSI and SBS‘ (Lonsdale, 2005a). 
 
However, the result is not consistent with TCE optimism about the ability of public buyers to 
balance their relationship with the suppliers using credible enforcement commitments in the 
presence of risk misalignment. Williamson holds the expectation that buyers are farsighted 
enough to anticipate contractual hazards, and have the ability to select the most appropriate 
efficient contract that will force suppliers to take risk extra-safeguards to ensure that suppliers 
deliver functionality and cost savings (Williamson, 1983). The findings from the two cases 
also challenges Williamson‘s reasoning that competent buying managers should be able to 
ensure that risk in the relationship is equitably shared with suppliers. 
 
However, the results of the two cases suggest that credible commitments can only be 
implemented under circumstances where the buyer is in inter-dependent relationship or 
dominant. If the buyer is in a dependent relationship, it will be difficult for the public sector 
manager to force the supplier to accept taking more risk. This limitation on the part of the 
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public authorities challenges TCE‘s assumptions on the public sector unlimited foresight to 
select the most optimal contract design for a given specific transaction. Williamson also did 
not explain what it is that the buyer may not have the ability to leverage the suppler for 
efficient performance. This thesis has demonstrated that power structure may explain why the 
buyer may not able to balance the contract in the manner prescribed.  
 
This insight challenges much of the TCE assumption that tends to suggest that power is not 
relevant in the business-to-business market because the parties are equally matched in terms 
of resources. This research has shown, contrary to Williamson‘s view, that asymmetry in the 
resource endowments of exchange partners is equally as powerful as asymmetry in asset 
specificity in shifting a relationship from balance to post-contractual imbalance  
 
The weakness of applying TCE reasoning also brings into focus the agency model and its 
prescribed incentive structures to influence supplier behaviour (Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Although the Ghanaian authorities did not consider this possibility and 
failed to manage uncertainty in the telecoms and water contracts, it has been demonstrated in 
this empirical work that this was a fundamental error in judgement. Given the level of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry in the two cases, and the absence of a risk incentive 
structure, it is not surprising that the government obtained poor supplier performance.  
 
The result of this study suggests that external factors related to political and property risk 
impacts could also partly explain the difficulties that governments face in achieving post-
contractual balance. In addition to the key problems mentioned above, the study draws 
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attention to external financial and political contextual factors as additional dimensions to the 
problem of achieving balance for governments in developing countries. These are related to 
the World Bank project financing role and political risk dimensions which were not identified 
by the Lonsdale study and have also received little attention in the literature.  
 
The results of the two cases independently show that the World Bank project financing 
requirements contributed significantly to the weak bargaining position of the Ghana 
government thus affecting its ability to leverage its suppliers to accept risk for better 
performance. In particular, World Bank‘s role indicates that little attention was paid to the 
possibility that international suppliers will frustrate contracting governments in the areas of 
risk sharing and efficient contract design. As found in the two cases, suppliers exploited the 
influence of World‘s financing leverage to their advantage. In this context,  this study 
complements other studies that World Bank does not make an attempt to specify or explain 
how private participation would generate an outcome that would yield the highest benefit to 
the host country (see Bayliss and Hall, 2002; Lobina and Hall 2003; Kessides, 2004). As a 
result, this study advocates for World Bank to take a critical look of its financing policies 
again and work out proactive strategies that will support genuine partnership between the 
public and private sector.  
 
Flowing from above is the issue related to sovereign guarantees which is tied to the issue of 
political risk. As we noted in the two cases, sovereign guarantees for all intents and purposes 
are similar to financial hostages, as defined by Williamson (1983) in his credible commitment 
model aimed at providing assurance to investors of the security of their investment. However, 
this approach resonates well with property rights theory that prescribes that the party who 
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manages, say the governments with weak property rights regimes should be made to bear a 
larger proportion of investment risk in transactions (Oslon, 2000; Williamson, 1991; North 
and Barry, 1989). However, the downside of it as demonstrated in the two cases is that the 
service providers were able to use that to create high switching cost for the government and 
effectively locked the government permanently in the relation. The implication is that it 
rather pushed the government into high levels of dependency with the effect that the 
government‘s aim of transferring risk to the private sector companies is frustrated by its weak 
position with the suppliers. This observation is borne out of the two cases and concurs with 
Hall‘s (2003: 13) assertion that sovereign guarantees demanded by international service 
providers are contradictory to the principles of risk transfer and sharing; namely, their 
capacity to take on risk. He argued in his report On Water Multinationals that, ―multi-
national guarantee is a country‘s risk, which can be translated into a huge financial burden at 
an unexpected moment… countries should be advised to ignore invitations to give guarantees 
in order to entice the multinational companies‖. It could also be added from the empirical 
study that this makes the contracting country highly dependent on the goodwill of 
international suppliers (See also Woodhouse, 2008). This implication of political risk to 
policy makers means that this dimension should be considered in analysing the contractual 
problems of PPP in developing countries. 
 
9.5 PPP-Management Contracting 
 
One further issue concerning the management contacting of PPP must be understood: the 
issue as to whether this form of PPP helps the public sector to transfer risk to the private 
sector. Our research may shed more light on the conflict of interest in the management 
contracting form of PPP which is widely practised in many developing countries (Saussier, 
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2004; Iossa, 2007; Barlow and Koberle-Gaiser, 2008). This relationship between the buyer of 
the management services and the service provider raises the possibility of post contractual 
moral hazards (Cox et al., 2004) as a result of information asymmetry. As was observed in 
the two cases, a supplier may have incentives to under-perform and attribute the problem to 
category factors beyond its control. In this regard, one would expect, based on uncertainty 
arguments, that risk incentive trade-off should have been adopted, given the difficulty of 
monitoring the service providers. This insight resonates well with Holmstrom (1979) who 
addressed the trade-off between risk and incentive and noted that the importance of applying 




In putting all the above analysis together, although PPP policy is an important public 
procurement strategy and has been practiced for a while in the developed countries and 
despite the amount of research done in the area, the contractual problems and its effect on 
efficiency outcomes remains unexplored. This research has found that the PPP can be 
analysed from three theoretical perspectives.  Firstly, PPP policy implementation comes with 
high levels of uncertainty because the private sector performing on behalf of government 
essential services and that necessitates that risk incentive schemes should be considered. 
Secondly, incentive structures are important consideration in PPP since the transfer of public 
service provision to the private sector involves uncertainty in the level of efforts to 
accomplish a given task. This means that risk incentive scheme should be crafted into the 
contract design to minimise monitoring and moral hazards cost. Thirdly, property rights 
matter, at least in the developing countries context. Fourthly, transaction cost is important 
consideration because taking in-house activities to third party requires explicit instead of 
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implicit contracting. In the case of the PPP transactions, the transaction cost for the public 
sector includes tendering, writing contract documents, monitoring and enforcement. In 
addition, although TCE has made strides in providing guideline on how anonymous parties 
can design efficient balanced contracts, consideration of how parties can achieve cost 
minimisation objectives against the backdrop that power resources of utility and scarcity 
parties are not equal, has not been explored. With these issues considered, the thesis makes 
contribution to knowledge and practice.   
 
9.6.1 Theory  
 
First, the analysis carried out in this research complements and adds to the growing body of 
literature asserting that both power dependency theories and incentive contracts theoretical 
model should be used as an either alternative or complementary theoretical explanation for 
post-contractual imbalance in PPP bilateral governance. As this study has demonstrated, 
although TCE analysis is useful in providing understanding of the contractual problems such 
as those in PPP, it also ignored some of the complexities involve in public sector organisation 
and the private sector.  As a result, TCE provides partial contractual solutions to prevent post-
contractual risk in partnerships. In the early development of the bilateral contracting model, 
Williamson (1985: 76) acknowledged that ‗Bilateral structures have only recently received 
the attention they deserve, and their operation is least well understood.‘ In order to provide a 
deeper understanding of bilateral governance structures such as PPP and its complexities, 
other perspectives of power, agency and PRT theories can help in this direction. This point 
also adds to many empirical studies reviewed in this thesis. For example, Heide and 1988 
Cox et al., 200; Sanderson, 2004; Lonsdale and Watson (2007) support TCE theories in 
understanding contractual problems they also complement their studies with power and 
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dependency theories. Similarly, Watson (2004) combined incentive theories with transaction 
cost theory to study the contractual problem in the film industry and the result is that a better 
understanding of managing risk with incentives contract design is provided. 
 
Furthermore, the Lonsdale study was based on the UK public sector; the present study 
extends this generalisation into the developing country context, showing that power is 
important consideration in the crafting of incentives and extra-safeguards against post-
contractual hold ups and opportunism. Beyond finding support at least, for the pre-contractual 
power relations, this study expands on Lonsdale‘s (2005a) study and extends knowledge by 
showing that the political risk, the World Bank and its conditionalities and sovereign 
guarantee, to which previous studies in PPP have paid little attention, should be considered as 
part of PPP analysis in developing countries. This is an important contribution, since these 
factors are commonly observed in international PPP contracting in developing countries. This 
is the first time their relevance has been highlighted as some aspects of impediments to the 
developing of post-contractual balance. 
 
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to use the power model to explore 
the impediments to balanced bilateral balance in Ghana, as a developing country context.  
 
9.6.2 Contribution to Practice 
 
The present study has contributed to practice with an analytical tool to assist public sector 
managers and policymakers in measuring and determining the possibility of developing a 
post-contractual power balance. An obvious shortcoming in TCE as a framework for 
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managerial decision making is the absence of coherent framework for determining when the 
public sector is likely to develop a successful post-contractual balance with the private sector. 
This research should be seen as complementing other power models on relationship styles for 
value capture (see Cox, Ireland, Lonsdale, Sanderson, Watson (2002). The power model 
proposed in the present study should assist public procurement managers to measure the 
power structures in their relation with the private sector and to choose appropriate risk-
incentive contract design to manage risk in their relationship with private suppliers. 
 
In relation to management contracting of PPP, this study contributes to the understanding of 
the challenges and problems that are encountered when the public sector contracts private 
management services to perform essential services on its behalf. Findings from the above 
case suggest that moral hazards may be high in such contracting environment. This study 
therefore should be seen as timely revelation of the risk so that proactive remedial action such 
as the use of risk-incentive schemes could be crafted into the contract design to protect the 
public sector from post contractual moral hazards.  
  
Lastly, this study serves as feedback to policy makers in Ghana and those at the World Bank 
Secretariat for improving strategic policy towards PPP initiatives for efficient outcomes, and 
the Ghanaian authorities for improving implementation of PPP-run public projects. To the 
Ghanaian authorities, this empirical study has provided an analysis of data collected from top 
executives the public sector and the private sector, the World Bank and politicians using 
well-crafted semi-structured questions to illicit the right responses on problem of designing 
efficient contract and extra-safeguards. As a result, this study provides valuable insights on 
contract management under PPP to the benefit of Ghanaian authorities. The research helps 
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explain the various problems that future PPPs face and the challenges posed when attempting 
to get the best deal from their international partner suppliers. Similarly, this study will be of 
tremendous help by bringing into the open the importance of designing strategic frameworks 
for PPP in the country to harmonise resources and minimise their vulnerability to suppler 
opportunism. 
 
9.6.3 Recommendations for Improvement 
 
On reflection on the research, a positive observation can be made about PPP. Ghana has 
enjoyed some benefits from the private sector model: at the very least, the private sector has 
helped the government to keep these two vital public services in uninterrupted operation. 
Although there are problems for the Ghanaian government associated with the private sector 
model in the context of balance and risk transfer, there are ways to improve future PPP 
transactions in the country. As a result, the researcher makes the following recommendations: 
 (1) Given the gap between the public sector and the private sector making it difficult to 
match the experience and negotiation competency of the suppliers‘ teams, it is necessary to 
raise an experienced government negotiation team. To strengthen the capacity of the 
negotiation team, it is necessary to create a central and autonomous institutional body, to 
handle high-level procurement contracts with international suppliers. 
 
A national strategic PPP policy framework should be created that reflects cost-effectiveness 
and timely project execution. Such a framework will not only help streamline procurement 
procedures in contract award, but would also minimise suspicion of corruption on the part of 
political authorities who negotiate on behalf of public sector bodies.  
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(2) Establishment and training of a dedicated department responsible for public contract 
negotiation with foreign companies within the public sector instead of ad hoc teams. This 
would enable the established body to build resources, capacity experience in order to 
negotiate with the private sector on equal terms.  
(3) To facilitate the above independence and minimise political interference, public 
institutions and structures should be strengthened in order to play their watchdog role. In this 
regard, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms should be put in place and given political 
support. For example, the National Audit Service and parliament should be resourced and 
supported to carry out their constitutional mandate of keeping watch over public expenditure, 
and public officials found engaging in fraudulent, corrupt procurement practices must be 
prosecuted. 
 (4) A transparency-based system including processes, procedures and decisions to hold 
partnerships accountable should be encouraged. For the system to work effectively, it 
requires that managers be free from political patronage and influence.  
(3) There must be a deliberate policy targeted at indigenous Ghanaian public sector 
entrepreneurs, encouraging them to participate in national infrastructure and service delivery.   
 
9.7 Limitations  
 
The international context of our study has shed light on the nature of various aspects of 
impediments to post-contractual balance in PPP initiatives. Despite the meticulous approach 
used in gathering the data and the rigour of the analysis thereafter, there are some notable 
limitations to this research which might necessitate further investigation. These limitations 
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relate to the cases examined and the difficulties in operationalising the first and second 
independent variables. 
 
The first limitation of this thesis is that the study used only two public sector organisations as 
case studies: one in the telecommunications sector; the other in the water supply sector. 
These two organisations are large enough to offer an appropriate platform with which to test 
the hypothesis. As noted by Yin (2003: 10) ‗case studies, like experiments, are generalisable 
on its theoretical propositions, and not its populations or universes‘. However, the 
generalisability of the results could be made more robust with further studies in other 
countries in the developing world. In the context of this case, the study use of two cases from 
one country cast some doubts on its generalisaibility to other developing countries.  
 
The second limitation of this study concerns the data collection. The analysis of the telecoms 
contract was based on interview evidence and historical data covering a period between 2003 
and 2006. Although the contract was quite recent, much of the data was either destroyed or 
lost when the company was finally sold to Vodaphone UK in 2008.  It also became evident 
that some documentary evidence was considered too sensitive to be released to the researcher. 
Although this problem was addressed by interviewing the managers who served as deputies 
and some of the TMP staff, there is a possibility that the researcher might have missed some 
key information which may have impacted on the conclusions reached.  
Although care was taken to ensure data integrity, it may suffer from evaluation apprehension 
bias from informants (Cook and Campbell, 1979). This refers to a situation whereby the 
quality of the managers‘ responses might be limited either by their ability to recollect from 
memory, or being influenced by the role they played in the transaction, leading them to be 
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selective in their responses, in order to put them in a good light. However, the potential effect 
of this issue on the conclusions is minimised by the triangulation of interview evidence, other 
data and the government‘s ministerial report on the GT sale which covered the tenure of the 
TMP management process and procedures, a copy of which was made available to the 
researcher. 
 
In the case of the water contract, data was collected in February 2011, when the contract was 
still on-going. Although care was taken to obtain all relevant information from both the 
interview and documentary sources, there is a possibility that new evidence has emerged 
between the period when the data collection for this research ended, and when the contract 
finally came to an end in June 2011. Although feedback from the company indicated that the 
contract was not renewed because of the poor performance of AVRL, further research would 
be needed to thoroughly examine the changes in the pre-contractual power resources between 
the two partners in the intervening period. 
 
An additional point worth mentioning is that the robustness of the results can be affected by 
the qualitative-based indicator method chosen for the operationalisation of the variables for 
the second independent variable. The indicators used for the measurement of the second 
independent variables are based on aggregations of indicators from a number of sources such 
as surveys carried by Karass (1994) and Lacity et al. (2009). While these indicators were 
identified in the data and analysis, precise qualitative measurement are crude measures for 
these variables and may not capture every aspect of the problem. For example, we relied on 
the assumption from the literature that the supplier‘s marketing and sales department is better 
resourced with superior capabilities and it is the task of the public sector procurement 
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department to match those attributes or miss getting a good deal from negotiations. It is 
significant to sound a note of caution here that the fact of a negotiation team having the 
appropriate attributes does not itself mean that it can achieve its objectives during the 
bargaining process, since other factors might compromise the bargaining process that this 
study was not able to capture or ignored, which could otherwise have given different 
interpretations and results. In other words, although we successfully examined the effect of 
asymmetry in negotiation, and resources and capabilities as they relate to post-contractual 
balance, the model could not fully explain their impact on the pre-contractual balance. The 
imperfect measurement accounts for the weak link, given that this study is internationally 
related.  As a result, this study does not claim to have dealt exhaustively with the 
measurement of the agency variables. 
 
In relation to supplier performance, two aspects of the conclusion reached by this study need 
to be considered with caution. The first is the conclusion that the two suppliers in the two 
contracts failed to deliver on their contractual promises. There could be problems with such 
conclusions when it is they are based on the limited data available to the research. It may be 
that there were some hidden intervening problems, process and procedures that would have 
affected the performance of the service providers. For example, the political and investment 
fund support from the government might have been low and that had the potential to affect 
supplier performance, because the supplier was working with less infrastructure and resource 
support. This was pointed out by the service providers during the interviews that the 
government did not provide all the necessary supporting infrastructure investments which 
would have improved their chances to fulfil their contractual obligations. Alternatively, it is 
also possible the pre-contractual outcome targets set for suppliers might have under-estimated 
the enormity of the problem, or the government did not make full disclosure of the problem 
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during negotiations. Any of these factors could have affected the outcome of the supplier‘s 
performance. Hence we must remain cautious in our conclusion that the supplier‘s failure to 
deliver on their promises was deliberate or solely attributed to the supplier. 
 
9.7.1 Future Research 
 
This work is the first study on Ghanaian PPP to examine constraints to post-contractual 
balance. Although the strength of the model developed to examine these factors and the 
picture built from the research reflects as accurately as possible the perception of the 




The relationship between negotiations resources and capabilities and post-contractual balance 
has been addressed by this study. This could be considered as a sincere attempt to investigate 
their relationship, but it is not dealt with in depth. Related to this is another dimension of 
internal politics which was included in the Lonsdale model but was not examined in this 
thesis. While organisational politics reflects among other features lack of argument among 
organisation members, especially about respective goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the 
boundary of its activity with resources and negotiating capabilities are blurred with regard to 
activities around policy contract negotiations and implementation. For that reason, a study of 
internal politics at a political leadership level should prove a promising way to see how that 
impact on decisions to implement PPP policy in a country. The fact that the government 
hastily assembled the two negotiation teams on each occasion, accompanied by pressure to 
conclude the contract without being given the freedom to thoroughly examine the supplier‘s 
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draft proposal, gives the impression that the PPP decisions are also political choices in 
developing countries taken at the top level of the political power structure. There is evidence 
that the executive power of government routinely by-passes procurement professionals when 
negotiating with international bodies (Aunison, 2009; Amin, 2007; Larbi, 1998). Although 
such work may be difficult, given the political nature of the research, it will enable us to gain 
a richer appreciation of the various impediments to optimal contract negotiation. We hope 
that future research will look at the full picture here. Although such work might be involving 
and challenging, it will produce a deeper and richer knowledge than could be achieved in this 
limited research study.  
 
Another consideration deals with the increasing role of the World Bank. It is clear that the 
World Bank is the major sponsor of PPP in developing countries in terms of infrastructure 
development. Such intervention puts political pressure on governments to make political 
concessions to suppliers. However, working with international suppliers with high standards 
of project planning and investment modelling could even encourage the political authorities 
to make far richer decisions with measureable outcomes than was possible for them in the 
past. While this assumption has not yet been examined, future research should pay attention 
to this possibility.  
 
Lastly, the qualitative study was useful approach to identify and describe the causal 
relationships between the two independent variables in post-contractual balance. However, 
these methods may not be well suited for establishing a quantitative relationship and the 
measurement of the supplier‘s performance. A possible bias could arise from the method of 
used in the measurement problem of comparing the achieved performance and the pre-
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contractual target set. To avoid the limitations of the qualitative study, future research should 
use quantitative measures in other to prove the direct relationships between the independent 
variables.  
 
Although evidence of the effects of bargaining competencies was found, their direct link to 
lock-in or hold up is weak. A further observation to be made is related to the role of the 
political leadership interfering in contract negotiation and management. Little is understood 
about the implications of this interference, together with all of the political choices and social 
and cultural issues that could be seen to have an effect on contract design and supplier 
performance.  
 
Future research should study these issues and build models to look at their effect as well as 
other dimensions of external factors such as political risk and World Bank financing policies 
on PPP projects as they relate to the question of the pre-contractual bargaining power of host 
countries with the private sector. More importantly, more research in both developed and 
other developing countries will allow us to identify other factors that may be likely to affect 
the development of balance in PPP relation. Although such work may be difficult, it will 
enable us to produce a richer appreciation of the various impediments to optimal contract 
design in PPP contracts. 
 
9.7.2 Concluding Remarks  
 
To conclude, this study has explored the factors that affect PPP contract management, to 
address the question whether the Ghanaian public sector has the ability to achieve post-
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contractual balance and examine its effects on supplier performance. It is an attempt to 
advance our understanding of the various impediments that could possibly impact on public 
sector efforts to develop post-contractual balance, suggesting that if the public sector fails to 
achieve post-contractual balance with the private sector, leads to the possibility of failing to 
get suppliers to deliver functionality and cost savings.  
 
In general, the key lesson that can be taken from the study is that the ability to develop post-
contractual balance in a country like Ghana in order to obtain the best value for money could 
be frustrated by power and other external and internal environmental factors. As a result, a 
useful lesson from this study, which concurs with previous studies, is that both policy makers 
and governments in developing countries should exercise caution in their optimism that they 
are capable of achieving post-contractual balance with their international private partners in 
the manner asserted in the TCE literature. Lastly, as most of the empirical research in the PPP 
literature has focused on developed countries, we believe that PPP practice in developing 
countries is a promising research area and that further work would provide more 
understanding of the impediments to bilateral balance in developing countries.  
 
Accordingly, this study concludes that the ability of the public sector to successfully create a 
balance is greater when it is able to create a favourable pre-contractual power relationship, 
and has a competent and capable negotiation team. In the absence of these conditions, the 








Key Research Questions and Interview Guide 
 Part A   Personal Details  
1. Name.............................................. 
2. Ministry /Department/Organisation.......................................................... 
3. Position/ role............................................................................................ 
4. Address................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................ 
5. Tel no.............................................................................................. 
6. E-mail................................................................................................ 
 
IMPORTANT: In each part of the interview schedule define the terms of the concepts 
to the interviewees before the questions are administered. 
 
Information on Qualifying Variables 
Sunk and Switching Costs refers to the total cost of previous specialised investment to 
support a relationship that will be written off if the transaction is terminated or ends.  
Switching Cost refers to the cost of transferring from one supplier to another including 
penalties and fines on one hand and the cost of engaging a new partner including 




I.  Is the cost of the assets (physical or knowledge) in the relationship jointly own? If yes how 
is the underlying assets shared? 
2. Is the relationship going to require additional physical and nonphysical specific 
investments and, if so, in what proportion are these assets going to be contributed by each 
party? 
3. In the case of break-up of the relationship can the assets be transferred to another uses  
without loss of economic value?  What proportion are partners to bear the cost of sunk cost? 
 
Key Research Questions and Interview Guide 
Personal Details About Interviewees 
1. Name.............................................. 
2. Ministry /Department/Organisation.......................................................... 
3. Position/ role............................................................................................ 
4. Address................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................ 
5. Tel no.............................................................................................. 
6. E-mail......................................... 
 
Information on Qualifying Variables 
Sunk and Switching Costs refers to the total cost of previous specialised investment to 
support a relationship that will be written off if the transaction is terminated or ends.  
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Switching Cost refers to the cost of transferring from one supplier to another including 
penalties and fines on one hand and the cost of engaging a new partner including 
administrative expenses and legal costs on the other.   
I.  Is the cost of the assets (physical or knowledge) in the relationship jointly own? If yes how 
is the underlying assets shared? 
2. Is the relationship going to require additional physical and non-physical specific 
investments and in what proportion are these assets going to be contributed by each party? 
3. In the case of break-up of the relationship in what proportion are partners to bear the cost 
of sunk cost? 
 
Part B. Pre-contractual Power Relations-Water management contract:  
Ghana Telecom 
 
1.In your view what were the driving forces of GT to go ahead to form a partnership with 
TMP to manage the water supply service on its behalf? 
 
2. In what ways would GT have suffered operationally or strategically (ie ability to   supply 
water to the people) if TMP withdraws from the relationship?  What were the specific 
problems GT would have suffered if the contract had not been signed? Explain. 
3. What was the main goal of your company in the relation and how does that impact on the 
pre-contractual negotiations with TMP over contract terms? Could those aims have made 




1. To what extent did was your choice of managing the water restricted by external and 
internal demands of the water problems. How has that affected the choice of suppliers to form 
the partnership?  
2. How readily were other equal qualified suppliers available to you in relation to the your 
invitation to submit bids? 
3. Is the supply base restricted? What is the nature and characteristics of the supply market 
and how did that affect the competitive objectives? 
 Information 
1. In what ways was information about the telecom project and that of the supplier assisted or 
hampered you in planning your negotiation strategy? Was the information available? Are the 
relevant details of the contract shared?   
2. How effective was the information you had concerning the telecom contract and supply 
market helped in planning your negotiation strategy? 
3. Is there unlimited access to critical information during the contract execution?  
4. To what extent were the access to and the quality of information on TMP management 
activities helped in your monitoring the performance of the company? 
 




Resources and capability of negotiation team: This is referred to as bargaining skill of a 
buyer or a supplier negotiation team and the degree of intelligent interaction between them 
during contract negotiations. 
1. To what extent was your procurement department play in your management contract with 
your public sector company? 
2. Explain how your negotiation team prepared for the negotiation. 
3. To what extent was the attributes of the negotiation team helped in your negotiation in 
specific areas in qualification, training, experience, expertise/knowledge?   
4. To what extent were the capabilities of your negotiators in terms of independence and 
professional judgement and management support?  
5. From the benefit of hindsight did the negotiation team properly match the resource and 
capability of the TMP? Explain.  
6.  To what extent was the performance of your team in terms of extracting concessions from 
the AVRL team? Specify and explain. If no, explain the difficulties of the team  









1. There a system of monitoring performance of the private sector and ensuring standards? If 
yes, how successful was it? 
2. Is there a system of monitoring performance of the service provider? How do you go about 
that and was there any problem with the arrangement? 
3. How is open is the communication lines between your outfit and the World Bank and the 
Ghana Water Company 
 
E. Contractual Balance Determination. 
 
1.In what ways was risk shared by GWCL and AVRL when  designing the contract? Explain. 
2..In your view, what formal provisions (ie rewards, sanctions, information sharing) in the 
contract exist to facilitate or encourage designing of balanced contract? Explain. 
  
Supplier Performance: The public sector‘s satisfaction with the supplier‘s  
 
1. Was there a clear set of performance targets set for evaluating monthly and yearly 
performance of suppliers? Yes/No. Explain 
2. How far has the service provider fulfil the contract obligations? Yes/No Explain. 
3. How were the services provided by the service provider contributed to the realisation your 
organisation gaols?  
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4. The donor agencies state that they were supporting the water sector financially and 
technically, so why has not this ended up with improved services?  
 
5.Is there any other issues of importance in relating to the pre-contractual negotiations and 
implementation that I have not touched which you would like to highlight? 
Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 




How do you assess the driving forces of your company to take this management contract with 
GT decision to manage the water supply service in Accra? 
2. What ways would your company have suffered operationally or commercially to support 
the survival of your business operations? (ie criticality to company and value of transaction to 
overall turnover) 
3. What were the specific problems your company would have faced if the contract had not 
been signed?  
4. To what extent was the water contract to the overall profitability and survivability of your 
company? How has that impacted on your dependence or otherwise on GT contract to the 
survivability of the company?   How had that influence your bargaining strength during the 





1. To what extent were alternative sources of business to support your operational or 
commercial objective? How has that affected your options to sign the contract?  
2. Do you have many business opportunities besides the Ghana telecom contract? 
3. What buyer‘s choices were available to your company regarding the signing of the contract? 
Information:  
1. In what ways was information about the water project and buyer market assisted or 
hampered you in planning your negotiation strategy? Was the information readily available 
and shared?  
2. How effective was the information you had concerning the contract helped in planning 
your negotiation strategy? 
3. Is there unlimited access to critical information during the contract execution?  
4. To what extent were the access to and the quality of information on TMP management 
activities helped in your monitoring the performance of the company? 
 
Part C. Resource and Capability   
 
To what extent was your sales/marketing team play in your management contract with your 
public sector company? 
2. Explain how your negotiation team prepared for the negotiation.  
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3. To what extent was the attributes of the negotiation team in terms of helped in your 
negotiation with specific factors of qualification, training, experience, expertise/knowledge 
4. Can you specify the special qualities of your negotiation members you consider provided 
you with competitive advantage in your negotiation? 
6. What was the level of management support and extent of capabilities of the negotiation 
team. 
5. From the benefit of hindsight did the negotiation team properly match the resource and 
capability of the GT? Explain.  
 
E. Contractual Balance: 
 
1.In what ways was risk shared by TMP and GT  in the contract? Explain. 
2..In your view, what is your assessment of the degree of balance in the contract design? 
Explain. 
 
Supplier Performance: Meeting Contract Provision  
1.Was there a clear set of performance targets set for evaluating monthly and yearly 
performance? 
2.How far has your company (TMP) been able to meet those targets or fulfil the GT 
expectations? 
3.Is there any other issues of importance in relating to the pre-contractual negotiations and 
implementation that I have not touched which you would like to highlight? 
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Thank you for time and co-operation. 
 
 
THE SECOND CASE: THE WATER CONTRACT. 
Part B   
GWCL: Pre-contractual Power Relations-Water management contract: Buyer 
Utility 
1. In your view what were the driving forces of GWCL to go ahead to form a partnership 
with AVRL to manage the water supply service on its behalf? 
 
2. In what ways would GWCL have suffered operationally or strategically (ie ability to   
supply water to the people) if AVRL withdraws from the relationship?  What were the 
specific problems GWCL would have suffered if the contract had not been signed? Explain. 
3. What was the main goal of your company in the relation and how does that impact on the 
pre-contractual negotiations with AVRL over contract terms? Could those aims have made 
AVRL more powerful during the negotiation?  
 
 Scarcity:  
1. To what extent did was your choice of managing the water restricted by external and 
internal demands of the water problems. How has that affected the choice of suppliers to form 
the partnership?  
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2. How readily were other equal qualified suppliers available to you in relation to the your 
invitation to submit bids? 
3. Is the supply base restricted? What is the nature and characteristics of the supply market 
and how did that affect the competitive objectives? 
 Information 
1. In what ways was information about the water project and that of the supplier assisted or 
hampered you in planning your negotiation strategy? Was the information available? Are the 
relevant details of the contract shared?   
2. How effective was the information you had concerning the water contract and supply 
market helped in planning your negotiation strategy? 
3. Is there unlimited access to critical information during the contract execution and how did 
that impacted on your efforts to control the performance of the service provider?  
4. To what extent were the access to and the quality of information on AVRL management 
activities helped in your monitoring the performance of the company? 
 
Part C  GWCL-Resource and Capability of the Negotiation Team 
 
Resources and Capability of Negotiation team: This is referred to as bargaining skill of a 
buyer or a supplier negotiation team and the degree of intelligent interaction between them 
during contract negotiations. 
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1. To what extent was your procurement department play in your management contract with 
your public sector company? 
2. Explain how your negotiation team prepared for the negotiation. 
3. To what extent was the attributes of the negotiation team helped in your negotiation in 
specific areas in qualification, training, experience, expertise/knowledge?   
4. To what extent were the capabilities of your negotiators in terms of independence and 
professional judgement and management support?  
 5. From the benefit of hindsight did the negotiation team properly match the resource and 
capability of the AVRL? Explain.  
6. To what extent was the performance of your team in terms of extracting concessions from 
the AVRL team? Specify and explain. If no, explain the difficulties of the team  





Other Contract Management Issues: Monitoring and Supervision 
 
1. There a system of monitoring performance of the private sector and ensuring standards? If 
yes,  how successful did it work? 
2. Is there a system of monitoring performance of the service provider? How do you go about 
that and was there any problem with the arrangement? 
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3. How is open is the communication lines between your outfit and the World Bank and the 
Ghana Water Company. 
 
E. Contractual Balance: 
 
1.In what ways was risk shared by GWCL and AVRL when  designing the contract? Explain. 
2..In your view, what formal provisions (ie rewards, sanctions, information sharing) in the 
contract exist to facilitate or encourage designing of balanced contract? Explain. 
 
Supplier Performance: The public sector‘s satisfaction with the supplier‘s  
 
1. Was there a clear set of performance targets set for evaluating monthly and yearly 
performance? 
2. How far has the service provider fulfil the contract obligations? Explain. 
3. How were the services provided by the service provider contributed to the realisation your 
organisation gaols?  
4. The donor agencies state that they were supporting the water sector financially and 
technically, so why has not this ended up with improved services?  
 
5.Is there any other issues of importance in relating to the pre-contractual negotiations and 
implementation that I have not touched which you would like to highlight? 
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Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 
Part B  Pre-contractual Power Relations-Water management contract:  
AVRL (Supply-side) 
Utility 
How do you assess the driving forces of your company to take this management contract with 
GWCL decision to manage the water supply service in Accra? 
2. What ways would your company have suffered operationally or commercially to support 
the survival of your business operations?  Explain. 
3. What were the specific problems your company would have faced if the contract had not 
been signed?  
4. To what extent was the water contract to the overall profitability and survivability of your 
company? How has that impacted on your dependence or otherwise on GWCL contract to the 
survivability of the company?   How had that influence your bargaining strength during the 
contract negotiation?  
 
Scarcity 
1. To what extent were alternative sources of business to support your operational or 
commercial objective? How has that affected your options to sign the contract?  
2. Do you have many business opportunities besides the Ghana water contract? 





1. In what ways was information about the water project and buyer market assisted or 
hampered you in planning your negotiation strategy? Was the information readily available 
and shared?  
2. How effective was the information you had concerning the contract helped in planning 
your negotiation strategy? 
3. Is there unlimited access to critical information during the contract execution?  
4. To what extent were the access to and the quality of information on AVRL management 
activities helped in your monitoring the performance of the company? 
 
Part C: Negotiation Resources and Capabilities  
 
1. To what extent was your sales/marketing team play in your management contract with 
your public sector company? 
2. Explain how your negotiation team prepared for the negotiation.  
3. To what extent was the attributes of the negotiation team in terms of helped in your 
negotiation with specific factors of qualification, training, experience, expertise/knowledge 
4. Can you specify the special qualities of your negotiation members you consider provided 
you with competitive advantage in your negotiation? 
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6. What was the level of management support and extent of capabilities of the negotiation 
team. 
5. From the benefit of hindsight did the negotiation team properly match the resource and 
capability of the GWCL? Explain.  
 
 
E. Contractual Balance: 
 
1.what types of risk you considered before signing the contract? 
2.In what ways was risk shared by AVRL and GWCL  in the contract? Explain. 
3.In your view, what is your assessment of the degree of balance in the contract design? 
Explain and justify. 
 
 
Supplier Performance: Meeting Contract Provision  
1.Was there a clear set of performance targets set for evaluating monthly and yearly 
performance? 
2.How far has your company (AVRL) been able to meet those targets or fulfil the GWCL 
expectations?  
3. How do you explain your performance? 
3.Is there any other issues of importance in relating to the performance both at company level 
and government level  I have not touched which you would like to highlight? 
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Any other relevant information you want to add or comments you want to make. 
Thank you for time and co-operation. 
 
World Bank 
1. The shift to public sector participation has been advocated to increase management 
efficiency demands an enabling working environment so managers can achieve efficiency 
goals and targets. Has his ended up with improved services? If not, why? 
 
2. How has the World Bank integrated measures in the management contract design to ensure 
a level playing ground is created for an inter-dependent relationship to exist between the buy-
side and the supplier side? 
3. It was said that the World Bank support to PPP idea and the policy to make Ghana use the 
private sector to manage its key utility sectors is one of the main obstacles to the 
consideration of alternative ways of managing the sector.  
4. Is the World Bank conditionalities most significant to the development of a mutual inter-
dependent relation? If not, then what are the most significant problems that created for the 
Ghanaian public sector? 
5.The World Bank state that they were supporting the Ghanaian water and telecom sector 
financially and technically, so why have these not this ended up with improved services from 
the service providers?  
6.Any other relevant information you want to add or comments you want to make. 
 





1. How do you assess the performance of the public sector both in the GT and GWCL in the 
management contract?  
2. Could the management contract be a kind of testing in practical local conditions to develop 
into a more ―involved form‖ of private sector participation. 
3. What were the main considerations of the government to seek a private professional 
management services to manage the two public companies? How has that contributed to the 
bargaining strength with the service providers? 
4. The introduction of management contract of PPP has been practiced over time how do you 
assess the management contract of PPP as one that created equal opportunity for the public 
sector to get a better deal.  
5. Any other relevant information you want to add or comments you want to make. 
 
Thank you for time and co-operation. 













Appendix 2: Coding of the Variables 
Code  Particulars  of Attribute Variable  
utilP Partners perception of the transaction to its operational needs 
Partners perception of the transaction to its strategic /commercial 
objectives 
Utility 
ScaP Availability of alternatives Scarcity 
TimeP Time essence and sensibility Scarcity  
infoP Accessibility of  key information 
Open door policy and easy access to records 
Frequency of reporting service providers performance 
Information 
Rescap P Partners experience, skills and capabilities in contract negotiation  
BalAssets Investments in fixed assets and non-physical assets. 
Proportion of risk transferred from the public sector to the service 
providers 
Risk sharing/allocation 
Conflex Flexibility in response to future events as they relate to the contract 
management 
Equal opportunity for contract adaptation and negotiation for 
genuine post-contractual negotiations 
 
Balance 
ConItive Equal  incentive and risk  
ServPerf   
PostCon Bal Balance of contract in risk and incentives  
 
 
Key:  utilP: Utilities of both contracting party and service providers 
ScaP: Scarcity  
TimeP. Time as it relates to concluding the contract 
InforP: Information  
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Rescap P: Resource and capabilities 
BalAssets: Proportion or risk transferred from the government to private service providers 
Conflex: contract flexibility and re-negotiation 
ConItive: Incentive contracting 




Appendix 3: Indications and Measurement for public sector  
Code  Indicator  PostConBal ServPerf: 
UtilP Public sector operational and strategic importance  +  
ScaP Suppliers scarcity  +  
TimeP Time sensitive   +  
InfoP Transparency and information sharing   +  
Rescap P Public sector resources and capabilities deplored 
Experience, skills and education 
 +  
BalAssets Public sector bearing all the risk in specific assets  +  
Conflex Contract rigidity   +  
ConItive Contract with incentive mechanism  -  
ServPerf Meeting  government‘s minimum expectation of 
performance 
 -  
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